The impending deal between Iran and the six world powers carries with it a great deal of risk and opportunity, but mainly raises a lot of questions. It's doubtful that the next few days will help lift the fog of uncertainty surrounding the issue or lower the level of anxiety in Jerusalem. The risks are apparent. Iran wouldn't be getting rid of all the uranium it has enriched, and isn't relinquishing its ability in terms of research, technology or physical capabilities to continue enriching uranium if it so chooses. Indeed, despite demands by Israel and the West, the heavily fortified Fordo complex will remain untouched, and will be able to resume functioning at a moment's notice. Tactically, suspending its nuclear weapons program allows Iran, for the time being, to avert being attacked, and eventually for the economic sanctions imposed against it to be lifted even if that process happens gradually. When the world finally eases up, Iran will find an excuse to return to its nuclear activity all the way to a bomb. The opportunities are also apparent. Iran has blinked for the first time since 2003 when it suspended its weaponization activities (for fear of being next in line after Iraq to be attacked by the United States). Despite its bombastic declarations, it will now cease to enrich uranium and open the Fordo complex and the Parchin military base to outside inspection. Under these restrictions it will be difficult for Iran to return to overt uranium enrichment activities, and if it is caught trying to enrich covertly it will galvanize the world against it all the way to being bombed. Between the potential risks and opportunities lies reality. It is not ideal for Iran to admit it caved in (even if only partially), which is why its senior officials continue to vow to destroy Israel. The world does not trust Tehran, which is why it refuses to lift the most severe sanctions on Iran's oil exports and economy. And Israel continues to see the Iranian glass as half empty, refusing to believe that anything good will come of the diplomatic process. What is clear is that with or without a deal, Iran will continue trying to hoodwink the West: It will try playing between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the world powers, stealing here while cheating there. It will continue to slowly, slyly progress toward a nuclear weapon. In contrast, the West will continue to pray, and maybe even act, for the socio-economic hardships challenging the ayatollahs' regime to create an alternative that can replace it. All of this depends, of course, on the diplomatic talks resulting in an agreement. If that doesn't happen we will continue to hear Israeli threats about an attack, and demands that the world back up its declarations with actions. However, if as expected an agreement is reached, even belatedly, it means that at least for the time being Israel will have a hard time launching an attack even if to preserve what has been achieved and avoid open confrontation with the entire world. In such a reality, the role of Israel's intelligence gathering services will grow increasingly important: The Mossad and Military Intelligence Directorate will be required to know what is happening. And they will have to sound the alarm if needed perhaps as Israel's only insurance policy against the half-baked Baghdad talks.
