The Sinai dilemma

Radical Islamist organizations have become a threat to Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai Peninsula in recent years, and a threat to Israel at its southern border. This phenomenon posits both sovereign states together in a united front, despite the growing distance between them since the start of the Egyptian revolution. The level of cooperation between the two countries over this matter was far greater than either side cares to admit, which is good news. But the current situation compels us all to rethink the demilitarization of Sinai as a solution.

During the 1978-1979 negotiations between Israel and Egypt, it was clear that the Egyptian army was a potential threat to Israel. The main fear was that Egyptian tanks would attempt to reach the center of Israel, which is why one of the fundamental principals Israel had insisted on, even at the cost of a partial demilitarization of its own territory east of the internationally recognized border, was the demilitarization of the Sinai peninsula. Israel agreed to evacuate newly erected air force bases and to relinquish the cities and communities it had built there to ensure that Sinai – an area three times the size of Israel – would remain a demilitarized zone. Thus, the decision makers thought, it would take Egyptian tanks much longer to reach Israel, affording Israel time to call up reserves units and to prepare.

It was agreed upon by both sides that a group of multinational observers would be stationed in Sinai to supervise, but not enforce, and ever since they have remained in Sinai without much to do.

Over the years, it gradually became clear that it wasn't the Egyptian army that posed a security threat to Israel. In fact, the Egyptian army implemented the principles of the peace treaty more than any other Egyptian body. The main security threat was posed by the nomads living in the Sinai Peninsula – nomads who had apparently been neglected by Egypt's governments and had turned, at least partially, to drug dealing, abductions, trafficking of African refugees and radical Islamist groups that believe that all the other groups are made up of infidels.

The population in Sinai has become a real cause for concern, one neither country foresaw when it signed the peace agreement. The demilitarization of the area has shifted from being a solution to being the root of the problem. It is now in Israel's best interest to allow the Egyptian army to gain control over the peninsula and stop the Bedouin from doing as they please, but the peace treaty between the countries is currently preventing this from happening. In hindsight, a more flexible mechanism should have been introduced, which would have allowed Egypt to operate in Sinai and the Philadelphi Route (a narrow strip of land situated along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt), in full agreement with Israel.

We encountered a similar phenomenon when the Israeli government wanted armed Palestinian police officers pass through an area under full Israeli control, which would violate the interim agreement. There is something to be learned from this: what may seem like a great achievement at a certain point could turn into a problem when we ourselves need to bypass it, even though it was we who instituted it in the first place.