For my generation, the war was the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Even though I had fought in the Six-Day War as a young paratrooper six years earlier, and had lost friends and commanders, that war was short and ended with an overwhelming sense of victory. In stark contrast, the Yom Kippur War, in which I served as an officer under Maj. Gen. Avraham Adan (known as "Bren"), was long, with many casualties and a lingering sense of gloom. That war shaped our worldview in the military, especially on the importance of deterrence. The need to be ready for war, rather than believing it would not happen. The feeling that we are not invincible, but that we can count on the spirit of the lowest-ranking commander and the lowliest soldier. The knowledge that the top military and government officials don't necessarily have all the answers and get things wrong just like everyone. After that war, I became convinced that while holding the military to the highest professional standards, the army, and the intelligence community in particular, needed to understand that when making decisions, courage is in order. Around the decision-making table is where everything must be said, even when what you are saying isn't palatable to the person at the head. Many are often brave under fire, but become weak when faced with decision-making on the homefront. Because of that war, I understood that building power was no less important than using it. This understanding runs contrary to the IDF ethos, which hails the people who use power but often fails to acknowledge those who build it. I have seen how power that is not well built fails to achieve victory in the battlefield. Anything that is not well-prepared in advance won't work in battle. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that what worked during training will also work in battle. Bren once told me, when I was a major-general on my way to conclude a division-wide drill: "Tell them that war is very different from drills." I realized all these things as a young officer who had the privilege of taking part in some of the post-war investigations. Sitting next to me was a renowned commander, later appointed IDF chief of general staff. He said to me: "Immediately after the fighting ends, you hear the battle stories, and then, several months later, you hear battle improvements." That is true. Sometimes it is because the memory can plays tricks on the tellers of the stories. Sometimes it happens because the tellers' perspective may have been partial. But sometimes it is more important to the tellers how they will be perceived than it is to actually get at the truth. When I tried to launch an organized investigation in the Intelligence Corps I encountered a strange answer: that it wouldn't be right to open old wounds. To this day, there hasn't been a complete, official investigation of the events in the Intelligence Corps. Later, when I grew up and tackled various national security issues, I understood that the Yom Kippur War held far more than met the eye at first (and second) glance, and during those early days right after it. It was the last classic war in which the Arab armies tried to defeat Israel on the battlefield, taking advantage of their numerical advantage and their ability to launch simultaneous assaults on multiple fronts. It was the last war that was fought in that style because, among other reasons, it was launched by the Syrians and Egyptians with a tactical and strategic advantage of complete surprise, but ended less than 40 kilometers (25 miles) from Damascus and 101 kilometers (63 miles) from Cairo. Egypt's then-president, Anwar Sadat, was sure that anyone interested in further war with Israel was dead wrong. He understood that Israel would dominate any battlefield and that the Arabs were better off striking agreements with Israel rather than fighting it. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, also clung to this understanding after Sadat was assassinated. After that war, and the peace agreement with Egypt, then-Syrian President Hafez Assad (Bashar's father) also understood that his chances of defeating Israel's superiority with conventional weapons was slim. So he turned to the manufacture of chemical weapons. But deep inside he knew that he would never be able to best Israel. When his son rose to power and considered going to war with Israel, Mubarak advised him to come and discuss past wars with Israel, so he would understand why he should reconsider. Fortunately for Israel, the IDF was unable to conclude that war more resolutely. To be honest, Israel could have completely demolished the Egyptian Third Army, which comprised three reinforced divisions and numbered more than 80,000 soldiers, to the best of my knowledge. The Third Army was encircled, cut off from water and food supplies. There was nothing stopping the IDF from demolishing the Egyptians. They were exposed, without any substantial defenses. But then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stepped in and prevented the annihilation. We loved to hate him back then, and to blame him for preventing us from reaping the fruits of victory. But he was wiser than most of us. He sensed intuitively, and based on his vast experience, that peace cannot be made with those you have humiliated, unless you finish them off. He surmised, and correctly so, that Israel would not be able to achieve a deal by advancing all the way to Cairo and conquering it, the way the agreement was forced on Germany by the Allied Forces after it was conquered in its entirety, or the way U.S. made Japan yield with two atom bombs. Kissinger understood that Israel must preserve Egypt's honor as a people, and Sadat's honor as their leader. Only a leader with his honor intact would be able to stay in power long enough to sign a deal with the Jewish state. Kissinger was right. He facilitated the first step in a long journey that concluded, three years later, with a peace agreement between Sadat and then-Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Two people of gestures and honor, brought together by a common understanding of history and a willingness to take risks, but also a willingness to come up with solutions for the other's concerns. The Yom Kippur War began catastrophically for Israel, but ended up being a stellar success. The first part restored Egypt's honor and helped Israel realize what price it would have to pay for maintaining the status quo. The second part involved Egypt learning that it would not gain anything from further fighting with Israel. The combination of these factors made it possible to strike a peace agreement, which took the biggest of the Arab nations out of Israel's bank of enemies. It has been over 40 years and this agreement still holds, though peace has not yet come of it.
