Chaos returned to Egypt's streets on Wednesday, making for one of the most violent days in Cairo's history. After the military coup on July 3, which ousted elected President Mohammed Morsi, the army took its gloves off on Wednesday and began a violent and aggressive operation to remove Muslim Brotherhood supporters from the capital's streets. The price paid was at least 300 killed and thousands wounded (official numbers), yet the real price was the shattering of another myth since the Tahrir Revolution: Who now can say that the Egyptian army, the "people's army," does not shoot at civilians-
With the way things turned out it comes as no surprise that the liberal Egyptians' most senior official, Vice President Mohamed ElBaradei, resigned from his post on Wednesday. What else can he do for a nation which has degraded into a violent brawl between uniforms and beards? This tragic story is far from over. The Muslim Brotherhood certainly have not had their last word. Not in the street, and not in politics.
Egypt continues to fall apart, and the future looks far from promising. After the implosion of the Tahrir Revolution dream, now another blow as the army decides to show another face, one that is almost similar to, in Wednesday's case, to the Syrian army. This is not what the masses wanted when they gathered June 30th to remove President Morsi.
It is hard to say we were surprised, but it still amazes that twice in two and a half years, millions both in Egypt and around the world, who truly believed that the mayhem would bring about an improvement, go by the wayside. Romanticism has always been in fashion, and sometimes, as in Egypt, the sobering return to reality overpowers the dream.
Last month some were shocked again to see that the Egyptian masses refuse to accept the Muslim Brotherhood regime and applaud Morsi's fall. I would be hard pressed to believe any tears were shed for Morsi on our side of the map, but it is also hard to say Morsi's overthrow was democratic. Egypt's tragedy is a two-fold: Morsi's victory put the dream of democracy on hold, but so did his removal.
And now we are left with the question: Is this what the millions who went to the streets only weeks ago to take down Morsi, with the sponsorship (or better yet encouragement) of the military, really prayed for? Did they really want a return to a state of emergency like in Mubarak's day? Did they really want to see a new government place a curfew on the streets of Cairo? And is there a still a consensus around the army for the secular liberals?
ElBaradei's resignation points to that coalition's split on Wednesday. It is hard to say that the liberals did not see any of this coming. The results of the first round of presidential elections gave them a choice between Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi and the old regime's Ahmed Shafiq - is this what they had in mind? At one point or another it became pretty clear we would wind up right back at the beginning - only without Mubarak.
And what does the future have in store? Wednesday's escalation by the military could paradoxically serve the brotherhood's interests. After losing power, confrontation is their only way to survive. The army now provided them with an opportunity to be depicted as the victims of a coup and not usurpers, as they were during Morsi's presidency.
Let us be clear - the Muslim Brotherhood is not exactly a pacifist group, and it is very tempting for them to adopt the methods of their Syrian counterparts and form a "Free Egypt Army." A development like that would ensure unrest in Cairo, as well in the Sinai Peninsula near us, and would inevitably lead to civil war. One way or another, the army's aggressiveness on Wednesday hints at their intentions to knock the brotherhood out of politics ala Mubarak, and not see them in the upcoming elections; they are still the only organized political entity in Egypt. But as of now the notion of elections do not even seem to be on the horizon.
No less tragic is Washington's inability to do anything and effectively becoming neutralized. The U.S. lost legitimacy in today's Egypt, in the eyes of the military, the brotherhood and even the liberals. It is the gulf states that have something to sell Egypt. Saudi Arabia, unlike Qatar, did not seek Mubarak's fall and the brotherhood's rise, Saudi Arabia seeks conservatism. It is fair to assume that one point or another it will help the army choose Mubarak's successor. This whole ordeal does not resemble democracy, but then again Egypt's current struggle is not for democracy, but to regain stability without admitting that one of the solutions is to turn the wheels back.
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