Strike Hamas leaders

Confounding the predictions of experts, even this one, Hamas pushed for the current round of escalation, and it looks eager to continue fanning the flames, as if it does not have anything to lose by continuing the clash with Israel. The widespread assumption in Israel before Operation Protective Edge was that after it was over, Hamas would seek a cool-down period to get its bearings and ensure its rule over Gaza, and that in light of its weakened position in the Arab world and the crisis in its relations with Egypt under Abed Fattah el-Sissi its leaders would be more careful about how they handled themselves with Israel.

But Hamas is proving that its leaders think they do not have much to lose. More than that -- an experienced poker player raises expecting the other side to fold for fear of losing.

Hamas believes that Israel does not really want to re-take control of Gaza and will therefore avoid for as long as possible a significant ground operation that would demand its forces' presence in areas with a dense Palestinian population (as opposed to operating in unpopulated areas, as in Operation Cast Lead of 2009). Hamas does not have anything to lose, since the Gaza Strip is in a shambles anyway and its population perpetually exists on the edge of want and distress.

Hamas' strategy in its current struggle, as in its previous entanglements with Israel, is clear and scarily simple. Its goal is to survive the Israeli operation, take the hits and raise its head when the operation is over and the dust has settled. For Hamas, survival means victory -- certainly a psychological victory. When the current confrontation is all over, who will remember how many tunnels or rocket launching positions Israel bombed? Everyone will remember, and rightly so, the rocket barrages fired at Tel Aviv, which are much more impressive than the fight for minds and memory.

A reality like this presents a real challenge for a country like Israel, given the difficulty of drumming up long-term international support as well as the problem of holding on to the support of public opinion at home in a war of attrition. So Israel is doing everything it can to avoid a ground operation in Gaza. But from the moment it launched Operation Protective Edge, it had to win a clear victory, a victory that would be understood in the streets of Tel Aviv and Gaza and not just by experts. The term "victory" isn't even appropriate, since in a war like this with an enemy like Hamas there is no knockout victory, only an accomplishment that will prevent the next conflict.

Such an accomplishment must include three things: First, a true attack on the Hamas leadership, which shows no sensitivity toward its fighters or the population under its rule, maybe because it knows Israel's limitations in everything pertaining to a ground operation in densely populated territory. But its leaders aren't suicidal -- they send their people to commit suicide, but take good care of themselves.

Second, the freedom to take ongoing action against Hamas and its fighters and not be pulled into temporary cease-fires during which Hamas just re-arms.

Third, the closure of the rocket smuggling conduit on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. If Israel doesn't retake control of this section of border -- wider and more heavily policed than the Philadelphi Corridor was -- it's only a question of time before Hamas re-arms and the next round begins.

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