Israelis don't forgive Golda
The sad testimony of Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister during the Yom Kippur War, to the Agranat Commission highlights a tough dilemma that modern leaders face, particularly during wartime. An array of experienced military officials told Meir, based on intelligence sources, that war was not imminent. So what could she do-
One can wonder why Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff David Elazar, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Israel Tal and Mossad head Zvi Zamir did not properly question the assessment provided by the Military Intelligence Directorate, which was led by Eli Zeira. But Meir? She could not go against the uniform opinion of her generals. Even her decision to initiate an early mobilization of reservists, a move opposed by the top IDF brass, was considered irresponsible and panic-induced.
It is particularly interesting that, following the war, Meir did not regret her dramatic decision to refrain from conducting a preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria. She was convinced that she had made the correct choice. While a preemptive strike would have saved the lives of many IDF soldiers, others would have died had the Pentagon not launched an aerial resupply effort. Without these American supplies, the IDF's combat capability would have been degraded.
It is not clear whether Meir made the right decision or not. But what is certain is that while Meir was not sophisticated enough to prevent the war, she did know how to lead the nation once it broke out. For better or worse, she was not one to hastily fold her cards. From her election as prime minister in 1969, she made mistaken and simplistic decisions in the realm of diplomacy and defense, as if everything was black or white. But she never reached the low point that Dayan did when, during the early days of the Yom Kippur, he spoke of the destruction of the Third Temple.
After the war, Meir was full of sorrow. She focused compulsively on getting Israeli prisoners of war released. This was apparently a form of consolation for her. She also felt a thin layer of guilt. But she did not feel bad about the flawed policy moves she had made before the war. And she also did not understand why the nation was not rejoicing over the brilliant military victory. In the four decades since that victory, there have been no further wars between the IDF and regular Arab armies and the Arabs have been forced to rely on terrorist gangs and rockets.
When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in November 1977 (at which point Menachem Begin was prime minister), Meir asked Sadat with a tone of jealousy why he had not come when she was in office. But in her heart, she knew the answer. Meir would not have signed even the interim agreement reached between Sadat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1975. She definitely would not have given up the entire Sinai Peninsula like Begin did as part of the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt.
Forty years after the Yom Kippur War, Israelis still have not forgiven Meir and hostility toward her has been passed down from generation to generation. But as the Israel Hayom poll published on Friday shows, most Israelis belatedly understand that the Yom Kippur War was a big victory. While remembering the many fallen, the average Israeli not only sees depressive darkness, but also the light of reality,
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