Hamas seeks a last-minute achievement

In recent days, the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip has drawn on concepts from other fronts and other times. The ideas of a "security zone" and a "war of attrition" are just two examples of known paradigms, which do not necessarily match the reality on the ground, that some are trying to apply to Gaza.

A security zone will not be established in Gaza, and certainly not in the form of the security zone Israel maintained in southern Lebanon for two decades. The IDF will soon finish neutralizing the tunnel threat and it will then redeploy to forward defensive lines -- an appropriate definition for which would be temporary "security strips." The IDF expects to hold these lines for a few days, before -- barring any surprises -- withdrawing the troops to Israeli territory by this weekend.

As for the term "war of attrition," which has recently returned to the Israeli lexicon, the situation in Gaza does not resemble what took place in the Sinai Peninsula in 1969 to 1970. Cynics will say that residents of southern Israel have been dealing with a type of war of attrition for the past 14 years. Israel now does not intend to accept a situation in which terrorist groups continue to fire rockets and mortars after IDF troops pull out of Gaza. Such a scenario -- in which quiet would not be returned to southern Israel -- would be a resounding failure for Israel and require the IDF to turn around, bring in reinforcements and re-engage in fighting in Gaza.

The IDF has already prepared operative plans for such a possibility, and it is not rushing to demobilize reservists or send regular troops back to their bases, so as to keep the option to act available.

Israel's political echelon has not discussed it yet, but the option of expanding the operation -- to deter Hamas from further rocket fire and pressure it into a cease-fire -- remains in the air. Israel clearly prefers a formal cease-fire arrangement over deterrence without an agreement. The reason for this is that a formal arrangement would give all parties rights and obligations. Without such a deal, the IDF would have to implement deterrence by hunting down every rogue terrorist cell on the ground in Gaza.

Hamas is also likely interested in a formal arrangement that would allow it to boast of achievements (however limited they may be) to justify the war it inflicted on Gaza. After weeding out the garbage from Hamas' list of demands, two main ones remain -- the payment of salaries to civil servants in Gaza and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. It is expected Israel will partially accept some of Hamas' demands, so as to alleviate the suffering of Gazan civilians and blunt international criticism of the destruction the war has wrought in Gaza. But Israel will demand the establishment of a supervisory mechanism that would do one of two things: either demilitarize Gaza and disarm Hamas, Israel's preferred option, or, more realistically, prevent Hamas from re-arming.

Meanwhile, cease-fire talks are being held in Cairo that involve only one side -- the Palestinians. Israel is watching from afar and Egypt is continuing to play a tough poker game, refusing to back down from its original demand -- a cease-fire before discussions can begin on other issues. In an attempt to break out of this and mitigate the surprise of Israel's decision to unilaterally withdraw its troops from Gaza, Hamas might try to seek an operational achievement. The IDF is primarily concerned about Hamas carrying out an attack through an undiscovered tunnel. Such an attack would have a twofold goal: to exact an immediate price from Israel and strike fear into the hearts of residents of southern Israel, which would make Israelis doubt the success of Operation Protective Edge as a whole.

טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו