Hamas in its present state is like a heavy gambler. It is drowning in debt, has just lost its last shekel, and has no recourse but to bet the house. Its leaders, therefore, are demanding the maximum -- beginning with a deep water sea port and international airport, while footnoting each demand with the threat of initiating a long war of attrition for which Israel's southern residents will pay the price, along with residents of Gaza, of course -- the ones living above ground instead of in underground bunkers like the Hamas leaders. Hamas' problem, however, does not lie only in the difficulty of getting Israel to meet its demands. Its problem lies in the fact that it must conduct several negotiations simultaneously. It is sitting at one negotiation table with athe Egyptians, which makes no effort to conceal its disdain for Hamas. As far as the Egyptians are concerned, Hamas can continue to stew in its own juices. At another table it is negotiating with the Palestinian Authority, whose representatives have joined the Palestinian delegation currently in Cairo and are working hard to hamper Hamas to ensure that any credit for a future deal goes to PA President Mahmoud Abbas instead of Khaled Mashaal. Another negotiation is taking place within Hamas, which resembles a multiheaded Hydra: One head, Mashaal, wants to ensure his leadership status, even from a safe exile in distant Qatar; another head is that of Hamas' leaders in the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the head of Hamas' military wing, Mohammed Deif, holds both in contempt. And we still have not mentioned the group's patrons in Iran, Turkey and Qatar, whose help Hamas will need once the talks end; and of course the other armed Palestinian factions, particularly Islamic Jihad. This reality complicates and hinders Hamas in its attempt to reach a deal with Israel, which is a primary interest for the group whose situation on the ground and within its military wing is apparently worse than what its leaders admit. The result has been a string of strange moves, whereby its representatives have made conciliatory and optimistic declarations followed by threats of war -- one step forward, two steps to the side and one step back. Still, an acceptable arrangement that will end this round of fighting is attainable. The Israeli government must firmly adhere to its interests and not become flustered by internal criticism or by Hamas' games. This is the only way to give Israel's southern residents the quiet they deserve.
