Report on 2014 Gaza conflict finds fault in IDF, cabinet's conduct

Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip in 2014 was plagued by a lack in intelligence and operational plans, technological deficiencies, and a prolonged failure by both the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet and the Israel Defense Forces to deal with the threat posed by Hamas' grid of terror tunnels, State Comptroller Yosef Shapira wrote in his review of the campaign, released Tuesday.

The operation claimed the lives of 68 Israeli soldiers and six civilians, including one foreign national.

The report reviewed the work of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government following the abduction and murders of three Israeli youths in Gush Etzion in June 2014, through the 50-day military campaign in Gaza in July and August.

The review examined thousands of official documents by the government, the IDF, the Shin Bet security agency, and the National Security Council, and gathered testimonies from hundreds of people involved in the decision-making processes during the operation.

The report states that the IDF neutralized or destroyed only half of Hamas' terror tunnels, "leaving the rest either damaged or still usable. … This means that a main operational objective -- neutralizing or destroying the offensive -- was only partially met, and the IDF thus failed to complete its mission."

Then-Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon and IDF Chief Benny Gantz had led Netanyahu to endorse aerial strikes against the tunnels, believing this would spare the IDF a ground offensive. But the report said this was an error in judgment, as Ya'alon and Gantz knew that bombing the entrances to the tunnels would impede the work of the ground forces moving in later to destroy the tunnels -- and this turned out to be the case.

Furthermore, members of the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet were not properly briefed on the decision to launch a ground operation in Gaza, Shapira found.

Unlike previous audits reviewing other military campaigns, the report does not assign "special liability" to any individual over the failures found, but it levels criticism at Netanyahu, Ya'alon, Gantz, then-Head of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, and then-National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen.

Cabinet underperformed

According to the report, cabinet ministers did not possess the necessary knowledge to participate in discussions over the operation.

Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett received a favorable mention in the report for having discovered the tunnel threat from third-party sources and alerting the prime minister and the cabinet to the issue, and for being the only minister to question the efficiency of airstrikes in the circumstances.

"In November and December 2013, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ya'alon, and then-Shin Bet Director Yoram Cohen noted that the tunnels were a strategic threat and that the efforts to counter it must be increased. But a comprehensive review by the IDF held following Operation Protective Edge revealed that the objective of destroying the tunnel grid was only partially met, and that some offensive tunnels breaching Israel's territory remain in place," the report said.

The IDF's review also found "that the effective and widespread use the enemy made of the tunnels and its defense systems surprised the military and underscored the understanding that this will be a characteristic of future conflicts. This review also found that tunnels are an issue on the Lebanese front, and that since the [2006] Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has expanded its underground infrastructure," the report said.

Even though Netanyahu, Kochavi and Cohen had already in 2013 described the tunnel threat as a strategic one, "the issue was not prioritized properly in national strategic plans in 2014. … It was only in 2015 that this issue was introduced as a 'top priority,' despite the prime minister's instructions to include it in the plans as early as February 2014.

"The 'jump' in priority reflects the discrepancy between the gravity of the threat posed by the tunnels and the importance attributed to it, for years, by the intelligence community and the political echelon. Starting in 2013, it was up to Kochavi and Cohen to influence the prioritization of this issue in national strategic plans."

The report stressed that despite this, "information provided by Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet agents on the ground, including on the offensive tunnels, was a significant intelligence achievement that allowed the forces in Gaza to locate many of the tunnels."

It continued: "Despite orders by the deputy chief of staff, issued in February 2013, to thoroughly examine a multidisciplinary operational concept based on past experience, knowledge and technological developments, and apply it to the tunnel threat, no disciplinary or multidisciplinary approach was approved by the General Staff in anything more than draft form.

"The lack of an operational concept focusing on an issue defined as a strategic threat multiple times since 2008 by numerous political and military officials, including the prime minister, defense minister, and chief of staff, is an ongoing failure that has undermined the [IDF's] ability to integrate it in cross-corps' doctrines in a manner relevant to dealing with the tunnel threat.

"It was up to Kochavi, as the one tasked with intelligence briefings to the cabinet, to present the true gravity of the tunnel threat as early as the Nov. 26, 2013, cabinet meeting, especially given how the prime minister, defense minister, and chief of staff had described it. Chief of Staff Gantz should have made sure the Military Intelligence chief presented the threat properly, and the defense minister and prime minister, who were familiar with the details of this threat, should have made sure the IDF was addressing it."

In addition, the report found that the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet's "authorities, including the question of which issues fall under its purview, are not anchored in writing. This means even cabinet ministers do not know whether the cabinet is a decision-making body or an advisory one; which issues mandate a cabinet decision; or under what circumstances the cabinet must be convened.

"In cabinet meetings dealing with the Gaza sector, certain information was not disclosed [by the military], and in some instances certain issues related to this sector were not discussed at all, despite having significant implications, and despite being vital to the cabinet's decision making process.

"The State Comptroller's Office turns the attention of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the fact that dismissing diplomatic alternatives without presenting them to the cabinet first prevented the ministers from properly discussing the advantages or risks involved in those alternatives.

"The State Comptroller's Office rebukes former Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, former IDF Chief Benny Gantz, former Head of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, and former Shin Bet Director Yoram Cohen for having failed to present the discrepancies known to them to the cabinet.

"Cabinet ministers were deprived of significant information that could have allowed them to take part in the decision-making process over the questions of how to proceed, and the decision was left up to the defense establishment and the prime minister. Failing to inform cabinet ministers [of the gravity of the threat] at an earlier date further prevented them from discussing the available alternatives and make a considered decision, without the pressure of the ongoing conflict," the report said.

Shapira stressed that the prime minister had "addressed the tunnel threat multiple times as part of internal discussions with defense and other officials, who defined the issue as a strategic and significant threat. However, and even if there was no intention to conceal information, the cabinet was not presented with the full scope of the threat.

"IDF and Shin Bet officials, the former national security adviser, the former defense minister and the prime minister's statement on the issue were far too generic, and few and far between, and failed to described the threat in a manner to underscore it properly. The chief of staff and former Military Intelligence chief should have presented the cabinet with meaningful information that could have changed the outcome, even if intelligence assessments remained unchanged.

"The prime minister, the defense minister and the national security adviser should have made sure this information was presented to the cabinet. ... [The lack of information] hindered the cabinet ministers' ability to participate in the decision-making process ahead of a potential escalation in Gaza."

Force-building deficiencies

Shapira's review also found that the plan for airstrikes targeting the terror tunnels, "as recommended by the defense minister and chief of staff to the cabinet, did not constitute a comprehensive, well-founded action plan based on experience and long-term strategic vision."

The Israeli Air Force, he said, had tactical abilities designed to counter other threats, not Hamas' grid of terror tunnels.

"During Operation Protective Edge, the IAF found itself using narrow abilities while lacking intelligence, operational plans, and relevant skills. Combat engineering forces struggled to complete their mission because of IAF strikes, which … indicates force-building deficiencies by the IAF and ground forces. Better coordination between the air and ground forces and the regional commands, and force-building efforts to that effect, would have allowed the IAF to make the most of its abilities, and better assist the ground troops," the report noted.

The comptroller also criticized the lack of resources allocated to security for communities near the Gaza border, despite their growing need.

He criticized the defense establishment for pursuing measures that eroded the residents' sense of security in the years prior to Operation Protective Edge, including removing IDF posts and pulling the funding for training community-based emergency response teams.