On Oct. 22, 1956, at the twilight hour, several vehicles stopped near an isolated villa in a suburb just outside Paris. After entering the compound, the visitors disappeared quickly. Then French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, Defense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, the Chief of General Staff and other high ranking officers got out of some of the vehicles. David Ben-Gurion, wearing a large-brimmed hat, got out of another vehicle. He had declared, before heading to France in a private plane, that he would be attending some maneuvers in the Negev for two or three days. Moshe Dayan got out of another vehicle with his eye patch covered by dark sunglasses. He was accompanied by Defense Ministry Director Shimon Peres. That evening, they would be joined by British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd. And so began the most secretive conference of post-World War II. The gathering was the result of the tireless efforts of Peres. When Peres had appointed director of the defense ministry, Israel was in a difficult situation. Western nations, the exclusive suppliers of arms to the Middle East, were discriminating harshly against Israel. Britain saw Israel as a hostile entity, and the U.S. refused to sell it weapons of any kind. Peres decidedm then, to turn to France. Defense ministry officials scoffed at the idea. Israel did not have good ties with France, which regarded itself as a "Muslim power" due to its dominion over most of North Africa. Israeli leaders, who were familiar with Britain and its leaders, knew very little about France, its language, its culture or its political landscape. They simply ruled out any sort of close ties with France. But Peres thought otherwise. He remembered how France helped Israel during the "Exodus" refugee affair. He knew that many French fighters participated in anti-Nazi underground activities. He also knew that during the flimsy regime of the "Fourth Republic" there was an opportunity to work directly with the many political centers and drum up support for Israel's cause. Peres started visiting France, meeting with hundreds of parliament members, ministers, military officials, journalists, and public intellectuals. Only Dayan supported him. But even Dayan said, "Shimon, I am behind you, but know this - you can't rely on me." The turning point happened when a rebellion erupted in French-ruled Algeria. The French were convinced that the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdal Nasser, was supplying the rebels with arms and cash. According to the formula "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," France thus began to forge ties with Israel. In the meantime, Israel's situation worsened. In September of 1955, the Soviet Union signed an agreement to provide Egypt with a huge amount of weapons, including hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces, more than 100 combat and bomber jet aircrafts, battleships and submarines. Nasser grew confident and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Ben-Gurion wanted to execute a pre-emptive strike to destroy the Egyptian armed forces, but Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett convinced a majority to vote against the move, and it was rejected. In December of 1955, socialist leader Guy Mollet was elected president of France. He viewed Mapai as a sister party, and his foreign minister Christian Pineau who was a prisoner in the Buchenwald concentration camp during Word War II, felt close to the Jewish people. Defense Minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, a friend of Peres, concentrated on the questions of how to achieve victory in Algeria and how to get rid of Nasser. Initially, France sold Mystere fighter planes to Israel. But in June 1956, at the end of discussions with the French chief of general staff, an agreement was signed for the supply of French weapons to Israel. In July of that year, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Britain and France, who both had a significant interest in the canal, began deliberations concerning a joint operation against Nasser. Peres was invited to discuss the matter with the French defense minister, and found him in a room filled with both maps and generals. "If France goes to war against Egypt, will Israel join-" he asked. "Yes, it will," said Peres. But the British were deterred from going to war without a compelling pretext, and they and the French gradually formed the idea that Israel would provide them with that pretext. And so Mollet invited Ben-Gurion to the Sevres convention. During the convention, ideas for a "pretext" for war were discussed. Peres suggested Israeli ships be sent to the Suez Canal to test the waters. The French Air Force commander suggested a provocation: Israel will bomb Beersheba, will blame the Egyptians, and will then declare war. Ben-Gurion, in disgust, summarily rejected the idea. It was finally Dayan who came up with the redeeming formula. He suggested deploying a small Israeli force at the Mitlah crossing near the Suez Canal. Britain and France would consider this a "danger" to the canal and they would send an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel: Distance yourselves by 20 miles each from the canal. For Egypt, this meant a withdrawal of hundreds of miles from the Sinai Peninsula. For Israel, this meant progress in inching closer to the Suez Canal. It was obvious that Egypt would reject the ultimatum and Israel would accept it, and then the French and the British would immediately intervene "to protect the Canal from the warring forces." On Oct. 24, England, France and Israel signed a secret agreement. France committed to protecting the beaches and Israeli airspace against an Egyptian attack. French air squadrons and naval ships were sent to Israel. Ben-Gurion decided on his own, without telling the rest of the government; even when he did let the rest of the government weigh in on Kadesh Operation decisions, he withheld some information about the alliance with France and England. He did not even tell them of his trip to France. At 4 p.m. on Oct. 29, Raphael Eitan (Raphul) and a regiment of paratroopers jumped in and thus opened the Sinai Campaign. The IDF invaded Sinai on three fronts: along the Mediterranean, in central Sinai and along the Red Sea. After a mere seven days of fighting, the Egyptian military was struck down. The victory was definitive. The French and British had failed in their operations, but Israel emerged as the operation's great victor. Thousands of Egyptian soldiers were killed and Israel lost 171 soldiers. Israel was forced by pressure from the U.N. and other world powers, to later withdraw, but "Kadesh" brought Israel peace and quiet for 11 years and also handed it great prestige among young countries in both Africa and Asia. One last thing as well: during the Sevres commission, which was led by Ben-Gurion, Peres addressed French leaders and asked them to provide a deterrent force for Israel. The French agreed, and that is how Dimona was born.
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Operation Kadesh, 55 years later
מערכת ישראל היום
מערכת "ישראל היום“ מפיקה ומעדכנת תכנים חדשותיים, מבזקים ופרשנויות לאורך כל שעות היממה. התוכן נערך בקפדנות, נבדק עובדתית ומוגש לציבור מתוך האמונה שהקוראים ראויים לעיתונות טובה יותר - אמינה, אובייקטיבית ועניינית.
