The chief of staff spent last Sunday at Central Command, on a visit that was part work and part nostalgia. He was met by his fellow draft classmen from the Paratroopers Brigade; yet another leg of his IDF farewell tour. The pleasant atmosphere changed abruptly that afternoon when senior Hezbollah operatives were assassinated in a strike on the Syrian Golan Heights. Gantz retired to a closed room for nearly an hour, joined by no one but his bureau chief. What he spoke about and with whom is not known, but it later emerged that among those killed were the son of slain Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh and an Iranian general in charge of the Syrian and Lebanese sectors. From that moment, Gantz abandoned his existing schedule and focused entirely on the developments in the north. While the remainder of his tenure was supposed to gently ease him into civilian life, the relatively stress-free routine of his final days as military chief was replaced by emergency consultations, situation reports, emergency meetings and impromptu travel, all to confirm the IDF was deployed and prepared to stave off the evil rumblings emerging in the north. If a year ago his tenure was perceived as being steady and drama free, 24 days before its end one cannot escape the thought that Gantz could be remembered as a two-war chief of staff. Officially Israel is not commenting on the attack in the north. There is no confirmation or denial of responsibility. We can raise an eyebrow at this policy, based on two fundamental facts: The strike was carried out from the air, and the IDF is the only air power operating in the region (aside from the Syrian army, which surely didn't assassinate its Lebanese and Iranian benefactors); and the United Nations reported that its people spotted Israeli drones crossing the border near the time of the strike. The information given by allegedly official Israeli sources to Reuters, and the ensuing denials, contributed to the sense that Israel was stuttering. None of this, however, changes the bottom line: Officials in Tehran and Beirut clearly know where to point their fingers, and, consequently, who will pay the price. In Israel, as stated, there has been no comment. What is clear is that over the past year Jihad Mughniyeh, Imad's son, went from being the "son of" and a symbol in Hezbollah, to being a headache. This transformation took place as Hezbollah began establishing a terrorist infrastructure on the Golan, intended to allow the group to act against Israel on a "low frequency" -- not along the Lebanese border but from Syria; not with its own operatives but via its minions. The initial infrastructure was erected by Samir Kuntar, the terrorist behind the deadly Nahariya attack in 1979 who was released in the 2008 Goldwasser-Regev prisoner exchange. This infrastructure is largely reliant on operatives from the Druze villages at the foot of the Syrian Hermon Mountain, in an area that has yet to be conquered by rebel forces and is still under the thumb of President Bashar Assad's regime. On several occasions this network has launched rockets at the Israeli Hermon and has placed roadside explosive devices along the border fence (including the bomb that wounded four paratroopers a year ago), but it has not managed to morph into a clear and present danger. As a result, Jihad Mughniyeh entered the picture as "commander of the Golan front." He was warmly received by the Iranians -- also his father's patrons -- who helped him with money, training and resources. His task was to establish a more widespread and professional infrastructure, ready to act against Israel through a variety of means: firing rockets and anti-tank missiles; roadside bombs and sniper attacks; infiltrations and abductions. It's possible Mughniyeh's tour of the Syrian Golan at the time of his assassination was part of this endeavor, and it's also feasible his activities there were part of preparations for a specific terrorist attack. Even the IDF intelligence analysts explicitly tasked with providing contrarian assessments would be hard pressed to argue Mughniyeh was an innocent bystander. Last Thursday Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was interviewed by the Beirut-based news outlet Al-Mayadeen. The interview lasted three hours, with one remark clearly standing out: From now on, Nasrallah said, his group would not only respond to Israeli attacks on Lebanese soil, but to attacks in Syria as well. Nasrallah, incidentally, did not say that Hezbollah would respond, instead using the term "the resistance axis" -- which includes Iran and Syria. He in all likelihood meant to lay the verbal groundwork for an impending terrorist attack, but could not have imagined that those responsible for implementing his threats were probably already under meticulous surveillance. Between clandestine and "noisy" The target bank for potential assassinations is formulated by a committee comprising the country's intelligence agency chiefs -- the heads of the Mossad, Shin Bet and Military Intelligence Directorate -- and is passed on for approval by the prime minister (with the knowledge of the IDF chief of staff and defense minister). From this point forward begins the process of compiling a "file" on the target, which includes any and all details pertaining to his life, where he spends his time and with whom, where he lives and what car he drives, along with any other bits of information conducive to creating the opportunity to eliminate him. When information is received that a window of opportunity has opened, a special forum is convened to deliberate. If the IDF is tasked with hitting the target, the meeting is held at the defense minister's office. When the Mossad is tasked the meeting is held at the prime minister's office. Assuming Israel was indeed behind the assassination strike, it is reasonable to assume that Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon hosted these deliberations, with participation from the relevant officials: the chief of staff and his deputy, the heads of the army's intelligence, planning and operational directorates, and heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet. It is safe to assume that aside from poring over the intelligence information and the coinciding operational requirements, such a meeting also entails weighing the consequences and counter-measures that are likely to follow. The deployment of Iron Dome batteries, for example, or raising alert levels at Israeli embassies across the globe. Each participant has the right to voice their opinion. The chief of staff presents the IDF's position, while the only officer authorized to provide a differing stance is the head of military intelligence. In contrast to the majority of his predecessors, Gantz does not adhere to this protocol and permits other officers to express different views. Regardless, the person ultimately responsible for determining the army's final position is the defense minister, who presents the matter to the prime minister for approval. This type of forum can deliberate over a span of many days or just one day before the target is hit. As is often the case, new information arrives adjacent to the time of the planned strike, which obligates a reassessment of the situation. If there is not enough time to reconvene a meeting, the participants appraise the situation over secure phone lines, after which a decision is made -- to proceed or postpone. In this scenario, too, the participants are permitted to support, object or abstain: Most often, a strike is carried out in accordance with their recommendations, but there have been cases in which a strike was ordered even in the face of officers who either objected to an operation or abstained from supporting it. During the initial deliberations the method of operation is also determined. Preference is likely always given to an operation that can be executed on a low frequency, without leaving any fingerprints behind. Even if the enemy is convinced Israel is responsible, he will not have proof. This was the case in the assassinations of Mughniyeh the father in Damascus in 2008, the Iranian nuclear scientists during the previous decade, and in a number of other operations attributed to Israel, from Abu Jihad to former Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Shikaki, killed in 1995. Sometimes a clandestine operation is not feasible and Israel is required to carry out a "noisy" operation; which was the case for most of the assassinations in Gaza and the assassination of Abbas Musawi, Nasrallah's predecessor. If Israel did in fact kill Mughniyeh junior earlier this week, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the decision was made due to the following considerations: a one-time opportunity that was unlikely to repeat itself, therefore the need for the less-than-ideal method -- out in the open. Assassinations, by their very nature, are controversial. Not only due to questions surrounding the value of the target and the investment made in killing him, but primarily due to the end result test. When the issue is a pre-emptive assassination to thwart an impending terrorist attack -- a cell on its way to its target -- there are no doubts. However, when it pertains to commanders or leaders, the end result test is much more complicated. Following most assassinations throughout history, including those carried out by Israel, small shoes were quickly and successfully filled by successors, including by those who proved to be exponentially more dangerous. Nasrallah is an excellent example, and not the only one, of someone who emerged to be a far greater problem than his assassinated predecessor. In contrast, there are rare cases in which killing a senior leader has knocked the enemy off balance; Shikaki and Mughniyeh are the prominent examples. Despite this history, Israeli policy has traditionally been in favor of assassinations. It is perceived to be an integral component of the fight against terror, and a way to turn the predator into the prey. Great Britain also acted in the manner against the Irish underground, and the United States is doing so in its fight against global jihad. This, despite the arguable benefits and despite the expected reprisal attacks. To paraphrase David Ben-Gurion, let every terrorist know his life was by taken by those who were worthy of doing so. Between elections and revenge The prime minister and defense minister were accused this week of acting out of political motivations. The enemy was not at the forefront of their considerations, it was claimed, rather the elections were. Such a claim is impossible to prove; prime ministers and defense ministers have always been and will always be political figures. That's how it is in a democracy. Anyone who gives them the wheel on a normal day, needs to also accept their decisions during an election period. The questions are necessary, certainly. Those currently under scrutiny are also served by having these questions answered: It will remove any cloud and claim of underhanded motives from over their heads. In any case, while it's possible those who made the decision will reap the alleged fruits of their decision, there are also inherent risks involved. Anyone who has sat in the cabinet in recent years is familiar with the scenario of another war in Lebanon. For those who missed last week's interview [ADD LINK: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=22837] with outgoing Military Intelligence research division head Brig. Gen. Itai Brun, here is a summary of what such a war may look like: over a thousand rockets per day fired at Israel, among them dozens of long-range rockets that can reach the Gush Dan region; enemy forces that will seize communities for the purpose of killing civilians or using them as bargaining chips; downed aircrafts; targeting of ships and an effort to damage Israel's strategic infrastructure -- oil, gas, electricity, airports and harbors; and painstaking preparations to thwart an Israeli ground invasion, in the form of a dense array of bunkers and fortifications dispersed between over 200 villages in southern Lebanon. Israel has an operational response for a large portion of these threats, but a third Lebanon war will not end without exacting a hefty price. There will be hundreds of casualties (on the front lines and the home front), the country will sustain considerable damage and the cost to the economy will be in the billions of shekels. It is doubtful anyone in Israel is interested in putting this scenario to the test. According to assessments, Tehran and Lebanon are also disinterested in a maximal conflagration. The Iranians are tethered to the war in Syria, preoccupied by nuclear negotiations and gasping under the weight of their collapsing economy. Hezbollah is invested in aiding the Assad regime and is also exposed to increasing criticism in Lebanon for the problems it has brought to the country's doorstep -- from terrorist attacks by Sunni elements to concerns of another devastating war with Israel. And still, there will be a response. Not only because the humiliation was too great and too public to simply absorb, but mostly because officials in Beirut and Lebanon have openly vowed vengeance. It is likely the dilemma now revolves around how to do it and when; Iran responded to Musawi's assassination by bombing the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires (and then the AMIA Jewish center in the city), but a terrorist attack abroad is a far more complicated undertaking these days. Not in terms of carrying them out, but in regards to the current global atmosphere; it is doubtful Iran, which seeks the removal of economic sanctions, wants to find itself lumped together with the Islamic State group and al-Qaida. As far as it's concerned, the way to avoid this is to act on a low frequency, which requires planning and time -- which in turn provides an opportunity to foil those plans. Israel is simultaneously preparing for the possibility of a revenge attack along the border -- on the Golan Heights or in the Galilee. Hezbollah has recently returned to being active in the Har Dov region, and Israel's weak response to the detonation of a series of roadside bombs last October signaled a green light for the group to continue its activities in the area. In the meantime the IDF is maintaining extremely high alert levels along the length of the border (the closure of the northern highway, Route 899, and the special directives issued to residents are the obvious examples of this). But in order to minimize the risks, Israel must make it clear to Hezbollah -- via UNIFIL or a foreign government -- that its next response will be far more severe, especially if Israeli civilians are hurt on the Israeli side of the border. This type of integrated action -- military-operational and diplomatic -- will transfer the dilemma to the other side. It won't prevent it from responding, but it will cause it to think again. Were Hezbollah to have its own choice in the matter, it would likely choose to take revenge on February 12 -- the seventh anniversary of Imad Mughniyeh's assassination. On the same day, a Thursday, Benny Gantz will attend his last weekly situational assessment meeting with the defense minister, four days before he hands over the keys to Gadi Eizenkot. Those who are familiar with Gantz know how much he is waiting to enter civilian life, mostly for the serenity it provides. It appears his path toward becoming a civilian, much like his entire military career, passes through Lebanon. Between the north and West Bank While Israel is busy bracing itself for a blow from the north, the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv this week reminded us that nothing good grows in the West Bank. Devoid of a diplomatic track, amid the existing atmosphere of incitement and the open hostility between Jerusalem and Ramallah, the "lone terrorist" will rise time and again to kill: with a car, axe or knife. It is hard to complain that this attack wasn't prevented. Despite all the intelligence work and think tanks, no one has found the way to penetrate the mind of the lone terrorist and stop him before he acts. Regardless, the probability of his success can be minimized. The terrorist in Tel Aviv arrived from Tulkarem, via routes taken by illegal migrants. Forty-thousand such migrants enter Israel daily, at least. Most are poor laborers, searching for an honest way to earn a living for them and their families. There is a hostile minority which exploits this convenient platform for terrorism. Israel is aware of all these routes. It also knows who uses them to enter and who picks them up on the Israeli side; and most of the time it knows who employs them inside the Green Line. It knows -- but does nothing. The plan to complete the separation barrier in the Judea region is stuck because of political and financial complications; money is also the main obstacle to fixing breaches and sustaining ongoing maintenance of the barrier in other sectors. And inside Israel, enforcement -- by police and the justice system -- is slow and fatigued, and certainly isn't a deterrence. Israel needs to make a courageous decision: If it is dangerous to employ all the illegal migrants, then it must work to immediately block them from entering. If they can be employed, then they should be allowed to enter openly, with documentation. The army, Shin Bet and Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories unit recommend adopting the second option. They argue it will help the Palestinian economy and bolster Israel's security: Those with work don't turn to terror. In the meantime, these decisions are slow to come. With or without a connection, terrorism is on the upswing. In 2014 there was a sharp rise in the scope of attacks and number of victims compared to the previous year. The trend has continued thus far in 2015. Amid the backdrop of elections, it is likely more time will pass before any decisions are made. This means the ball is in the IDF's hands (along with the Shin Bet and police). And similar to the situation in the north, it will try to ensure we make it through the upcoming period peacefully.
