Proceed with caution
Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon was IDF chief of staff in March 2002 when Operation Defensive Shield was launched. That operation lasted around 40 days. Ya'alon can do a comparison and see that the events of 2014 are not similar to what occurred 12 years ago. Operation Brother's Keeper is a simpler mission, thanks to what has taken place since Operation Defensive Shield.
In 2002, Israeli troops had to shoot their way in, and blood was often spilled. The Israel Defense Forces also had to cope with public relations damage caused by lies wrapped in the guise of truth, in the style of the film "Jenin, Jenin." But none of this is happening this time.
Since Operation Defensive Shield, the IDF has maintained a presence in the areas of Judea and Samaria where the terrorists organize. This presence has hampered the strengthening of Hamas, even though it has not completely prevented it. Thus, counterterror operations in 2014 are easier than they used to be. The scope of Hamas' infrastructure, which is the target of the current IDF operation, is more limited than it once was. The claim that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took advantage of the kidnapping of three Israeli teens last week to launch Operation Brother's Keeper is correct, but irrelevant. By the same logic, Israel took advantage of Palestinian suicide bombings, which peaked with the Seder night massacre in Netanya in March 2002, to Operation Defensive Shield. Terrorist events obviously play a role in determining the timing of Israeli responses. It could not be otherwise.
Harming Hamas is necessary for Israel. It also serves Egypt's interests and plays into the hands of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Although I have reservations about placing responsibility for the kidnapping of the teens on Abbas, Netanyahu's criticism undoubtedly boosted support for Abbas among the Palestinian public. More than anything, Abbas does not want to be perceived as a collaborator with Israel, at least verbally. As of now, Abbas has maintained the security cooperation with Israel that he openly vowed to preserve. It is likely there are opponents to this inside the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership.
But the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet must remember past experience, which has taught that Israel's line of credit for operations such as Brother's Keeper is short and the interest rate is high. The familiar issues are as follows:
1. The longer the operation continues, the higher the chance there is for painful mishaps or unexpected conflagrations. Most turns for the worse in operations like this start with errors, which sometimes cost lives. Also, the restraint being demonstrated by Hamas and Fatah will not last indefinitely.
2. The understanding being shown by countries around the world toward the IDF's current operation will end sooner rather than later. The West initially understood Israel's responses at the start of the Second Lebanon War and recent Gaza operations, but that understanding had a very short expiration date.
3. Israel's national consensus is also fragile. Israelis have seen operations like this since Peace for Galilee in 1982. The reservations of Israelis will not reach the level of Balad MK Hanin Zoabi's, whose comments about the kidnapping were not only outrageous but also imperiled the efforts of young Arabs who support the integration of Arab citizens into Israeli society. Yet the general consensus of support within Israel for the operation will crack as soon as the first hitch, whether it be military, technical or political, occurs.
Transferring 200 Hamas members from Judea and Samaria to Gaza will cause friction with the international community. The deportees who did not return to terrorist activities after their release from prison (and it is likely there are some like this) will turn to Israel's High Court of Justice and the International Court of Justice in The Hague. If Israel wants to deport them, it should do so patiently, without drawing attention, one by one, or pair by pair.
Ya'alon and IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz have likely instructed soldiers to act with great caution. The most urgent task is finding the teens and the Hamas cell that kidnapped them. Any other moves should be made slowly, to reduce the risk to soldiers carrying them out. This approach will also work even if the government lowers the bar in terms of the targets it has set for itself in the operation against Hamas.
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