Reports are one thing, reality is another
For months, a report compiled by the Shamgar committee, which in 2008 was tasked by then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak with outlining the process according to which Israel may negotiate the return of abducted individuals, gathered dust in one of Barak's desk drawers.
The findings were never really discussed, so as not to influence the negotiations meant to secure the safe return of Hamas captive Gilad Schalit; but even in 2011, when Schalit was finally back on Israeli soil, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu still refrained from discussing the Shamgar committee's report.
It seemed that there was a need to create some distance from the traumatic event before calmly discussing the issue.
Until Schalit's release, Israel's ability to deal with the issue of abductees was steadily deteriorating, and the fostered concept of mutual guarantee seemed to trump any political argument to the contrary.
There was the 1985 Jibril deal (when Israel released 1,150 security prisoners in exchange for three Israeli prisoners captured during the 1982 Lebanon War), the disgraceful exchange made for Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2004 (when Israel released 435 security prisoners in exchange for the Hezbollah-held businessman and the remains of three soldiers killed in 2000), and the embarrassing 2008 prisoner exchange deal that secured the return of the remains of IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev (when Israel released Lebanese terrorist Samir Kuntar, four other Hezbollah terrorists and the remains of 199 security prisoners).
Schalit was welcomed by the Israeli public with open and loving arms, but the deal only added to the anguish felt by many. The Shamgar committee's recommendations were meant to chart a steady course of action for any future abduction.
Among the recommendations, the committee said any future prisoner exchange deal should have an actual ratio of 1:1 (1:3 was also suggested), and stipulated that, according to the circumstances, bodies would be exchanged for bodies -- not living terrorists.
It was also suggested that a secret Knesset subcommittee would be required to secure a two-thirds majority vote to allow the government to engage in negotiations with terrorists. To further free the prime minister from solely bearing the brunt of the situation, the committee also suggested having the defense minister head any such negotiations, while giving the prime minister the final say on the matter.
On Thursday, some two and a half years after Schalit's release -- and coincidently, while the United States was furious over U.S. President Barack Obama's capitulation in the case of American deserter Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl -- the cabinet held its first meeting on the Shamgar report.
Another meeting has already been scheduled and one can only hope that these meetings will not resemble a long line of railroad cars devoid an engine or final station. The Shamgar report is a worthy -- albeit moderate -- one, and in the words of an individual who has been dealing with this issue for a long time, it places the "blocks on the road."
Another individual privy to the report said that should the recommendations be adopted by the government, they would be "placing soft shackles on the government's hands, and that is what they were meant to do."
The first cabinet meeting on the report garnered little attention, and as of 9:45 p.m. Thursday I found no media report, much less headlines, referring to it. The very thing that once sparked both anger and the imagination had gone by practically unnoticed.
The bigger, tougher, more burdensome problem is that even if the government accepts the Shamgar recommendations as its future guidelines -- not as a law -- who known when, or how, or under which political makeup it would be required to follow them.
Given the fate of the Brodet committee's recommendation on defense spending, which were tossed aside, one has to wonder who will be the future prime minister who would be able to withstand public pressure to give in to terrorists.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו