Intelligence lapses, police malpractice | היום

Intelligence lapses, police malpractice

On Saturday, more than 48 hours after the three yeshiva students were kidnapped in the Gush Etzion area, the following picture transpired: The abduction was premeditated, it was carried out by a terrorist organization and it involved rigorous planning; the abductees were held in Judea and Samaria, with a high probability that they were in the Hebron area; there was no clear-cut information that would shed light on their well-being, and there was a real chance that they were dead.

These assumptions are based on the meticulous intelligence-gathering operation carried out over the weekend, orchestrated by the Shin Bet security agency. Security forces arrested and interrogated dozens of Palestinians who were considered terrorist activists or have ties to clans that have worked with terrorist cells in the past; human intelligence assets were tapped, and technological means were employed; forensic teams gathered evidence on the scene and examined the wreckage of the torched sedan that was discovered in the area, which may have been used during the kidnapping.

The IDF sent large reinforcements to the area to facilitate the arrests and to apply pressure on the Palestinians, with the hope that this would compromise the identity of the kidnappers and provide details on the captives' whereabouts.

The fear that they may have been killed stemmed from the intelligence and the fact that no organization had set any conditions for their release. The very fact this kidnapping took place in Judea and Samaria added more fear. Because of Israel's strong intelligence capabilities there -- coupled by its relatively unrestricted operations -- the conventional wisdom is that terrorists in that area would prefer to kill hostages shortly after they were seized rather than hold them hostage and negotiate their release. The overwhelming number of abduction cases in that area followed that pattern.

That is why there was initial concern that the terrorists would try to transfer the abductees to the Gaza Strip or Jordan. Defense officials said such a scenario was "extremely unlikely," in part because that would have required meticulous planning and sophisticated coordination on the other side, in real time. This would have exposed the kidnappers' activity and created an intelligence signature that would have compromised their operation.

Israel's intelligence agencies have clearly failed; they did not uncover or foil the plot before it was set in motion. They are likely to face scrutiny. Another issue that would have to be probed is the precious time that was lost between the moment the teenagers were kidnapped until Israeli law-enforcement and security forces started taking meaningful action to track their whereabouts. The Israel Police failed to disseminate the information to the Shin Bet in a timely manner -- a major lapse on its part.

The intelligence shortcomings suggest the kidnapping operation involved only a small number of perpetrators and a very sophisticated compartmentalization method. This was designed to minimize the risk of exposure.

This did not prevent the terrorists from engaging in extensive preparations and intelligence gathering, and they must have had a strong familiarity with the terrain. The kidnappers most likely lured the teenagers after successfully dissimulating their car as a "safe" Israeli-owned vehicle driven by harmless Jews.

It is safe to assume that more than one person took part in this plot, for three reasons: The first -- overpowering three teenagers is no small feat; the second -- they apparently used a decoy to deceive them; the third -- they successfully disappeared.

Even though Israel has stated that this was the work of terrorist organization, it has not specified which one. Despite the initial reports, no Salafi group had actually claimed responsibility for the kidnapping operation. This leaves us with two immediate suspects: Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Both organizations have operatives in Judea and Samaria. Hamas has a much greater presence in Hebron and it has a history of kidnapping: Sharon Edri was abducted and killed by a cell from Zurif in the area.

Both organizations are highly motivated in their desire to carry out kidnapping attacks as part of their efforts to release terrorists from Israeli prisons. This motivation was reinforced by the fact that 170 Palestinians prisoners have gone on a hunger strike. Their actions were also designed to embarrass the government, less than a month after it approved draft legislation that would, in some cases, prohibit the president from pardoning terrorists who have been convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.

In past kidnapping cases, the captives were murdered and buried without the organizations making demands, with their remains discovered only years later. (This was what they did to Edri, Ilan Saadon and Avi Sasportas.)

Over the weekend an accusatory Israel said it held the Palestinian Authority responsible for terrorism that originated in Palestinian-held territory. PA President Mahmoud Abbas was not involved in the abduction. The kidnapping was probably anything but a welcome development to him, despite the celebrations in the Palestinian street.

Abbas obviously fears that Hamas, his partner to the unity government, was involved in the kidnapping, which could result in the PA being subject to even more pressure. This may also erode some of the support it has marshaled on the world stage over the past several weeks.

The world's indifference -- because of the FIFA World Cup and the crisis in Iraq -- has not been lost on Israeli officials, who have publicly stated their displeasure. The talking points being disseminated to Israeli missions abroad are to emphasize the PA-based terrorists who target civilians -- innocent teenagers in this case. But the effect this would have on Israel's image remains to be seen. The West, which has barely lifted a finger when 300 girls were abducted in Nigeria, can hardly be expected to emote when it comes to the disappearance of three yeshiva students.

Despite this event, Israel has not cut off coordination with the PA on security matters because it wants to help it react to possible disturbances. Although the Palestinian officials have expressed their desire to help Israel find the boys, Israel has gone solo on that front. Efforts are currently focused on intelligence gathering that could presumably lead to the abductors and their abductees, who, if possible, would be saved.

The Israel Police's SWAT teams and the IDF's elite Sayeret Matkal commando unit have been on their highest alert since Friday. The Shin Bet has been running the show, overseeing the entire operation. The number of Shin Bet operators and analysts who are regularly embedded with army units has been bolstered.

Some officials have said there is a "fair" chance for a successful resolution., But they have also expressed concern that copycat terrorists would seize the momentum and try to carry out more kidnappings.

As a result, authorities have once again issued a prohibition on hitching rides with strangers, especially in Judea and Samaria. But the officials expressed frustration over the fact that there was practically "zero chance of enforcing this."

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