Major General Gadi Eizenkot is leaving the GOC Northern Command with a sigh of relief. Almost five years have passed since Eizenkot stepped into the "palace" (the second longest term to be held by a northern front commanding officer). He can now sit back and say that under his leadership the Northern Command did its duty well and brought quiet to northern Israel. There are a number of underlying reasons for this quiet: Israeli deterrence in the region, as well as Hezbollah fears of a new onslaught on Lebanon. But there is more to it than that. Since the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Hezbollah has been going through a political transformation; their patrons in Tehran are in a delicate situation due to U.N. nuclear sanctions and the civil uprising in Damascus. All this has led Hezbollah to talk a lot but do little. They did not even respond after the assassination of their military commander, Imad Mughniyeh. They remain silent, for now. Yet this public display of quietude conceals intensive military action. It is impossible to ignore Hezbollah's massive and unprecedented military buildup amounting to around 50,000 missiles and rockets. Their focus is on longer-range missiles, larger weaponry and attaining a high level of precision in an attempt to turn the whole of Israel into a battlefield, Tel Aviv especially. Meanwhile, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is fortifying southern Lebanese villages in order to bog down any future IDF forces on their way north. Nasrallah believes that a large number of Israeli civilian and military casualties will paralyze Israel's leadership, which in turn will shorten the war and bring him satisfactory results. We can deduce from Lebanon's rationale that Israel's conduct during the Second Lebanon War was not satisfactory. This time around, decisions should be made under careful consideration and with a clear understanding of their implications. In terms of combat, there should not be a random collection of battles but rather one focal point with a clear target. In terms of defense, Israel must not neglect its home-front as it did in the past, but rather have an orderly plan to safeguard its population, backed by mature leaders who will tell their citizens the truth. On the diplomatic front, we must build international legitimacy before the first gun is fired, elicit continuing support as the war rages, and come to understandings with our allies that allow for a satisfactory conclusion to the war. These three strategies form the basis of the IDF's operational plans formulated in response to lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War. Eizenkot, who helped develop the plans, will take responsibility for and hone them in his new role as deputy chief of staff. In the meantime, he is leaving the Northern Command with a smile (except over the Nakba day debacle) and a clear understanding that in northern Israel, more than anywhere else, everything is temporary: both IDF generals and the relative quiet.
