It was hard to miss the satisfaction felt in Israel on Tuesday over the results of Operation Protective Edge. From the top of the political echelon to the last soldier on the ground, the message was clear -- we have won.
Reality, of course, is more complex. It will take time before the full ramifications of the Gaza campaign become clear, and especially before we know if the main objective -- re-establishing significant deterrence against the Gaza-based terror groups, in a way that would ensure peace and quiet in southern Israel -- has been achieved.
Still, even now, a few initial lessons can be noted:
The Israel Defense Forces was unable to shape the nature of the campaign via aerial strikes, and had to reluctantly engage in a ground operation, which was revised soon after it was launched, going from undermining Hamas infrastructure and eliminating rocket launchers, to a counter-tunnel operation.
The military met its goal successfully and neutralized 32 terror tunnels, despite the heavy price of 64 casualties.
The ground operation was able to restore the sense of capability that seemed to have been undermined in the military -- especially among the ground forces -- following the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Operation Protective Edge saw tenacious fighting by the troops, who did not hesitate to place themselves in harm's way and accomplished their missions despite the high number of casualties among their commanders. This was the result of outstanding collaboration between the Armored Corps, the Israeli Air Force and the Engineering Corps, the efficient use of the IDF's technological advantage and the influx of intelligence provided to the troops.
Unfortunately, the IDF paid a hefty price for operational failures, such as the armored personal carrier incident in which seven soldiers were killed, and the casualties suffered from mortar shells and tunnel attacks.
The counter-tunnel mission itself took much longer than expected, revealing significant shortcomings in the troops' readiness for fighting underground.
The military will also have to draw the necessary conclusions from its inability to target top Hamas operatives, and the fact that in some cases, the intelligence regarding Hamas' intentions proved false.
There is no doubt that Hamas sought to replicate Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah's tactics, thinking that the heavy rocket fire on Israel would result in public pressure on the government to end the operation.
The Israeli public, however, did just the opposite. The fact that 5 million Israelis found themselves under fire turned the homefront into the actual front, and translated into massive public support for the Gaza campaign. The public mourned the casualties but understood that this was the price we had to pay, and the entire country embraced the soldiers and the residents of the south.
The Iron Dome missile defense system must be credited for much of the public atmosphere. Iron Dome's phenomenal success was a game changer, since if not for its 90 percent interception rate -- and if the number of civilian casualties had been much higher than three -- it is likely the homefront would have been singing a different tune.
This must also serve as a lesson ahead of any future conflict, especially considering Hezbollah has over 100,000 rockets and missiles, which will turn the homefront into the battleground as well.
The government tried to avoid launching an aerial campaign and was reluctant to launch the ground campaign that followed. The multiple cabinet meetings delved into the smallest of details, and were conducted while maintaining true and open dialogue with the military.
Nevertheless, the animosity within the cabinet, especially between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and Finance Minister Yair Lapid on one side, and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Economy and Trade Minister Naftali Bennett on the other side, was palpable.
The end of the Gaza campaign is bound to bring this simmering conflict to a boil. Netanyahu will argue that he avoided embarking on a dangerous adventure, while Lieberman and Bennett will undoubtedly argue that Israel has missed a chance to topple Hamas' regime and shape a new reality in Gaza.
The challenges ahead
Objectively, the government will have to honestly ask itself how much it really knew about Hamas' plans to engage in fighting at this particular time, and whether Israel was truly prepared for it.
The government will also have to ask itself why the defense budget was brutally slashed; why ties with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas were all but severed; what it really knew about Hamas' tunnel infrastructure and why it refrained from ordering the IDF to eliminate the tunnels immediately -- but mostly the government will have to decide on a plan to rehabilitate the strategic ties with the United States, which have been seriously compromised during Operation Protective Edge.
As for Hamas, its rockets failed to exact a heavy price from the Israeli homefront, and the tunnel infrastructure it labored on for years was destroyed without yielding the achievements Hamas had hoped for.
Other strategic assets, such as Hamas' drones and commando and paragliding units, were also destroyed without accomplishing anything noteworthy.
Hamas did, however, succeed in placing most of Israel under the threat of rocket fire, and even managed to temporarily disrupt Ben-Gurion International Airport's operations. It has also managed to keep its top officials out of harm's way, and maintain its chain of command throughout the month-long fighting.
Hamas entered the conflict in distress, brought about by the prolonged blockade of the Gaza Strip and its inability to pay its employees' wages. Coming out of the conflict, Hamas has failed to replace Egypt with Qatar and Turkey as mediators, it has failed to garner any solid assurances for the future, and, most notably, its actions have left Gaza in ruins and its leaders will now have to answer to hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Israel launched Operation Protective Edge with extensive international legitimacy, as the West has sobered up to the fact that the terror emanating from Gaza is directly linked to the horrors taking place in Syria and the Islamic State group's atrocities in Iraq.
Israel's consistent consent to any cease-fire and humanitarian lull offer -- which were all violated by Hamas -- also afforded the IDF the leeway necessary to continue with the operation, which was gradually scaled back as the devastation in Gaza, and with it the number of Palestinian casualties, grew.
The number of casualties, however, caused international public opinion to turn against Israel. Global anti-Semitism spiked, as did the demand to act against the "massacre in Gaza." The military has made sure to have legal backing for each stage of the operation, but Israel still has to fend off the inquiry ordered by the United Nations Human Rights Council.
What could assist Israel in that respect is providing sustainable aid to Gaza's rehabilitation efforts, as well as conducting a truly impartial review of the events.
Someone has already, and seriously, suggested naming Richard Goldstone to head the investigation, as a ruling by him that Israel has followed international law and spared no effort to minimize civilian casualties, would go a long way in thwarting the Palestinian Authority's declared intention to pursue legal action against Israel with the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו