Exactly one week ago, last Friday at 6 a.m., a military command and control center was set up in efforts to rescue three teenagers who had disappeared in Kfar Etzion the previous night -- Naftali Frenkel, Gil-ad Shaer and Eyal Yifrach. What started as a tactical event quickly turned into an ongoing military operation with strategic implications, as kidnapping incidents usually do. Today, a week after the operation began, there are still more questions than answers. The kidnappers In retrospect, there is no doubt that the abduction was well planned. This was not a case of a lone terrorist who took advantage of an opportunity. The perpetrators had planned, gathered intelligence, amassed weapons and prepared hiding places in advance. A senior officer labeled the kidnapping as "extremely professional" -- certainly when compared with the amateurish abduction and subsequent murder of Israeli soldier Tomer Hazan last year. Though the details of the kidnapping have not yet emerged, it is doubtful that this level of preparation was the product of an independent group. Similar events in the past were masterminded by Palestinian prisoners from their jail cells or by Hamas officials from their offices in Gaza or by terror organizations abroad. The name that jumps out in this context is Salah Arouri -- a jailed Hamas official who was released by Israel as part of the prisoner exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Schalit in 2011. Arouri was deported to Ankara as part of the deal and is now trying to revive the Hamas terror cells in the West Bank from exile. The timing of the attack will also be revealed when the kidnappers are apprehended -- whether this was a seized opportunity or a clear directive from above. The directive may have come from Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashaal in a speech he gave on May 20 in Qatar. In the speech, Mashaal referred to a letter he received from Hassan Salameh, a terrorist serving 36 life terms for masterminding suicide bombings in Jerusalem in 1996. Mashaal declared that "Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades and the resistance know the way to get prisoners released." This brief remark may have been as good as an explicit order for a cell waiting for a chance to take action. And still, if the objective was to abduct Israelis to be used as bargaining chips for the release of Palestinian prisoners, where is the negotiation? As of yet, there have been no demands made, no requests, not even a hint from any organization at all. On possibility, the optimistic one, is that the kidnappers realize that there is a manhunt underway and fear that any movement or conversation could lead to their arrest, so they are waiting for a good time to begin negotiations. The other possibility is the pessimistic one: There are no negotiations because the kidnapped boys are already dead. In the absence of any clear cut facts, Israel has been operating on the assumption that the missing teens are alive. This assumption is not only important to the families, and to rallying the public in support of the massive military crackdown currently underway, buy it is also important for the troops: For fear of hurting the abductees (and a desire to capture the kidnappers alive), all the operations and arrests are being carried out on the extreme assumption that the three could be anywhere at any time. The Shin Bet security agency Ultimately, it will be the Shin Bet security agency that will procure the information that will lead to the kidnapped Israelis. The Shin Bet's basic coverage within Palestinian territory has thwarted 212 terror attacks, among them 64 planned abductions, over the last 18 months. But this latest abduction somehow managed to "fly under the radar," as the defense minister recently put it. The Shin Bet's credo, which hangs on the wall of every one of the organization's offices, states that "the General Security Service [Shin Bet] is tasked with maintaining the country's security, protecting the order of the democratic regime and its institutions, defending against terror threats, espionage, dissent, injury and the exposure of state secrets." There is no doubt that in this instance, just like any other terror attack that is not prevented, the Shin Bet failed to fulfill its credo. The organization admits as much and takes full responsibility. When the kidnappers are captured and interrogated, and the details of the attack become clear, the Shin Bet will examine how the organization's "radar" managed to miss such a consequential event. In the meantime, the Shin Bet is busy gathering intelligence that will lead to the kidnappers and to rescuing the boys, while simultaneously supplying IDF units with intelligence to help them sabotage Hamas infrastructure in Judea and Samaria. The first part, capturing the kidnappers, is proving to be the more complicated part. Despite Israel's intelligence domination and absolute technological superiority in the West Bank, it has taken longer than expected to apprehend the culprits. Meanwhile, every known Hamas activist and anyone who may know the kidnappers or help them has been arrested. They are being interrogated by the Shin Bet, which has stretched itself to the limit this week to gather as much information as possible and piece it all together to create a reliable assessment of the events. The second part is relatively easy. Information on Hamas' political infrastructure and financial ideology is gathered all year round, and now it has been translated into arrest warrants for most of the top Hamas echelon on the West Bank. Some of them will even stand trial thanks to evidence linking them to terrorist activity. The Israel Defense Forces This week, the IDF Central Command deployed the largest number of troops since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002: Three brigades (Paratroopers, Nahal and Kfir) supported by additional battalions, elite units and a nearly unprecedented scope of intelligence units and air force support. Like the Shin Bet, the IDF was also taken by surprise by this abduction (in fact, the IDF shares some of the blame for the failure to prevent it. IDF Military Intelligence unit 8200 is responsible for gathering most of the technological intelligence that is used by all the security forces). But the moment the details began to emerge, the IDF launched a two-fold effort that was both geographical and organizational. Geographical -- to locate the kidnappers and their hostages in Hebron, where they are assumed to be hiding; and organizational -- to widely sabotage Hamas infrastructure in Judea and Samaria. It was this approach that brought to the arrest of more than 250 Hamas members, as of Thursday. Some of the men in custody are suspected of terror activity in the field, but most of them are part of Hamas' substantial West Bank presence. Among the suspects are 51 prisoners who were released as part of the Schalit prisoner exchange, all of them having committed serious crimes. Israeli authorities are looking into the possibility that they violated the terms of the deal by taking part in terror activity. If such suspicions are verified, they will be returned to prison to serve out the remainder of their sentences, as the deal stipulates. The IDF is also investing efforts in preventing the incident from spilling over and sparking violence across Judea and Samaria and leading to escalation of violence from Gaza. The close cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, both in civilian and security affairs, has not suffered. The PA is currently assisting the IDF in calming the spirits in the West Bank. But as the crisis continues, the IDF will have to take into consideration the increasing hardship suffered by the Palestinian population, mainly in the hermetically sealed city of Hebron, and certainly on the eve of the holy month of Ramadan. The IDF has made sure to respond with increased force to rocket fire from Gaza into Israel this week, but has so far refrained from targeting Hamas leaders there for two reasons: No clear link between Hamas in Gaza and the kidnapping has been established, and Israel does not want an unnecessary escalation of violence in the south. The police The time immediately following an abduction, any abduction, is known as the "golden hour." During this time the kidnappers must perform a series of actions and movements until they reach their hiding place, so it is the optimal time to intervene and thwart the kidnappers' plans. It is hard to say what could have happened had the phone call made by one of the abducted teens during the course of the kidnapping prompted the authorities to launch an immediate search. The result could have been similar to the current reality, but it is certainly possible that the time could have been used to quickly resolve the incident. "We lost precious time," a senior officer said this week. "We lost it for no good reason. The police screwed up." In an instinctive effort to deflect criticism, the police claimed that the call was unintelligible. Even if that is true (the veracity of the claim is currently under dispute), there is no doubt that the call was alarming enough without making out the actual words that it prompted the on-call officer to consult an additional officer, who, in turn, consulted his commander, before it was decided to shelve it as a prank call. One would expect someone who lives in Judea and Samaria and knows full well the dangers of the region to behave differently. A responsible person would have investigated the phone call, looking into who owned the phone from which it was made. Such a simple task would have revealed within seconds that there was in fact a kidnapping in progress. A less responsible person could have at least passed the information along to the Shin Bet or the IDF, which are responsible for preventing abductions and should therefore be the ones to decide whether a call was reliable. Two days ago, Israel Police Commissioner Insp. Gen. Yohanan Danino -- himself under attack for waiting too long before returning from New York once he got news of the abduction -- ordered an internal investigation into the chain of events. But meanwhile, another front has cropped up: a recording of the call has leaked, and several media outlets have obtained copies as well as details from the forensic report of the vehicle that was apparently used in the abduction. Some of the details were made public, infuriating the Shin Bet and leading them to seek legal prosecution of said media outlets. But that was just the first stage. The Shin Bet, which maintains that the release of sensitive information has caused substantial damage to their investigation, is expected to investigate not only the outlets that distributed the information, but also the leakers. The rumors On Monday, the following unusual message was aired: "The IDF Spokesperson's Unit wants to clarify that the wave of rumors that has spread in the last few hours regarding the fate of the kidnapped teens is unfounded and irresponsible. The only reliable information is provided by the IDF spokesperson in his own voice. The IDF Spokesperson's Unit calls on the public to act responsibly and refrain from taking part in spreading unfounded rumors." This message, which ran contrary to the fundamental rule of never denying something that was never said, came after a second wave of Whatsapp and Facebook messages described a heroic operation culminating in the rescue of the kidnapped boys and the killing of the kidnappers. This wave followed the first wave of rumors, also spread on social media, that began on Friday when news of the abduction just began being reported. At the height of the rumor fiasco, IDF Spokesperson's Unit notices were forged, as were several Israeli news websites. Many in the defense establishment and the justice system believe that the responsible parties should be apprehended and legally prosecuted, to deter future rumor mongers. Though it is unlikely that anyone will actually be prosecuted, the deluge of information, be it reliable, less reliable or completely unreliable, was poised to drown the Shin Bet, which is obligated to investigate every lead. At the beginning of the search, immense resources were invested in following leads that ended up being completely false. The lesson gleaned from this affair will be a draconian one: More court orders, more gag orders, more censorship. Israel and the Palestinians The abduction of the three boys caught Israel at a time when it was floundering in the international arena. The Palestinian unity government had gained international support, even from the U.S. and the EU, and Israel was pushed into the corner reserved for peace rejectors. Israel's argument that Fatah had struck a union with terrorists fell on deaf international ears. Until the abduction. Despite public rage -- the public demanded revenge; there were even Facebook pages urging Israeli security forces to kill a Palestinian boy every hour until the Israeli boys are released -- and despite some politicians' inciting rhetoric, there were some very interesting cabinet debates. The decisions made at those cabinet meetings were largely aimed at hurting Hamas as much as possible, alongside clear orders to avoid hurting Fatah or the Palestinian Authority. This despite pointing an accusatory finger at the Palestinian Authority for its role in the abduction that took place in its territory and for its partnership with Hamas. The phone conversation between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, in which Abbas condemned the kidnapping, helped divide the Palestinian side. There were calls from within Fatah to dissolve the fledgling unity government if Hamas is proven to be involved in the abduction. It is unlikely that this will actually transpire, but it is safe to assume that the senior Fatah officials are not too upset about the IDF crackdown in the West Bank. The Israeli defense establishment warned this week not to take too much advantage of the situation: If the operation in the West Bank lasts too long, or if it becomes too violent, it could spark a popular protest which will not only face Israeli soldiers with unwanted friction, it could force Abbas switch sides again. That is why several key figures have proposed acting now, with American mediation, to quietly renew peace talks with Abbas. In their view, though it probably won't lead to a historic peace agreement, it would certainly bolster the moderates and weaken the extremists in the Palestinian Authority -- an obvious Israeli interest.
