The Reuters report that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to negotiate with the Palestinians on the basis of the 1967 lines was unequivocally denied by Israel. The prime minister had no part in the report. Regardless, the reputable news service's report is not a lame duck. It is more of a trial balloon. Someone wanted to gauge both sides' reaction, and what it would mean for the coalition in Israel and whether it would cause division among the hard-liners and moderates in Ramallah. With time, the intent behind yesterday's report will be revealed in the memoirs of those tasked with the negotiations, and it will then be clear who was interested in publishing it and what they wanted to learn. It stands within reason to think the Palestinians will attribute a great deal of importance to the report. If they are able to plant the idea in the public's mind that Israel agreed to 1967-based talks, it will make it easier for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to overcome the resistance in the street to merely holding talks. If Israel denies the report -- Abbas will be able to at least demand a declaration of intent to that effect as one of his conditions, similar to what yesterday's report hinted at. That is why he delayed his answer to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Either way, if the Palestinians oblige by renewing negotiations in a spirit acceptable to Kerry, he will likely explore the issue of the 1967 borders, known as the "Green Line," with Israel. It is clear that Netanyahu will be open to discussing it. Israel has consistently said that all issues are open for negotiation. If Kerry raises this matter as part of a package that includes all the other issues, Netanyahu has no option but to address it. This is obvious, especially because not only the Palestinians, but the Americans and past Israeli governments have conducted talks based on the willingness to swap land so that most of the settlers would be able to remain in their homes. Despite the inaccuracy in the Reuters report, it is still important in and of itself because of its content and timing. When one of the sides employs a ruse of this sort it means an agreement is likely imminent, and it is a last-ditch attempt to gain one more advantage or deny such an advantage from the adversary. Negotiations are looming, and any postponement or diversion from this path is because the leaders on both sides struggle to look at the reality from eye level. Habayit Hayehudi and certain Likud-Beytenu elements will be unable to accept Netanyahu's agreement to talks based solely on the 1967 borders. But they can remain in the coalition with Netanyahu at the helm if the talks are according to agreed upon parameters, namely that negotiations include all of the final-status issues. On the opposite end, the Palestinian Authority does not intend to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, but when the issue is raised, with an American tail wind at their backs, Abbas will not be able to avoid discussing it. Such is the duality of force employed by the Americans on both sides of the fence between Ramallah and Jerusalem. The exhausting marathon of discussions is primarily between the Americans and Arabs at the moment. If it bears fruit, Netanyahu will have to roll up his sleeves. The hardest part is still ahead of us.
