Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's wretched presence in the presidential palace of Damascus may, contrary to Western assumptions, do more good than harm. His murderous, terrorist, pro-Tehran regime is also non-ideological and relatively secular; it staves off anarchy, Islamist rule, genocide, and rogue control of Syria's chemical weapons. As Syria's civil war intensifies, Western states are increasingly helping the rebels overthrow Assad and his henchmen. In doing so, the West hopes to save lives and facilitate a democratic transition. Many Western voices call for more than the non-lethal aid now being offered, wanting to arm the rebels, set up safe zones, and even join their war against the government. Helping the rebels, however, neglects a fundamental question: Does intervention in Syria against Assad promote our own interests? This obvious question is missed because many Westerners feel so confident about their own well-being that they forget their security and instead focus on the concerns of those they perceive as weak and exploited, whether human (indigenous peoples, the poor) or animal (whales, snail-darter fish). Westerners have developed sophisticated mechanisms to act on these concerns (protection groups, animal rights groups, and so on). For those of us who are not so confident, however, fending off threats to our security and our civilization remains a top priority. In this light, helping the rebels entails multiple drawbacks for the West. First, the rebels are Islamist and intend to build an ideological government even more hostile to the West than Assad's. Their breaking relations with Tehran will be balanced by their helping to advance the barbaric force of Islam's Sunni forces. Second, the argument that Western intervention would reduce the Islamist thrust of the rebellion by replacing materiel pouring in from Sunni countries is risible. Syria's rebels do not need Western help to bring down the regime (and wouldn't be grateful for it if they did receive it, if Iraq is any indication). The Syrian conflict, at its foundation, pits the country's disenfranchised 70 percent majority of Sunni Arabs against Assad's privileged 12 percent minority of Alawites. Add the assistance of foreign Islamist volunteers as well as several Sunni states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) and the Assad regime is doomed. Assad cannot subdue the ever-widening rebellion against his rule; indeed, the more his troops butcher and maim, the more defections occur and his support shrinks to its Alawite core. Third, hastening the collapse of the Assad regime will not save lives. It will mark not the end of the conflict, but merely the close of its opening chapter with yet worse violence likely to follow. As Sunnis finally avenge their nearly 50 years of subjugation by Alawites, a victory by the rebels portends potential genocide. The Syrian conflict will likely become so extreme and violent that Westerners will be glad to have kept a distance from both sides. Fourth, the continuing Syrian conflict offers benefits to the West. Several Sunni governments have noted the Obama administration's reticence to act and have taken responsibility to wrest Syria from the Iranian orbit; this comes as a welcome development after decades of their accommodating the Shiite Islamic republic. Also, as Sunni Islamists fight Shiite Islamists, both sides are weakened and their lethal rivalry lessens their capabilities to trouble the outside world. By inspiring restive minorities (Sunnis in Iran, Kurds and Shiites in Turkey), continued fighting in Syria could also weaken Islamist governments. When the regime falls, the Alawite leadership, with or without Assad, might retreat to ancestral redoubts in Latakia province in northwestern Syria; the Iranians could well supply it by sea with money and arms, permitting it to hold out for years, further exacerbating the confrontation between Sunni and Shiite Islamists, further distracting them from assaulting others. The one exception to the policy of non-intervention would be to secure Syria's vast chemical weapons arsenal, both to prevent terrorist groups from seizing it and Assad from deploying it in a final apocalyptic scenario as he goes down, although this difficult mission could require as many as 60,000 foreign ground troops deployed to Syria. Nothing in the constitutions of Western states requires them to get involved in every foreign conflict. Sitting this one out will prove to be a smart move. In addition to the moral benefit of not being accountable for horrors yet to come, staying away permits the West eventually to help its only true friends in Syria, the country's liberals. Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. © 2012 All rights reserved by Daniel Pipes.
