Taking a dramatic mountain and making it a molehill, Israel thinned out the flotilla and stopped the aerial invasion. Hindsight is 20-20, and looking back, Israel appears a bit on edge. "There was no hysteria," Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor said on "Meet the Press." All actions were planned. Evidence shows that pro-Palestinian organizers intended to provoke authorities and create an altercation. They briefed their activists: Disrupt proceedings at Ben Gurion Airport, then drive to their grandparents' house within the Green Line, a line that preceded the War of Independence and began during their grandparents' time and ended in the Nakba (what the Palestinians call the "Catastrophe," of Israel's creation in 1948). After this, they are told, visit their friends in Christian-inhabited Bethlehem, though in reality they go to Ramallah, and from there, where to but the Israel Defense Forces' checkpoint at Kalandia north of Jerusalem. Some of the activists, aided by the Israeli extreme left who crossed the border without second thought, achieved limited success by giving false information to the Immigration and Border Authority. They got all the way to the checkpoint and started a protest that nearly became violent, but Israel was able to avoid a larger altercation. Round one may have been a success, but it was also only the beginning; Each side will implement lessons learned. In light of these developments, the nation's attention was diverted exclusively to the Quartet nations. U.S. and European diplomats are conducting talks closely monitored by the Israelis and Palestinians. The dialogue is meant to create a comfortable atmosphere for Israelis and Palestinians that would prevent the parties from avoiding negotiations. The Quartet intends to invite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to an arranged international event, and thus restart negotiations. All this in order to avoid a unilateral Palestinian bid in the U.N. in September. There are disparities between the positions of the U.S. and Europe, but they are secondary to the Israeli and Palestinian reaction. It's difficult for both sides; the decision before Netanyahu and Abbas is whether to sound out a decisive "nay," or, a "yes, but" to avoid being cut off from the two bodies upon which both sides are so reliant. It's a fair assumption that Hamas, who is now Abbas' decision-making partner, as well as the tougher ministers in Israel, will push for "nay." But Israel's 44-year-old diplomatic history tells us that "yes, but" is more effective. Especially when governments around the world suspect Israel of trying to shirk true negotiations. Since backing off from the offer made by former prime minister Ehud Olmert, Abbas has taken a devious stance. He avoids negotiations but also does not have enough public support to bring about a resolution should he wish to. If Israel does choose to agree to the Quartet's proposal, the proverbial ball will be in Abbas' court.
