The logical assessment that is shared by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, most of the ministers in his government, and the experts and technocrats busy in daily diplomatic and political activity, is that the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas will never sign a final-status deal with Israel. This is the bottom line that is clear to most people. Abbas was elected to his post eight years ago. Throughout that time, however, he has failed to win legitimacy from half the Palestinian population. Even those who have supported him in the past -- as well as his opponent, Hamas -- are asking him, "Where's the money-" This question has come to the fore because of the bureaucracy and corruption that has strangled the PA. Abbas has also lost believers in the Israeli political, diplomatic, and military establishments. They hear the arguments that there is a need to quickly proceed toward an agreement since Abbas is preferable to any other option, be it a Hamas member or a Salafist warlord. They hear these arguments, and they reject it out of hand. They believe these claims are not valid since there is no point in making an agreement or handing over territory to someone who is expected to lose it sooner or later to an Iranian-sponsored organization. If anyone out there believes that Abbas is a realistic partner (following in the footsteps of Yasser Arafat), they should listen to former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who came out last week and explained what happened behind closed doors in the negotiating room. In an interview with Channel 2, Olmert said that in the 36 meetings he held with Abbas, everything was agreed The only thing that was missing was a signature. Olmert gave up the Jordan Valley, divided Jerusalem, handed over control of the Temple Mount, returned to the 1967 lines, retreated to the settlement blocs, made territorial swaps, agreed in principle to the right of return, accepted the symbolic resettlement of 5,000 refugees, and invited Abbas to fly with him to the U.N. General Assembly, where they would jointly declare the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. He even held out a pen for Abbas to take so that he could initial the deal. How surprising -- Abbas refused. Today, there is widespread consensus. Since Abbas didn't sign then, he won't sign ever. Even in the current negotiations, Abbas is confirming what everyone already knows, this at a time when he is once again presenting more and more unacceptable demands. The 11 visits that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has paid to the region have not had one iota of an impact on Abbas' obstructionism. The Palestinian Authority chairman is not giving up the right of return for refugees. He refuses to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. He is also not giving up on the partitioning of Jerusalem. On the issue of refugees, Abbas claims that this is an individual right. While he may have given up his right to return to his home in Safed, he does not have the authority to renounce the right of 5 million refugees and their descendants throughout the world to do the same. "This matter will be brought before the Palestinians for a referendum," the Palestinians say. As for Jerusalem, once again Abbas says that he does not have the authority to make concessions, since this is a decision that it is to be made by the Arab League; Jordan, due to its historical ties; Saudi Arabia, due to its status as the custodian of Islamic holy places; and Morocco, by dint of its status as the chairman of the Al-Quds Committee of the Organization of Islamic States. As for security, Abbas wants to place the responsibility for this issue in the hands of the Americans and international forces. In order to continue the dialogue and avoid a complete breakdown which neither side wants, a decision has been made by Netanyahu to allow the talks to continue until the end of this year. As such, Kerry has been hard at work for weeks formulating a draft paper that has yet to be shown to the two sides. The give-and-take over the language of the paper has become an individual negotiation between Kerry and both sides. There's the U.S. and the PA, and the U.S. and Israel. The paper seeks to attain a modest goal -- one where neither side is pleased by it, but where both sides are not completely disappointed by it. On the surface, it appears to be a document with a large number of holes. Its contents will be revealed sometime during March. Clearly, each side will offer its own set of reservations and objections to certain aspects of the paper. Nonetheless, the document will be binding so as to enable the continuation of talks held under the auspices of understandings that are still in effect (like the Palestinian pledge to refrain from unilaterally seeking recognition of a state or initiating anti-Israel measures with international institutions). Before the wording of the American document has been finalized, it is clear to both sides what it will include -- two states along the '67 lines more or less with settlement blocs, a recognition of the changes that have taken place on the ground since the Six-Day War (a statement that will rule out the possibility of an argument over territories near the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway, like Latrun, since it is clear there won't be a return to the '67 lines). The issue of security will be extensively dealt with in the document, including the clause that mandates an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley for a certain period of time without the presence of any foreign forces. The document will also include recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people without a return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. Leaving a legacy The news media constantly talks about the legacies which leaders seek to leave behind once they are out of office. This discussion is brought up when discussing Olmert's "near agreement" or Ariel Sharon's disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu rejects the customary approach of the left and the Israeli media who believe that without an agreement and concessions on his resume, he doesn't have a legacy of which to speak. True, we are only at the end of the first year of Netanyahu's third term as prime minister. Even now, though, one can argue that Netanyahu will be remembered for three things -- being "Mr. Iran," "the lord of the free-market economy," and "the defender and protector of Israel's core strength." Netanyahu insists on recognition of Israel as the Jewish state, and he has managed to enlist support on this matter from U.S. President Barack Obama. The prime minister is charting a new path, staking his territory now as the man who saved the state's Jewish character through deeds. As finance minister, it was Netanyahu who slashed child allowances, a move that has proved to be a key factor in the reduction of birth rates among Israeli Arabs. It was Netanyahu who initiated the construction of the fence along the borders with Egypt, the Golan Heights, and the east in order to prevent infiltrators from Africa from working in Israel. One can say that the fence ringing the country has Netanyahu's name all over it. There is also Netanyahu's statement in the famous Bar-Ilan speech of 2009, in which he declared that a two-state solution was necessary to preserve the Jewish character of the state. All of these decisions attest to a clear line with precisely defined goals guided by a far-reaching, historical vision, an adherence to an objective, and an effective execution. More than anything else, Netanyahu will be remembered for standing up to Iran and instigating the international sanctions regime that led Tehran to blink first in the negotiations with the West. He is now trying to influence the final outcome of the sanctions, which he hopes will be the cessation of all production of centrifuges by the Iranians. Aside from this, the widespread opinion holds that as long as the threat from Iran still exists, the threat against Iran -- from an Israeli attack -- also exists. In 2009, Netanyahu returned to the prime minister's office as the repair man charged with undoing the damage created by two of his predecessors -- Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak -- who set a new standard of Israeli concessions. A few months ago, a senior American official told a Likud minister that in order to comprehend just how major a change Netanyahu initiated, one needs to understand what happened between Netanyahu and Obama during their first meeting in the White House. The president was adamant in insisting that the basis for dialogue would be an Israeli retreat to the 1967 lines, "and not an inch less." There was talk about a complete freeze on settlement construction, including in Jerusalem. There would be no Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, and the talks would delve into the future of Jerusalem as well as recognition in principle of a right of return. As things stand today, the situation is completely different on all fronts. Netanyahu is once again expected to meet with Obama in early March in Washington. The issue that Obama wants most to discuss is an agreement with the Palestinians, while Netanyahu will be more eager to discuss neutralizing the Iranian threat. Ron Dermer, Netanyahu's closest aide and the man who currently occupies the post of Israeli ambassador to Washington, will be by the premier's side. From the outside, Netanyahu's supporters talk about his isolation and the fact that he has no one with whom to consult. Netanyahu, for his part, is making do with what he has, and there have been no leaks whatsoever. Labor is torn The Labor Party's Knesset members met in the parliament this past Monday as they do every week. After the public declarations about the day's major news topics (Hadassah, the haredi enlistment bill), the journalists left the room. That was when the faction members began debating the diplomatic issue. The big question was whether the party should present its own peace plan or simply continue to stand on the side and permit the government to exhaust the negotiating process? MK Omer Bar-Lev prepared a plan, and he wants his party to take a clear stand immediately. The Labor Party's position remains adhering to the Clinton parameters. According to this plan, Jerusalem would be divided. Two faction members from Jerusalem, MKs Hilik Bar and Erel Margalit, oppose dividing the city. Like many residents of the capital, they remember how Palestinian gunmen in Bethlehem fired on homes in Gilo during the second intifada. They know that the proximity of Palestinian areas to Jewish neighborhoods and talk of "Jewish neighborhoods to Israel and Arab neighborhoods to the Palestinians" won't stand the test of reality. The man who will make a final decision on this matter is the party chairman, Isaac Herzog. The Labor boss knows that any decision on the matter could obligate him one way or the other on the question of whether to enter Netanyahu's coalition if major events occur. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman is enjoying his newfound status as the responsible adult and the darling of the Americans. He was in Paris this week, where he met French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius. Lieberman did let us in some inside real estate information, telling us: "I don't know if we're close to a peace agreement, but I'm renovating my house in Nokdim and adding another room." With regards to the negotiations, Lieberman said the Americans and Europeans were busy in trying to persuade the Palestinians to concede, not Israel. "We're doing everything that is in our control," the foreign minister said. "The State of Israel has made every effort and expressed a willingness to go far [in order to achieve peace]. The ball is now in the other side's court. Everyone is aware of this, including the Americans and the Europeans. I hope that they will be able to handle the challenge on the other side." Dagan and Iran In November 2012, Ilana Dayan, the host of Channel 2's Uvda, a television newsmagazine, aired a segment on a secret defense discussion that took place in 2010 following a meeting of the Forum of Seven ministers. According to Dayan, Meir Dagan, who at the time was head of Mossad, and then-IDF chief Gabi Ashkenazi arrived in Jerusalem for a discussion that was supposed to touch on something other than the Iranian threat. The story quoted a number of "sources close to the two men" who said that following the meeting, as they "were about to open the door to leave," Netanyahu blurted out an order that left them stunned. The prime minister ordered them to put the defense establishment on what is known as "Pay Plus" -- code for the military to prepare an attack. Dagan and Ashkenazi thought this was a hasty move. They expressed their opposition. "This isn't something that you do if you are not sure that you want to do it," the chief of staff said. Ashkenazi associates say that he feared placing the army on "Pay Plus" without immediately executing an attack would create "facts on the ground" that could lead to war. "This accordion makes the sound of music when you play with it," he said. According to people who were present at the time, Dagan was even harsher in his opposition. "You all are about to make an illegal decision to embark on war," he told Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak. "Only the cabinet is authorized to make such a decision." "To put it simply, the prime minister and the defense minister tried to steal [authorization for] a war," Dagan would later say. During the program, the people interviewed were careful not to repeat these statements themselves. Instead, it was Dayan who quoted them. This past week, the former head of the Mossad delivered a lecture in Tel Aviv and dispelled all doubts. The man who according to foreign sources headed the best intelligence organization in the world said that he would speak freely since it was a private meeting. Standing in front of an audience of 150 people who in real time posted tweets and photos on Facebook, he explained how he had violated an order given to him by the prime minister and defense minister simply because it did not square with his and the chief of staff's opinion. "The people need to make a decision on the matter," Dagan said even though any rational-thinking person knows this is something that needs to be discussed secretly and confidentially. Dagan added that in the modern era, Israel's technological edge is shrinking since money can buy anything. The most important thing we have to boast of, he said, is the qualitative, human advantage.
