Two arbitrary numbers hover over the polls at today's elections in Turkey: 330 and 367. Both numbers signify members of parliament. The lower number is what Recep Tayyip Erdoğan needs to get to make changes to the secular constitution, drawn up by Ataturk, and which need to be brought to a national referendum. The higher number will allow Erdogan to forgo a referendum and amend the constitution in parliament. In an effort to reach the higher number, Erdogan has been campaigning all over Turkey. Everyone knows Erdogan will win his third election, even though he is likely to lose many Kurdish votes. This should dampen his victory, and that is a slight relief. According to Prof. Ehud Toledano, Erdogan is a political genius. He has correctly read the mood of Turkish society, and he is not the extremist he is sometimes portrayed outside of Turkey, even though his foreign policy damages his country. His ambitions remain a mystery. It's possible that he's a megalomaniac, whose dream it is to restore the glories of the past. We might even be witnessing the return of the Ottoman Empire. In his country, there is proud talk of "The New Ottomanism" but there are also those who miss the secular nation's founding father Ataturk, whose big achievements following World War 1 have been eroded by Erdogan. Nobody expects Turkey to set off to conquer the Hejaz Railway route all the way from Damascus to Saudi Arabia. It's also not expected that Turkey try bend Syria, Lebanon and Israel to its will or gain sovereignty over them. What is expected is something in between. The more the Arab states fall apart, lose their central governments and devolve into tribal fiefdoms, the more Turkey's opportunities grow to turn Ankara into the region's most important capital, and principal patron. Despite seemingly improving his relations with Iran, Erdogan's Turkey and the Islamic Republic are on a collision course, says Tel-Aviv University's Prof. Itamar Rabinovich. Ankara has not turned Iran into its ally, but rather has stayed in the race for regional hegemony - and that is the source of Ankara's policy of resistance to the nuclear ambitions of Iran's Ayatollahs. Turkey's strategy for regional hegemony led it to attempt to mediate between Israel and Syria, involve itself in the Gaza Strip, and to support last year's bloody flotilla. Now it has come out harshly against Bashar Assad. This is largely to do with internal pressures and Turkish public sentiment on the eve of elections. But let there be no mistake. When the polls close. Erdogan will soften his provocative tone against Iran's loyal client, who, from his capital Damascus, is fighting for his political life. If Assad wins, Erdogan will find a way "to do business" with him. After failing to join the European economic system, Erdogan is clearly interested in turning Turkey into a Middle-Eastern superpower. He is succeeding. He is succeeding, with the aid of his opponents in the West, who helped to erode the special stature of the army in Turkey as enshrined in the constitution; the constitution that Erdogan is working assiduously to wipe out.
