Resident evil

For the second time in one year, radical Islam reminded Egyptians and the rest of the world of the difference between necessary, and pure, unadulterated evil: While officials in Western capitals condemned the military-backed government for using force to disperse violent protests in Cairo, extremist Islamist elements displayed the degree of their depravity, proving the dangers of the alternative which is liable to grow from the rampant chaos in Egypt's streets.

The murder of 25 policemen -- which resembled a scene one would expect to see in the streets of Baghdad or the alleyways of Damascus -- signaled to the world yet again that a violent and determined terrorist network has been established in Sinai, one which sees any target as legitimate. Even if there is no operational connection between the terror alert that shut down U.S. embassies in the region in recent weeks, the Grad rocket intercepted over Eilat last week and the slaughter of policemen in Sinai on Monday, they all share a clear ideological connection: Israelis, Egyptians and foreigners are all fair game.

This logic should already be obvious to anyone involved in the war on terror. The Americans should be encouraging Col. Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi to go on a widespread offensive in Sinai, because eradicating the global jihadist network there would send a clear message to the entire region that terrorists have no sanctuary or refuge. However, the United States is not missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Over the past few days it has been hard to find even one important figure in the American defense and diplomatic establishment who hasn't stood angry, agitated and frightened about American conduct in Egypt.

In the present situation, Egypt and Israel are alone (or together) in the fight against terrorism in Sinai. From Cairo's perspective, the immediate dilemma is plain: Should it lash out in a military offensive, motivated largely by the immediate desire for revenge, and send massive reinforcements to Sinai, or should it swallow its pride and act in a more calculating manner -- first by establishing control in Cairo and the other large cities in Egypt proper, and only then turn toward restoring order to the Sinai Peninsula.

In Jerusalem the hope is that Cairo chooses the first option, either partially or completely. To this end, Israel is prepared to grant the Egyptians permission to deploy more military forces in Sinai, even though as of Monday such an Egyptian request had yet to be submitted. Egypt currently has a force in Sinai equivalent to something slightly smaller than a division -- 10 infantry and armored battalions, supported by eight Apache helicopters -- but their main problem is quality intelligence information, a result of neglecting the Bedouin network in Sinai for years.

The assumption in Israel is that even if Egypt does decide in favor of an offensive, it will take a long time before it bears significant results. In this time frame more deadly attacks are expected, possibly against Israeli targets as well. Similar to "Operation Burning Wheels" in August 2012 -- which was triggered when terrorists murdered 16 Egyptian soldiers stationed at an outpost in Rafah and then violently breached the Israeli border -- terrorist elements in Sinai could have also chosen an Israeli target Monday, and, heaven forbid, could have succeeded.

To prevent this in the future the Israel Defense Forces needs to further entrench its operational intelligence infrastructure in Sinai and along the border, join forces with the leadership in Cairo and pray that it manages to stabilize its rule. If this does not happen, then Monday's massacre in Sinai may eventually look like child's play.

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