Har Dov, on the western side of the snowy slopes of Mount Hermon, offers visitors breathtaking vistas of the northern border, reminiscent of a pastoral postcard from a Swiss resort. But this serene landscape is deceptive, as beneath it war is lurking; dormant, yet ready to erupt at any moment. From a military standpoint, the Har Dov sector is a paradox: a mostly quiet sector, but one from which you can literally see the enemy -- a dangerous enemy representing a highly volatile threat. Since Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon 17 years ago, the Har Dov sector has become the unofficial "playground" where Israel and Hezbollah face off. The relative small number of civilians on both sides of the border and the multiple military outposts throughout the area has made it a sphere where action and reaction are ostensibly legitimate, reasonable and containable; where the parties can exact prices from each other without risking an undesirable security escalation. This unusual situation, where a constant threat is brewing close to the surface but only rarely erupts has made Har Dov a relic of a different time -- the only place reminiscent of southern Lebanon not only topographically, but also in terms of military strategy. Physically separated from the homefront, this sector is different on a practical level as well: There is almost no cell reception up there and unlike other sectors, where soldiers get off duty and plunge into the internet, social media and their family's WhatsApp messaging groups, here there is a real combat deployment. The Givati Brigade's 435th Rotem Battalion is currently deployed in the sector. Givati has a long history with Har Dov and it has lost three battalion commanders and dozens of soldiers to it over the years. But the soldiers have their own logic, and being as cut off as they are is not very popular. Most believe Har Dov is too boring; that they don't see enough action. There is no shortage of commentaries on the change in our times or how this generation of soldiers is different from its predecessors, but the fact is that the average fighter prefers to be deployed in Judea and Samaria, where the terrorists are, and if not in Judea and Samaria then in the Gaza Strip. The northern border lacks the necessary interest, and it has the roughest deployment conditions, as soldiers are routinely on base for 17-day stretches, broken only by brief four-day leaves. There is no doubt that this is the biggest challenge the military faces in this sector: maintaining vigilance as well as high motivation among the troops. The 435th Battalion is deployed across a section spanning from the Sion River to Gladiola outpost -- the highest outpost on the mountain, while simultaneously being deployed across Haemek sector through to Metula, a town that lies in the northernmost point of Israel. Other Givati troops are deployed along the Israel-Lebanon border, as well as in the southern Golan Heights and in Nablus. "Har Dov is different from any other place," Lt. Col. Tal Ashur, commander of the 435th Battalion, says. "The threat here is more significant and if anything were to happen here, it would probably be far more complicated." The threat lurking on Har Dov is tangible. The 2017 version of Hezbollah is brazen and as the Shiite terrorist group no longer hides or operates under civilian auspices. Hezbollah makes sure to maintain high visibility, so that everyone is clear on who the landlord is on the Lebanese side of the border. Dozens of Hezbollah outposts are deployed along the border, and its operatives routinely patrol the Lebanese side of the fence, overtly demonstrating their presence as well as constantly gathering intelligence. On Mount Dov itself, where there is no fence, intelligence gathering is also carried out by shepherds and farmers, who are often paid by Hezbollah to facilitate terrorist attacks. "The majority of what we do involves security -- detecting, thwarting and preventing border infiltrations or the placement of explosives," Ashur explains. "Nothing here as is innocent as it seems and the challenge is to remain vigilant and sharp even when everything around seems quiet and pastoral and harmless, and understand that the situation can change at any second." The best way to maintain vigilance, he says, is mainly though military drills. The troops stationed on Har Dov spend a considerable amount of time outside the outpost in initiated operational activity. This offers a triple gain: training, breaking the routine and the constant deception of the enemy. The main threat in the sector is that of border infiltration, mainly for intelligence gathering purposes and -- in a more severe scenario -- for the purpose of anti-tank, mortar and sniper fire; and there is also the constant threat of abduction attacks. Hezbollah has previously targeted the Gladiola outpost, claiming it had "seized control" of it and even showing its flag allegedly flying over it on its TV station. In reality, the flag was planted on a nearby hill and filmed from an angle that made it look like it was flying over the outpost. But the message -- echoing a past statement by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that the organization's purpose was to "conquer the Galilee" -- was clear: The Shiite terrorist group is looking to inflict more than physical harm, it wants to mark a resounding psychological achievement. Ready, but not exactly willing This is a relatively good period for Hezbollah. It is physically strong and its recent achievements in the Syrian civil war have afforded it significant gains in the public's eye. Politically, Hezbollah is at one of its peak times in Lebanon: President Michel Aoun is a staunch Hezbollah ally and in his efforts to legitimize the group, he recently told Egyptian media that "the resistance is part of us." The underlying message of these synonymous interests is clear: Hezbollah is the sovereign on the ground and Nasrallah is the landlord. It was not for nothing that his deputy, Nabil Qaouk, recently said that these were the organization's "glory days." Even Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Gen. Joseph Aoun is considered a Hezbollah sympathizer and regularly coordinates his troops' moves with the group -- some even say he runs his operations by Hezbollah for approval. Hezbollah's confidence was best expressed recently by Nasrallah's mouthpiece, the Al-Akhbar daily, whose editor-in-chief, Ibrahim al-Amin, wrote that "if the Israelis make a mistake, they will be made to pay." Still, none of this suggests Hezbollah is looking for a fresh round of hostilities with Israel at this point in time. If anything, the opposite is true: The organization is preoccupied with the Syrian civil war, in which it has already sustained 1,800 fatalities and thousands of casualties, and it is not ready to fight on another front, especially when it is not fully vested in it -- especially given the strong Israeli deterrence. But the years of fighting in Syria -- and the efforts by Hezbollah advisers counseling Shiite forces in Iraq and Yemen -- have also done the organization good: it has come to know itself, to build up its strength and prepare for the real challenge of war with Israel. It is still too early to assess the impact of the American airstrike on a Syrian airbase last week, following the chemical attack in the Idlib province, but until that point Hezbollah was riding high as part of a multinational force, alongside Russia, which marked a series of military achievements, the most notable of which was the reoccupation of Aleppo. The latter stabilized President Bashar Assad's regime and established the supremacy of the Shiite axis, comprising Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, in the Syrian civil war. With this, Hezbollah has justified the tremendous Iranian investment in it as the "defender of Shia Islam," and Nasrallah has justified the highly criticized decision to send his operatives to fight in the bloody war in Syria, as now he can claim Hezbollah's involvement has prevented it from spilling over into Lebanon. Confidence aside, the assessment in Israel remains the same: the chances that Hezbollah will provoke a war with Israel are slim-to-none, certainly as long as it continues fighting Syria. This probability, however, increases should it be required to respond to a specific event, for example, an incident in Syria that Israel would be held responsible for and which Hezbollah would find difficult to contain, such as the 2015 assassinations of Jihad Mughniyeh and Samir Kuntar. Should Hezbollah's response to such an incident be harsher than expected in terms of the number of casualties or the sector targeted, it is likely to lead to a harsh Israeli response. The potential ensuing series of attacks and counterattacks could easily lead to an undesirable escalation. This scenario is at the heart of the IDF's preparations, which focus on Har Dov: rocket fire on IDF posts, roadside bombs, or mortar fire on first responders or evacuation forces all spell a complex incident and not solely because of the highly skilled enemy. The topography of the area -- the convoluted roads, the convenient outlook from Lebanese territory that enables anyone moving up the mountain a long-range view of their targets, and the relatively great distance between outposts -- presents the IDF with a complicated challenge. Evacuating casualties, for example, could take a very long time if helicopters are unable to land in the area; senior commanders could find it difficult to arrive at the outposts to oversee the event on the ground; and reinforcement would take longer to ascend the mountain. This situation requires greater independence from the Givati troops deployed on Har Dov, certainly in comparison with other sectors. The auxiliary company stationed in Gladiola for example, has all the means to fend off an attack on its own for a prolonged period of time, including tanks, mortars, missiles, surveillance technology and heavy engineering tools. This may be unusual for the company but it is required considering the perilous sector. "We keep everyone here on their toes," says Maj. Uri Shabat, who commands the company stationed in Gladiola. "Every day begins with a briefing, including an up-to-date review of the threats in the sector. We show the soldiers footage of the fighting in Syria so that they know what capabilities the enemy has. We do everything to be prepared for a scenario in which we are attacked and have to fight alone." Gladiola itself is built accordingly. Life here takes place in a series of concrete compounds, ready to absorb massive attacks and minimize the risk that any harm will come to those stationed in them. Movement between the buildings is done through trenches and any and all activity takes place in fortified spaces. None of the Givati soldiers currently stationed at Gladiola serve in southern Lebanon, not even Ashur, who enlisted in the IDF in the early 2000s. But for those who are older, Gladiola is a constant reminder of the days of the security zone, when soldiers had to sleep in triple bunk beds to save space. Changing points of contact The third Lebanon war could very well begin with at attack on Gladiola that could result in rapid escalation. The scenarios are endless, but the principle guiding Hezbollah is simple -- win. If in 2006 Hezbollah's primary objective was not to lose, it has set its sights higher for the future. The organization seeks to deal Israel a painful blow, to exact a price from it and to etch in the collective Israeli, Lebanese, regional and global memory the fact of who won and who lost. Overall, Hezbollah's would-be blow to Israel would comprise three levels: rocket fire, clandestine strategy and psychological warfare. The first and most significant level is firepower: Hezbollah has tens of thousands of rockets and missiles that can cover any point in Israel. To illustrate, if during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 Hamas fired an average of 120 rockets at Israel a day, Hezbollah is preparing to fire a four-digit number of rockets at Israel every day throughout the conflict. Most of the projectiles are short-range rockets, meaning life Haifa and northward will be challenging. But Hezbollah definitely plans to massively target Tel Aviv as well, mainly using its M-600 rockets, and it is also trying to procure precision missiles with bigger warhead, so as to maximize the damage. The second level includes operational surprises, such as the use of drones and multicopters, some carrying explosives, divers and speedboats, cyberattacks and targeting strategic infrastructure, all with aim of inflicting as much harm as possible on Israel, and if possible -- cripple it. The third level is pure psychological warfare and it touches on Nasrallah's statements about "conquering the Galilee." Using Hezbollah's elite Radwan forces, Nasrallah seeks to carry out quality cross-border raids into Israel, and take a settlement or outpost hostage while simultaneously firing hundreds of heavy rockets on the border area to maximize casualties. This is much more than planning a flag on the Gladiola outpost: A quality attack of this kind will exact a heavy toll -- dead, wounded and abducted Israelis -- and it will, to a large extent, shape the image of victory during the first blow. Preparing for the first two levels of threat is done on a national level and within the military is crosses corps, branches and sectors. Dealing with the third threat is supported by many factors, but the sole responsibility for it is lies with the Galilee Division. In any war scenario -- and certainly in routine times -- its role is to maintain strong defenses along the border to prevent Hezbollah from marking any achievement. This means both increased forces and a variety of measures, actions and emergency contingencies, as well as routinely taking preventive measures. Anyone traveling on Route 899 in northern Israel cannot miss the extensive engineering work aimed at making life difficult for Hezbollah: clearing roads, building barriers and setting up fences. The IDF is changing the line of contact -- "reorganizing the sphere," as they call it in the military -- and it can see how across the border, Hezbollah is doing exactly the same, bolstering its positions to make things difficult for the IDF in the next round of hostilities. Here, Hezbollah is not pulling any punches and it is investing considerable resources in systematic intelligence gathering; in the orderly activity by which each of the 230 villages in southern Lebanon has been turned into a fortified combat zone; in setting up obstacles and establishing ties with the Lebanese military. In a large number of places Hezbollah uses Lebanese army posts for intelligence and operational purposes. The past rivalry between these organizations has dissipated in light of their recent fighting against joint enemies -- Islamic State and al-Qaida -- on the Syrian-Lebanese border and also in light of Hezbollah clear emergence as the real landlord in Lebanon. This is good news as far as Israel is concerned, as in the next war there will be no dilemma as to whether to separate the Lebanese state from Hezbollah. In 2006, Israel refrained from targeting Lebanese infrastructure to drive a wedge between Lebanon and Hezbollah, but the next conflict will be free of this dilemma. The statements made by the Lebanese president and chief of staff and the open cooperation between the Lebanese military and Hezbollah have made Lebanon and its armed forces a legitimate target for Israel, making the IDF's life a tad easier. Still, the next war will see Israel face unfamiliar challenges, not only with respect to the threats to the homefront, whose clear purpose is to deal a blow to the Israeli public with aim of generation pressure on the government, but also on the frontline. The war in Syria turned Hezbollah into a skilled fighting force with significant combat experience -- in other words, it has made it into an army. From the IDF's standpoint this has clear disadvantages, namely Hezbollah's ability to operate in larger contingents and use a variety of weapons, from tanks and artillery to advanced air and intelligence technology, but there are also advantages: It is easier to fight a military precisely because it is institutionalized, hierarchical and has multiple measures, i.e., targets. The Givati renaissance The Givati Brigade joined the Second Lebanon War on its last leg. Prior to that, it was deployed in the Gaza Strip, immersed in the counterattacks that were carried out in the wake of the 2006 abduction of Gilad Schalit by Hamas; its troops frustrated by the fact that they were not called up to take part in the bigger war. In future operational plans there is no longer a question as to its place as Givati plays a key role in every operational outline, in every sector. Givati will wrap-up it operational deployment in late May and begin training. The multiyear work plan enables the IDF, and Givati in it, to train often and maintain a high level of combat readiness. This is illustrated in both ability and resilience: Today, Givati is a strong, confident and highly sought-after unit. Its reassignment to the 162nd Armor Division, also known as the Steel Formation, seems to have gone off without a hitch, many of its top soldiers go on to become officers and many of its officers seek a military career. But the past year has been rough. The case of Elor Azaria, a soldier convicted of manslaughter for killing an immobilized terrorist in Hebron in March 2016, rattled the IDF to the core, and Givati was not immune to it. Givati commanders made sure to speak to soldiers in every unit, to make sure they all knew right from wrong. The bottom line was clear: Follow procedures and you will have the IDF's full backing. You have to be particularly naive to believe the Azaria case would be the last of its kind. The heated political and religious debate it provoked, the blatant involvement by lawmakers, rabbis and other boisterous public figures who attempted to weigh in on IDF procedures and the resonating impact social media had on the issue, these will all require continuous attention by IDF commanders. It stands to reason that Givati will miss Har Dov. After completing its training, the brigade will resume operational activity, this time in Judea and Samaria, with all of its familiar dilemmas. But for now, Givati is deployed up north, where things are clearly black and white. It is only if and when Israel and Hezbollah trade blows again that the troops will understand what they have gone through during this deployment, where -- more than anywhere else -- they military service was by the book, and where any uneventful day means war has been staved off, by at least that day.
