Between Lebanon 2006 and Gaza 2014

Eight years have passed since the Second Lebanon War, eight years of quiet on the northern border with Lebanon, irrefutably a result of the deterrence accomplished by Israel during its war with Hezbollah.

And indeed, despite the Israeli leadership's problematic political and military behavior during the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah reached the conclusion that it would be wise to avoid goading an Israeli response along the northern border, as was his custom during the run-up to the war, because Israel would respond by inflicting serious damage to the organization and its supporters, the likes of which have not been seen since the war.

Many Israelis have sought to recreate the achievements of Lebanon around the Gaza Strip. They hope it will be possible to execute a similar long-term model of cease-fire and understandings, producing the same abiding peace that the northern border between Israel and Hezbollah has experienced for the past eight years.

But it turns out that Gaza is not quite Lebanon and Hamas is not really Hezbollah. This is why it is so difficult to score a cease-fire that either puts an end to the escalation we've seen unfold or allows us to emulate the Lebanon model in Gaza.

First, Hezbollah is, after everything is said and done, a Lebanese organization, whose salient interests -- maintaining and bolstering its position among the Lebanese Shiite population -- lie in Lebanon. But while the organization invests great efforts in maintaining the resistance-to-Israel image -- its Iranian patrons demand Hezbollah play the role of Tehran's vanguard against Israel -- the organization's interests are buried within the domestic Lebanese context, as well as the Syrian conflict.

In comparison, Hamas is truly a Palestinian movement whose interests rest in the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The movement steadily produces points of contention and confrontation with Israel, evinced by the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers last month near Hebron. Hamas, therefore, can neither sever itself from Israel nor the conflict with Israel, as Hezbollah allows itself to do from time to time. And even if the Hamas leadership actually wants quiet on occasion, the events on the ground that transpire force its hand, compelling a fierce escalation.

Second, Hamas is much weaker than Hezbollah. Its regional, inter-Arab and Palestinian (among the Palestinian populace) standings are nowhere near those of Nasrallah during the Second Lebanon War. This goes without mentioning the strife between Hamas' military and political leadership, or the domestic Gazan leadership and the one headed by Khaled Mashaal in Qatar.

In addition, the group cannot claim to control the more radical Gazan Palestinian factions, such as Islamic Jihad, which have their own agendas. Its diplomatic and political impotence, despite how well its Gazan fighters survive, hinders the Hamas leadership's ability to make difficult and painful decisions, something Nasrallah was not intimidated by at the time.

What this boils down to is that Hamas has a lot less to lose than Hezbollah did. Gaza is destroyed anyway and the reality after the cease-fire -- back to being sandwiched by the stifling blockade between Israel and Egypt -- does not exactly radiate or attract Hamas leaders. It's also worth mentioning that, for obvious reasons, Israel has avoided damaging Gaza's civil infrastructure, thus sending the message to Hamas -- however implicitly -- that it has no interest in toppling its regime for fear of the alternative: chaos and a free rein for even more radical groups. Therefore (and somewhat paradoxically) Israel has supplied electricity to the very workshops where Hamas operatives manufacture their missiles, and has allowed food imports to the Gaza Strip that sustain Hamas agents as they fire rockets at Israel.

For all these reasons, it will be difficult to achieve the same kind of deterrence to Hamas that Israel accomplished with Hezbollah. Hamas follows in Hezbollah's footsteps, imitates its combat tactics and receives weapons and missiles from the organization, but it is doubtful Hamas will be willing to (or even can) pursue an agreement that sets as a condition long-lasting peace on the Gazan front.

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