Maj. Gen. Nitzan Alon, head of the Israel Defense Forces' Operations Directorate, opens with a familiar joke: In a word, our situation is "good," but in two words, it's "not good." The situation, he quickly explains, is complicated: Strategically, broadly speaking, our situation is good -- among other things, due to the processes that have unfolded in the Middle East in recent years. But, on the other hand, there is volatility in the Palestinian arena and at the northern border. "There are positive changes, but we must not take this to mean that we can sit back complacently," he says. Q: Over what do you lose sleep- "Scenarios of incidents that appear to be tactical -- something in between a major terrorist attack and a small surprise attack, mainly from the Palestinian theater, and especially from Gaza. These are potential scenarios that are not highly unlikely. We are doing what we can to prepare for them, and at a strategic level, also to prevent them, but I really wouldn't be surprised if I were to wake up at night from an incident like this." Q: An incident that you consider to be tactical, despite the fact that its immediate consequences would be strategic. "It is a tactical incident that constitutes a trigger for a more significant incident, which could, for example, lead to a broad campaign in Gaza." Q: Or to captives -- and we are familiar with the cost that entails. "Definitely. In universal terms, a soldier falling captive is not a strategic incident, but in our reality, it has strategic consequences. It could happen and we must be prepared -- firstly with intelligence, with defense, with the ability to act quickly in the field, with the ability to launch a relevant attack -- and at the same time, to create strategic conditions that would reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence." Q: Are we succeeding in deterring such scenarios in Gaza- "There is deep deterrence in Gaza [for fear of] a campaign against Israel, but this does not offer us total security. There are also other factors that could initiate some kind of action, and we must take into account that the dynamic could shift toward an escalation." Q: And the strategic consequence of this would be a broad campaign? Toppling Hamas- "Firstly, we need to define for ourselves what the concept of toppling Hamas means. In military terms, we need to decisively beat the military campaign we are facing." Q: And how is a decisive win done in Gaza -- by searching for every rifle and every rocket- "To win, you do not need to destroy the majority of the enemy's military power, rather to ensure that they cannot operate in an effective manner. In the [1967] Six-Day War too, we destroyed a tiny percentage of the Egyptian army, but we damaged it in a way that did not allow it to function, and so we achieved a military victory." Q: So what is a victory in Gaza- "Without going into detail, Hamas has a manner in which it perceives the way it should fight Israel, with offensive and defensive components. We must know how to take effective action against all these formations and to reach our own victory, but this is really an issue of our operational plans." Q: And in the north- "That is certainly a far greater challenge because of [terrorist organization] Hezbollah's military capability, but do not get confused: The IDF is infinitely stronger than Hezbollah, and our capability to beat its military system absolutely exists." Q: These concepts -- a decisive campaign, victory -- are they even relevant in 2016- "At the military-tactical level, as an order to division and brigade commanders and to troops in the field, they are definitely relevant, as well as on an operational level. It is a complex challenge to decisively win a campaign that does not operate in an orderly manner -- [one that is] semi-military, embedded within the population and that attempts to offset our advantages in intelligence, firepower and maneuvering -- but that is what we must strive for, and I think that our power ratio should also allow us that." Q: Let's return to Gaza. How did a tactical threat, such as the terror tunnels, turn into something so demonic that concerns the entire country- "The asymmetry exists not just in tools and methods, but also in expected achievements. Israeli society [and] the Israeli government expect from the IDF a much more significant success-to-failure ratio than in the past. Therefore, a successful tactical attack by the enemy may be perceived to have additional significance." Q: Could it be perceived as a failure on our part- "That is the system of expectations for us. I am not judging the Israeli public, but we must look at things with the perspective of time, and not at a specific tactical event, because that is not what determines the campaign at the end of the day." Q: So then are we scaring ourselves- "I do not speak in the name of Israeli citizens or the Israeli government. At the military level, we judge things professionally, and I don't think we are scaring people. We assess the threats, the visible and potential capabilities of the enemy, and we prepare to deal with them. In this sense, I think we are very realistic in our perspective -- both with regard to the threats and with regard to our ability to face them." Q: We have heard this from everyone who has occupied your position over the last decade, and yet, we came out of the last four campaigns in Gaza and in Lebanon with a sour taste. "I suggest you look at this too with the perspective of time, which shows the accomplishments to be more significant than the tactical failures that initially stood out. And that does not diminish our need to set a mission for ourselves, and to implement it even in an irregular military campaign like the one that stands before us." Q: Does Israeli society want everything right now- "I actually think that we saw during Operation Protective Edge that Israeli society is much more resilient and has more stamina than people like to give it credit for." Q: And will that still be the case when a thousand rockets fall here each day during the next war- "By any measure, comparative or objective, our ability to attack them is infinitely greater than their ability to attack us. There is no such thing as war without a cost ... but I wouldn't want to trade places -- not I nor my family -- with one of our enemies. And I also suggest that we don't scare ourselves too much. Do not misunderstand me: I am not underestimating the enemy, but I think that the abilities of all our enemies together would not pose a dramatic threat to the State of Israel." Q: If we were to find ourselves in the midst of a military campaign now, what do you think the essential steps are in order to reach the desired goal -- a decisive victory in the military campaign and the implementation of the government's instructions- "We need to prepare for a range of conditions, not all of which will be in our hands. There is a variety of possible opening situations, as well as the influence of the enemies' decisions and the political leadership's decisions. I will just say that more than a few of the lessons we have learned, in the recent campaigns too, are tied to the quality and timing of decision-making, and usually to the speed as well. Many of the exercises we carry out are dedicated specifically to this -- to our dialogue within the IDF, and between the political leadership and us." Syria -- a humanitarian tragedy Alon, 52, has been operations chief for about a year-and-a-half, and he is considered to be one of the generals closest to IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot. In the past, among other roles, he commanded the Sayeret Matkal elite reconnaissance unit, the operational division of the Military Intelligence Directorate, the Judea and Samaria Division and the Central Command. His familiarity with the Palestinian arena is deep, rational, and, along with the other senior officials in the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency, he played a central role in the efforts to subdue the wave of terrorist attacks over the last year. "The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not seem likely to end soon," he says. "There was an outburst here that was stopped mainly thanks to our operational forces in the field. The swift improvement in their operations, in the results, made clear to the other side the futility of this wave of terrorism and led to a dramatic reduction in its scope. But, since the motivation has not disappeared, we are seeing and will continue to see additional outbursts like this, and we are preparing for that: for different situations of escalation." Q: Is there a concern that things could get completely out of control- "There is potential for significant change in the Palestinian arena. We are at the edge of a decade that began with the end of the Second Intifada, a decade of relative calm and improved military coordination, and we need to prepare for its end -- that is, a reality that will be less stable than what we have experienced over the last decade." Q: Does that mean that your assessment is a foreseeable future of terrorism at varying intensity- "It is difficult to know what the tactical expression in the field will be, whether it will be a wave of stabbings by young people or intensified efforts for other attacks, and we must remember that this is happening on the backdrop of a very unstable internal Palestinian system. Our job is to take care to stop any outburst like this, to have an intelligence and operational response, to always stay one step ahead of the incidents and to react as soon as they begin -- but also, to ensure that these things do not have consequences that affect broader strategic aspects." Q: For example- "For example, the situation in Jordan, and our relations with other pragmatic Sunni states." Q: Were you referring to them earlier when you said our strategic situation was good- "Yes, but before we give ourselves a grade, we should first look around and understand that the Sunni-Shiite tension is creating a different situation. If in our consciousness, we were used to thinking about the State of Israel as a small country surrounded by enemies, with everyone against us, the reality is different today. And in this reality -- wherein the Sunni world perceives Iran to be a central threat, and to this we can add threats like the Islamic State group and global jihad -- a certain realm of shared interests is created between Israel and some of the Sunni countries." Q: What is the political, military and economic potential of this- "It has potential. It is, of course, easier to [make use of the potential] secretly, and harder to do it in some fields that are more visible -- as there will always be a glass ceiling of strong anti-Israel sentiment ... and the Palestinian issue is not solved. We must act wisely within this space, preferably outside the spotlight." Q: We had gotten used to thinking about the Arab Spring as an Islamic Winter, but now what you are saying is that essentially, for Israel, it really is spring. "You can't say that in Syria, in Aleppo for example, there's a 'spring,' and the things that are going on there, as human begins it's our problem as a whole. But there's no doubt that these tectonic changes, which are truly historical, have created strategic circumstances that are more beneficial for Israel." Q: Improved conditions- "That depends on what we do with them. But I'll say it again -- we have to be realistic and responsible and remember this won't solve many of our problems, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Q: So the logic saying that as long as they kill each other in Syria it's good for Israel is true- "Despite the humanitarian and human tragedies, in some places it certainly has diminished threats and their [the Syrians'] ability to fight us. But it shouldn't make us complacent: While the probability of war against Israel at this point in time is low, we must prepare for [regional] changes and other scenarios." Q: Sitting in your office and seeing the image of a boy in Aleppo, covered in dust following an airstrike, what goes through your head- "We have to recognize that what's going on in Syria is a human tragedy, and we mustn't encourage it or gloat in any way. I think that the State of Israel, with its history, can't say that it [the civil war] should go on forever simply because it serves some of our security interests." Q: The strategic reality today is different. Russia is present in the region, and it has deployed S-300 missile batteries that could threaten us. What are the implications for us- "First, we have to understand that this is a significant change, one that presents both threats and opportunities, so it's not just negative for us. S-300 missiles are definitely something we need to address, and even though they are not trained at us at the moment, it requires comprehensive study and understanding." Q: Of changes in operational patterns- "For proper planning and adapting operational patterns." Q: Do we see the Russians as partners? Rivals? A threat- "[Russia] is a power present in the region, and they are trying to secure their interests, which are rather obvious, with limited operative investment. We maintain safety and prevention mechanisms opposite the Russians, to avoid friction and refrain from a situation like they had with the Turks a few months ago [when Russia downed a Turkish jet over the Syrian border], but we also need to ensure that, despite this presence, we maintain the necessary freedom of action in accordance with our interests. And like I said -- this presence is not without its opportunities." Q: Such as- "Such as in generating deterrence opposite our enemies, or our ability to leverage [Israel-Russia] ties to prevent negative phenomena like Hezbollah becoming stronger. Those kind of things." Q: Does this mean the Russian umbrella currently allows you to operate in spheres and ways best kept quiet- "We don't comment on such thing, so we won't comment on them now." Q: You visited the United States last week. Are they concerned by our growing ties with Russia- "I think the Americans are not worried that we might get confused about who Israel's real ally is here, and we make sure to get that point across, so there are no misunderstandings on this issue. The U.S. is Israel's key ally, and we maintain a conversation based on mutual understandings, which allows us to maintain our interests. As a rule, the regional presence of a world power mandates we hold closer operational dialogue and better coordination mechanisms, including in real time." Q: Can we tell where the civil war in Syria is going- "We need to distinguish between what we can and cannot affect. There are dozens of countries involved in this situation, and since our policy is not to intervene -- and wisely so, in my opinion -- we have to be very careful in our view of this arena. You could say that there is a clear declining trend, a fading of the idea of the Islamic State and the notion of the Islamic caliphate, and it is difficult to see how it could weather against world powers in the long-run." Q: The ideologue will survive, though. "This is a complex notion that will survive in a different form, not necessarily of a sovereign Islamic caliphate right here, right now. We can see that the more Islamic State is undercut on the ground, the more intense its terrorist efforts become. " Q: What would be the optimal result for the Syrian conflict as far as Israel is concerned- "We want a stable border, free of Islamic State presence; we want to be able to talk to the other side, without it being pro-Iran or pro-Hezbollah; and we don't want to see the Iranian sphere of influence, with its partners, grow and become a power base. Overall, those are our direct interests." Q: That's like wishing to be young, healthy and rich. "Some of this is not just wishful thinking, but rather things we can influence. We have to be careful in our assessments about how the Syrian sphere is shaping, because we have limited influence over the balance of power between the dozens of elements operating in Aleppo, and at the end of the day, it's not our fight, but I don't think preventing Islamic State or Hezbollah from maintaining a presence on our border is an unattainable fantasy. It's a legitimate and realistic demand." Q: When the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard wakes up in the morning and looks at his map, does he have Israel in his sights- "At the moment, no. If you look at his global presence, right now he's busy primarily with Aleppo and with his relationship with the Russians, Yemen and other issues. Israel is not at the center of the arc, but we need to look at the negative impact Iranians have on us, which is quite substantial." Q: Is Iran a strategic threat to Israel- "As long as it operates the way it has been, with ideology backed by resources, then it is definitely a threat to Israel. Is Iran a strategic threat? I don't think so -- it's not an existential threat." Q: It's not bad to be chief of operations in a time when there's no existential threat to Israel. "I think that has been true for many years, and in retrospect -- I doubt that since 1948 there's been anyone who could really have thrown us into the sea." Q: We have spent years convincing ourselves otherwise. Have we been terrorizing ourselves for nothing? "I've been a member of the General Staff for quite a few years now, and I don't think that's the right way to put things. We have missions, we face challenges -- we are by no means living in a time of each man under his vine and under his fig tree -- but I think that if there's any message to drive home, it's that the IDF is a strong military and it has the necessary capabilities. One the one hand, you can't expect total tactical success, but on the other hand, overall the IDF has the instruments with which to realize its purpose, and our purpose is to protect and defend Israel and its people." Doing nothing is not without its risks In recent years, given the relatively security calm, a significant part of the IDF's operations are carried out away from prying eyes, as part of what the military calls "the campaign between the wars." These are various intelligence and operational missions, the majority of which remain clandestine, while those who do not are attributed to foreign sources. "In the past, we used to say the military had two modi operandi -- fighting a war and preparing for war," Alon explains. "The use of force in the campaign between the wars is not to be taken lightly. We take a proactive approach to this matter, both to prepare for threats and to identify and act on opportunities, be it by the overt or covert use of force, or in many other ways." Q: How much of your day is dedicated to this issue- "There are quite a few things whose results may be obvious, but getting things done, the considerations, the methods of execution -- the less is known about that the better." Q: It has been said before that the current, highly volatile situation in the Middle East could generate many opportunities for Israel. "It is true that the regional turbulence, especially in active theaters like Syria, affords us more operational leeway. As I said, our approach, as outlined by the chief of staff, is more assertive. True, taking action has its risks, but inaction sometimes harbors bigger risks." Q: Could you rank the threats in the Middle East in your opinion- "The most urgent threat pertains to the Palestinian sphere, with its two theaters. There are graver threats, mainly related to Hezbollah's Iranian-backed military capabilities. There are threats that are further away, but are just as significant, such as Iran potentially developing nuclear weapons. Ranking them in a one-dimensional manner would be wrong, and the IDF is devoid the ability to prioritize, because we have to address all these threats." Q: Still, you have to prioritize -- troops, missions, budgets. "Yes, but you prioritize in a way that ensures force-building relevant to long-term threats on the one hand, while on the other hand, the focus remains on immediate threats, like the wave of terrorism in Judea and Samaria." Q: Where do you think Hezbollah's focus lies at this time- "Hezbollah is not something that stands on its own right -- it relies on Iran's military, economic, and industrial backing. The organization is currently undergoing a process of modernization, for example in terms of obtaining more accurate and powerful rockets and missiles, but here too -- this is not something we watch from the sidelines, but something we deal with, including in terms of offensive and defensive force-building, and aspects pertaining to of the use of force. And again, you have to put things in perspective: Our capabilities are far greater, and I wouldn't recommend Israelis switch places with Hezbollah operatives." Q: So let me ask you again -- what bothers you the most? Terrorism? Hezbollah? Iran? The rifts in Israeli society- "We honestly don't have the privilege to only focus on one thing. We have to be able to address security threats, from the immediate issues, especially in the Palestinian theater, to the long-term perspective on the future potential threats, all while at the same time ensuring the faith the public places in the military, the IDF Code of Ethics and state values are not compromised." Influence the military from within Morals and ethics have become an issue of great concern for the IDF over the past year, especially since the surge in terrorism began, and doubly so since Sgt. Elor Azaria shot and killed a subdued terrorist in Hebron, in March. Alon, formerly GOC Central Command, believes, as do his counterparts in the General Staff, that this case was an anomaly, and he did not appreciate -- to put it mildly -- the fact that many among the Israeli media named Azaria their "man of the year." "Much of the IDF's strength lies with the faith placed in it by the Israeli public and its backing," Alon said. "The IDF's system of values is based primarily on the state's values, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, laws and traditions. This is a true system of values and it's very important that it remains the compass we follow. In this respect, I think that the statement made by the military command, from the officers on the ground in Hebron to the chief of staff, was very clear." Q: If anything, the Azaria case proved that at least in this instant, you don't have the public's backing. "First of all, I think the public's faith in the military was and remains high, and even those who state the otherwise in this case have faith in the military, want it to be at its best, certainly in its operational best. Moreover, I don't think any of them would relinquish the values the IDF holds." Q: So the public misunderstands this case- "There are a myriad of issues here, including moves of information and disinformation. But it's really not my job to educate the public. As the military in a democratic state, however, we are tasked with and have the duty to discipline those who serve in its ranks, and set rules and norms that are enforced, sometimes through the military justice system. On these things we need to be very clear." Q: Maybe you were wrong? Maybe this case should have been handled via disciplinary proceedings, without all the mess that followed- "Mistakes, lessons and nuances rose to the surface in the debriefing, but it is still very important that the IDF act according to its values, and exercise its operational inquiry mechanism without fear or bias. It's an essential tool for operational learning, as is the military justice system. I don't think we were wrong." Q: Are you concerned about this case's implications for the military- "Naturally, this is a very significant case and the things at stake extend far beyond the IDF. But I don't think the IDF should be swayed by opinion polls. We first have to influence the military from within and see that our soldiers understand what is expected of them, what the demands are, and what they can and cannot do. I was in the field for many years and I know sometimes these demands are complex, but despite these complexities, I think we can carry out our missions, and carry them out well and according to our moral standards."
