In retrospect, one can say that Brig. Gen. (ret.) Joshua Shani, the lead pilot who flew the first C-130 Hercules cargo plane in 1976's Operation Entebbe, emerged from the mission to Uganda somewhat worse for wear. The stress caused him to develop a stomach ulcer, his hair turned mostly gray, and his wife was furious with him for not telling her he would be taking part in one of the most famous hostage rescue operations in history. Shani, who today heads aerospace giant Lockheed Martin's operations in Israel, does not necessarily see himself as a hero. In the 40 years since Operation Entebbe, he commanded the Israeli Air Force Lod Base and was the military attache to the Israeli Embassy in Washington. One has to ask: After countless books, movies, TV shows and interviews about the rescue mission, what else could be revealed- As it turns out, many aspects of the story have been left untold, especially when it comes to the alternatives and contingencies outlined for the operation, such as using a Ugandan cargo plane, embedding El Al pilots with the troops to fly the abducted aircraft, and even a plan to have the pilots procure a backup sailboat for tens of thousands of dollars in cash. Alongside the iconic status and heroism that have become synonymous with Operation Entebbe, over the years the mission has become a battleground where verbal wars over the versions of the event, as perceived by its architects and participants, take place. Even Shani, in his quiet way, protests the fact that the IAF's part in the mission has been dwarfed. "Every article you read focuses on Sayeret Matkal," he said, referring to the Israeli military's elite special forces unit, "but I can tell you that I believe the linchpin was my squadron. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin came to me, to the squadron, to discuss things before the final decision was made. I was just a kid, an especially young squadron commander, and the prime minister of Israel walks into my office and says, 'Look me in the eye and tell me if it's doable. I've heard all the generals and experts, but I need you to tell me if it's doable. Why? Because Sayeret Matkal, which is the best in the world, incomparable for this kind of mission -- they don't really care whether it's Sde Dov or Entebbe.'" The message, Shani recalled, was clear: "You're the Air Force -- you're in charge. Is this doable? I told him, 'Mr. Prime Minister, go home. We'll make sure the hostages are here by tomorrow.' It was Friday. I kept my word -- the next day all the hostages were free." History in the making The events that led to the famed rescue operation are common knowledge: On Sunday, June 27, 1976, Air France Flight 139 departed from Tel Aviv carrying 246 mainly Jewish and Israeli passengers, and a crew of 12. The plane flew to Athens, where it picked up an additional 58 passengers. It departed for Paris at 12:30 p.m., and moments later was hijacked by two Palestinians from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- External Operations, and two German nationals. The hijackers diverted the flight to Benghazi, Libya, where one passenger, who was thought to have suffered a miscarriage, was freed, and then continued to Entebbe. Q: When did you learn of the hijacking? "There's a set protocol at Ben-Gurion International Airport, which at the time included the Hercules squadron under my command, by which once they [airport authorities] learn a plane has been hijacked, Sayeret Matkal scrambles to the airport, because the working assumption is that whoever has control of the plane may try to land it at Ben-Gurion. That day, the protocol was set in motion, and my squadron was called in," Shani said. Q: Did you know one passenger had been freed- "Of course. She was questioned in Paris, and effectively gave us our first intelligence. We knew, more or less, how many hijackers were on the plane, what they were armed with, etc. Once we learned the plane was headed to Entebbe, we began outlining [flight] routes, gas [requirements], radar coverage, and mapping out threats. We did that on Monday, and at the time the IAF wasn't even in the picture. On Tuesday, IAF Commander Benny Peled tracked me down at a family affair -- God knows how he did that, it's not as if we had cell phones as we do now -- and started grilling me over the exact questions we were asking ourselves." Q: How much did you know about the deliberations and disagreements between Rabin and then-Defense Minister Shimon Peres- "We knew nothing. I wasn't privy to any political discussion. I was only asked questions like, 'What will you do if the runway lights are out-' I said we'd just land in the dark. I took [then-IDF Chief of Staff Mordechai] Gur and Peled up in my Hercules, to give them a demonstration. It wasn't easy, but I did it," he recalled. "The final question was, could we fly to Entebbe stealthily, land, and get to the hostages? I convinced them we could. That moment, when it was decided -- the IAF could do it -- was when the decision on the operation was made." Q: Did you have any doubts as far as flight times and weights- "It was pretty clear this was a one-way ticket; that we wouldn't have the fuel to fly back. The first alternative was to have Shayetet 13 [the Israeli naval commandos] parachute into Lake Victoria with rubber boats. They were supposed to sail to the airport, about 12 kilometers [7 miles] away, eliminate the hijackers, free the hostages, and negotiate their safe passage back to Israel with the Ugandan authorities. "We played it out, had them parachute into the sea off the coast of Atlit, but we only had about 50% success. Two boats ruptured upon impact with the water. Fifty percent success wasn't good enough." Q: Why did you want to raid the Entebbe Airport? "Things in Entebbe took a dramatic turn for the worse. In a horrible move -- reminiscent of the Holocaust since two of the hijackers were German -- the Jewish and Israeli passengers were separated from the others. The foreign passengers, 148 people, were released in two groups and put on a plane bound for Paris. The crew was given the option to join them, but the captain, Michel Bacos, made the brave decision to stay with the Israeli hostages." With the lives of 106 hostages hanging in the balance, the hijackers demanded the release of 40 Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel, as well as the release of 13 other prisoners held in four other countries. The ultimatum was clear: Unless the prisoners were freed, the hostages would be executed one by one. The ultimatum was rejected twice, and the final deadline was set for Saturday, July 4. "And on top of that, we learned that [Ugandan ruler] Idi Amin was cooperating with the hijackers. This is when the idea of sending in the commandos came about. They, by the way, didn't like it very much, because those waters were infested with alligators," Shani recalled. "It was then that Peled came up with a new idea: Have the entire squadron land, 12 to 14 planes, take the airfield, and later, somehow, the situation will work itself out: The planes will take off and head back with spatial defense. He had a systematic plan to overrun Entebbe. This idea was in play for several hours, after which we formulated a different plan: Why raid the airfield? We can land, grab the hostages and fly back. It's less dangerous." Q: This plan still had an Achilles heel -- you had to resolve the refueling issue. "We took a fuel pump with us. We knew we'd find a pit -- an underground fuel reserve -- since there's one at every airport. You need an adapter that weighs a ton to tap into it. We began connecting the adapter during the operation, and then Peled flew overhead in the command aircraft, with [then-Deputy Chief of Staff] Yekutiel Adam, who had top command of the operation, and his [Peled's] last words were, 'The Nairobi option is open,' meaning if you can't make the refueling work, head to Nairobi. I decided right then and there to head to Nairobi to refuel. That's how we solved the refueling problem." Q: During the planning stage, were you, personally, convinced it was doable, as you told Rabin and Peled- "I believed we would escape by the skin of our teeth and have more casualties, but I also believed that our sheer audacity -- flying 180 soldiers, aboard four aircraft, 4,000 kilometers [2,485 miles], when no one else in the world had ever attempted anything that crazy -- that alone meant that in all likelihood, it would be a total surprise. Thwarting this operation would have been so easy without the element of surprise. All they had to do is place some trucks on the runway and that's it, no more rescue operation. Either I would see them and avoid landing, or I wouldn't see them and would crash." Ensuring the element of surprise, he explained, "meant flying the distance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia at very low altitude. We were practically touching the water so the Saudi and Egyptian radars wouldn't pick us up. We flew at 100 feet, extremely low altitude, and we maintained total radio silence. "This tense flight continued until the Eritrean coast, where we climbed up to 20,000 feet, broke radio silence, and began gabbing freely, to ease the tension. Overall, it was an eight-and-a-half-hour flight, with an unbearable weight on your shoulders. My fear wasn't physical -- it was the fear of failure. I thought, if I screw up, if one of my pilots screws up, or if the Air Force screws up, this could potentially be a huge national disaster. The pressure was unbearable." Q: Where did you take off from? "We held a final dry run on Thursday, at Sirkin [airbase]. Many ministers were there, almost the entire government. On Saturday, we took off from Ben-Gurion to Sharm el-Sheikh, so we could continue to Entebbe with maximum fuel. We held a briefing at Ben-Gurion. I sat with Yoni [Netanyahu, commander of the Sayeret Matkal commando force and older brother of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] for a very long time. We discussed the smallest nuances of the operation, but I want to be clear -- when it comes to operations like these, it's impossible to cover everything. "Overall, we had a day and a half to prepare for the operation itself. Along the way, I got El Al pilots -- took them right out of a plane that had just landed -- and brought them on board in real time, telling them we were 'going on a little mission.' We set off. Four planes taking off in the same direction on Saturday draws unnecessary and dangerous attention, so we took off in different directions. We met in Sharm, refueled, and took off again, still without a final green light for the operation. They [the government] could have called it off, and we could have been called back." Q: How did you pick your teams- "The pressure was enormous. Finally, I just closed the door to my office. I had a board behind my desk, and I began writing names and erasing them, writing and erasing, writing and erasing, for all sorts of reasons. When I was done, someone came in and took a photo of the board with all my scribbles. That photo is still hanging in the squadron today. "Unlike a normal IAF squadron, whose operations are based mostly on regular service pilots, I used two reservists because of their vast experience. I took two qualified El Al captains: Amnon Halivni and Arieh Oz, a former squadron commander. I decided to have three pilots on each aircraft -- we had 20 hours of flying ahead of us and that's a lot. At the end of the day, the four captains of the planes during the operation were my deputy Dvir Natan, Halivni, Oz and me." Q: That is a sizeable crew. "It was a large and complex crew. I have to say that one of my considerations was that whoever didn't come would end up regretting it for the rest of his life. Another consideration was that we needed to be covered for various contingencies. Some people who didn't take part in the mission are angry with me to this day, and others are grateful that I gave them a chance to be part of this historic operation." Q: It seems many people knew about this operation ... "But only at the very last minute. We spared no effort to keep it a secret. First, we cut off all communication systems on the base. Even in Sharm. We were very concerned about a leak because the element of surprise was crucial. We were also concerned that the airmen would tell their families. "You know, on the operation's 10th anniversary, we held an event at the 131st Squadron [the Nevatim Airbase] and we re-enacted the briefing. The same crews, the same people. At the time, I didn't tell my wife anything -- I had young children and I thought, why put her through this? Anyway, I'm standing at the re-enactment briefing and I ask, 'Who didn't tell their family where they were going-' No one raised their hand. No one! Only me. I was the only one not to say anything. My wife wanted to wring my neck." Q: What was it like in the cockpit during the flight- "The atmosphere was tense when we were flying at very low altitude -- three and a half hours you spend sweating. But once we climbed up, it was dark by then, a kind of calm came over us. Tension rose again only when we approached Lake Victoria. The procedure we agreed on was that at that point, I would split from the formation and continue alone. Dvir led the other three [planes] and they had to hover in a holding pattern for seven minutes, in the midst of a horrible African thunderstorm. Everyone ended up getting sick and throwing up. It was terrible, but I had no choice. I could feel my blood pressure rising to the point of erupting from my body. This is where I was scared. Actually, I wasn't scared, I was anxious because of the responsibility I had. "When we were approaching the terminal, the shooting started. At this point I was worried they would hit the planes. There was a Hercules there, one of Idi Amin's, and we had one of our mechanics take a look at it. We decided that in case of emergency, we'd use it. We would have. We wouldn't have hesitated for one second. "Moreover, we each had tens of thousands of dollars in cash on us. Each captain was given money by the Mossad. I remember putting that thick envelope in the pocket of my flight suit. Someone told me it was $50,000. The plan was to buy a car and drive across the border to Kenya, which was very dangerous, because we were bound to get pulled over, or to buy a boat and sail to Nairobi. These were alternatives in case the planes were compromised. The last alternative, which is why I had El Al pilots with me, was using the hijacked plane itself." Q: While the special forces stormed the terminal, you remained on board the planes. "I had to get [the plane] back from the old terminal to the new terminal. I got them [the troops] as far as the old terminal, and went back. The others joined me. We were in the [landing] slots at the new terminal, and we started tapping into the fuel line. Meanwhile, our troops raided the terminal, and also took over the bank that had a branch there. During the debriefing, Peled jokingly asked, 'If anything, why didn't you take some cash to cover the mission's expenses-' "The fourth plane, flown by Halivni, was empty. It was meant for the hostages. It approached the old terminal and the Sayeret's men led them over and they boarded slowly. It was clear Halivni wasn't refueling, he was supposed to take off and land in Nairobi with the hostages. It wasn't worth the risk. "I remember us sitting on the asphalt in the dark, still trying to decide whether or not to refuel, when I saw the silhouette of his plane taking off in the dark. I said to myself, 'That's it, the operation is over. We have the IDF's finest fighters with us, we'll make it.' Then we had to do a head count of the troops. We counted eight times to make sure no one was left behind. Then we all took off toward Nairobi." Q: Were Kenyan authorities aware of the operation- "Ehud Barak landed in Nairobi with the second Boeing, used as an ambulance, and coordinated things with the Kenyans in real time. He told them, 'There was an Israeli commando raid, and they're flying their C-130s here to refuel. Let's work together.' There was a lot of hostility between Uganda to Kenya, and we were counting on that. The Kenyans wanted money for refueling us. I signed for the bill. To this day I have no idea who paid or if it was paid at all." It was in Nairobi that the pilots learned that Yonatan Netanyahu had been killed. "We learned that he stormed the terminal and was hit by a Ugandan soldier who fired at him from the [air traffic control] tower. In Entebbe, word was that Yoni was wounded, no more. But Dr. Efraim Sneh [who commanded the medical unit embedded with the mission] told me Yoni was shot in the heart, and he wasn't going to make it. It was devastating news, and it clouded my joy over the operation's success," Shani said. "Then we headed back to Israel. Peres issued a press release at 4 a.m., when we were still far away. We landed at Tel Nof [airbase], and I remember Rabin came over to congratulate us. We switched off the engines, and at that time I had been in my flight suit for 20 hours, in the middle of summer. I reeked to high heaven. All I could think about was, 'Please don't let him come over and hug me; we'll have a dead prime minister on our hands.' He hugged me anyway." Q: In hindsight, is there anything else you would do differently- "No."
