The decision to free Gilad Shalit was made by one man alone - Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, in discussions with his ministers who approved the draft of the agreement, one fact came up again and again in the protocols - the presence of the leaders of the three primary Israeli security agencies helped tilt the vote in favor of the agreement. Mossad chief Tamir Pardo, Israel Security Agency (ISA) chief Yoram Cohen, and Israel Defense Forces Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz all stated in turn that they would take responsibility for the deal and gave it a green light. The military-security chiefs pointed out that in the prolonged situation for which there was no military solution to bring Shalit home, the only option left was to negotiate, and that there was a window of opportunity to close the deal at a "bargain price." They warned that Israel could not afford another failure like the one it experienced with MIA airforce navigator Ron Arad. Get the Israel Hayom newsletter sent to your mailbox! The military-security leaders made no attempt to couch the reality. They said the deal would be a tough one for Israel, due to the release of many heavyweight terrorists. They reminded those present that according to statistics, 60% of terrorists who are released return to terrorism. They pointed out that each year there are between 8 to 12 attempts to abduct soldiers for the purpose of negotiations for the release of prisoners, and that those who are to be released in the Shalit deal promised those left behind in prison that they would do everything they could to free them in the near future. Shin Bet [ISA] chief Yoram Cohen said that his agency would be able to contain the threat posed by the release of the prisoners. Cohen is known as a field commander - someone who knows Hamas well. An ISA official who headed a department in the agency took part in the negotiations alongside chief negotiator David Meidan. During a discussion about the Shalit deal, Mossad chief Tamir Pardo said he supported the deal and that "Israel is a strong and powerful country." He promised that the release of 1,000 Palestinian prisoners would not harm the country. "Israel can contend with different types of challenges, even with a deal that results in the release of a thousand prisoners." Pardo said that a government has an obligation to rescue its soldiers in danger. "I am a commander who sends soldiers on many difficult missions each day. They know the risks involved, but they also know that in a time of need, we will stand by them and help them. It's not just a question of security, but also one of trust and mutual commitment." Defense Minister Ehud Barak and IDF Chief Benny Gantz echoed Pardo's words, and spoke of their conversations with youth before they were drafted into the IDF. The youth, they said, wanted to know that the government would not abandon them if they are captured by the enemy. Netanyahu conveyed a similar message to families of fallen soldiers prior to the prisoner exchange. "It was always clear to me that a government does not abandon its soldiers and citizens," Netanyahu wrote. Minister of Science and Technology Daniel Hershkowitz, [New National Religious Party], admitted recently that the confidence of the military-security leaders is what influenced him to vote in favor of the Shalit agreement. During a government discussion on the deal, Hershkowitz corresponded with Shaleh Shorshan, author and head of a terrorist victim organization, whose husband Doron was killed in a 1992 terrorist attack, but despite pressure by Shorshan, he voted for the deal. "There was no populism or politics during the discussions, only the principle of saving those whom we send to defend us," Hershkowitz said. The icons remained in prison It was important for Netanyahu to emphasize the achievements of the deal. He told his ministers repeatedly that he was given a double legacy - an abducted soldier, and an agreement that was almost complete. According to Netanyahu, a leader must be able to identify an opportunity and take advantage of it. In mid July he discovered such an opportunity, when he noticed a change in Hamas' position. They agreed to Egyptian mediation, instead of the German mediation which up to that point had not yielded any results. Hamas became more flexible apparently due to the Arab Spring uprisings, which lead to the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and may be forcing Hamas out of Damascus. The numbers in the deal are difficult. 280 of the 1,027 released prisoners were responsible for the murders of 599 Israelis. The high number reflects the means of attack used by the "engineers" who perpetrated them - explosive belts and devices. The 1,150 prisoners released in the 1985 Jibril deal, in comparison, were responsible for the murders of 178 Israelis. In any case, behind the numbers lie the names, faces, and families of the victims. There were also promises. There was the case of Sharon Edri, who was abducted and murdered during Netanyahu's previous term as prime minister in 1996. Netanyahu promised the Edri family at that time that their son's killers would never be released from prison. Both Edri's family and the murderers didn't believe that, and this week's reality proved otherwise. According to Netanyahu, the main accomplishment of the Shalit deal was the fact that the major icons of Palestinian terrorism, who carried out horrendous attacks and were hailed as heros among Arabs, remain in jail. Among those who will remain in jail are Ahmed Sa'adat, secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who was behind the murder of minister Rehavam Ze'evi; Abdullah Barghouti who was sentenced in 2004 to 67 consecutive life sentences for masterminding the murders of 66 Israelis; Marwan Barghouti, senior Fatah - Tanzim leader sentenced in 2004 to five consecutive life terms for masterminding terror attacks that killed 5 Israelis and wounded many more; Ibrahim Hamed, a Hamas military commander in the West Bank, who was responsible for the deaths of 90 Israelis; and Abbas Al-Sayid, who planned the Park Hotel bombing in 2002, which resulted in the deaths of 35 Israelis. Netanyahu explained to the ministers that despite the secrecy of the negotiations, the decision-making process was orderly and took into consideration lessons learned from the 1985 Jibril deal, in which 1,150 prisoners were released to Gaza and the West Bank, in return for three abducted soldiers. In the current deal, 110 prisoners returned to Judea and Samaria, of which 56 are members of Hamas. Netanyahu views those released to Gaza, a closed area, and those sent overseas will be neutralized to a greater extent than if they were to stay in Israeli prisons, where they can still issue orders for attacks. "I did not cross red lines," Netanyahu told ministers at the fateful meeting. He said that even though the initial starting point that he inherited was not strong, he made the best of that position. The framework was established beforehand, he explained - 1,000 prisoners were to be released, 450 of which were considered icons. 90% of the deal was the same as the one proposed by the German mediator in the summer of 2010, which he approved, but Hamas rejected. The remaining 10% made the difference, according to Netanyahu. That percentage included the dropping of the Palestinian demand for the release of several "heavyweight" prisoners. In addition, Israel agreed to release several Israeli Arab residents of Jerusalem, and to reduce the number of those who would be sent overseas to 40. Hamas realized there would be no further compromise Netanyahu's explanations did not convince everyone. The main claim of those who opposed the deal, was that it was more or less the same deal proposed by former prime minister Ehud Olmert in March 2009. The heads of the Mossad and ISA at the time opposed the deal. Meir Dagan was quoted this week as saying that the Shalit deal was worse than the deal rejected during Olmert's term. Dagan later denied he meant that, but Olmert himself was said to agree with that assessment. Olmert reportedly said that Netanyahu could have concluded the deal two and a half years ago. Some terrorist "icons" were in fact released in the deal. Amna Muna, responsible for the murder of the young Ofir Nahum, Aziz Salha, the terrorist who raised his blood-filled hands in the air during the 2000 lynching of two IDF reserve soldiers in Ramallah, and the planners of the Dolphinarium, Moment, Sbarro, and Hebrew University cafeteria bombings, were all released from prison. "As a former mayor of Jerusalem, I did not agree to free those prisoners," Olmert said. Senior Kadima party members heaped criticism upon the prime minister for concluding a deal that was the result of public pressure and Dafni Leef's social protests. In March 2009, Olmert announced, "As long as I am prime minister, the government of Israel will not agree to any terms dictated by Hamas during negotiations. Israel submitted gracious proposals to the opposing side, far-reaching proposals that were meant to bring Shalit back home. These proposals were rejected, and we will not submit others to Hamas." In the meantime, the government changed hands, mediators came and went, and the contacts continued, until they reached a dead-end. On July 1, 2010, Netanyahu held a press conference in his office, and delivered a long-winded speech. "The decision to free terrorists is a difficult and complicated decision for the entire government. We are not only talking about saving lives, but also about endangering lives by encouraging more abductions, by more murders at the hands of those who were released, and by the creation of a core terrorist group who will mastermind future attacks against Israeli civilians. That is why the U.S., Britain, and other countries refuse to negotiate with terrorists over the release of hostages," Netanyahu said. Netanyahu told reporters that he agreed to free 1,000 prisoners, but not "heavyweights", and he did not agree with prisoners being released to Judea and Samaria, which would enable them to carry out attacks inside Israel. His speech was given the title "Not at any price." Today Netanyahu believes that due to that speech, and the gradual isolation of Hamas leaders in prison, Hamas realized that he was not about to make any more concessions. Netanyahu and his advisers also believe that the campaign launched by the Shalit family, with the help of lobbyists and public relations firms, raised the price and lowered the chances of Shalit's release. They said that explicitly, and believed that when Hamas was convinced that Netanyahu was no longer influenced by the public campaign to free Shalit, and even opposed it, they caved and decided to conclude the deal. Proof of that can be found in statements by Hamas leaders, who said that pressure by the Israeli media worked in Hamas' favor. Aside from the explanation of removing iconic prisoners from the list, and the release of more prisoners to Gaza than to Judea and Samaria, which Netanyahu mentioned at the last cabinet meeting before the deal was approved, no one was willing to explain in detail which changes actually lead to the conclusion of the deal. Netanyahu and his ministers remained silent until Shalit returned home. Ministers who opposed the deal categorically, such as Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz, voted for it this time. No one was sent to explain their decision, and no one dealt with the question of how a bad deal that so many rejected in the past, suddenly became tolerable. What were the underlying principles of the military-security chiefs' recommendations? From the sidelines, it seemed as if everything was coordinated with the prime minister. Was it a done deal as soon as Netanyahu decided to support it - with everyone towing the line, from President Shimon Peres, to government ministers, and finally, the High Court of Justice- The only person who was in on Netanyahu's secret was Barak. The day the agreement went through began with a phone call from Cairo. David Meidan, the prime minister's point man on the negotiations, informed Nentayahu that the deal was set and was ordered to sign it in principle. Meidan was there with the ISA chief and Military Secretary to the Prime Minister Maj. Gen. Yohanan Locker. Netanyahu then met with the soldier's father Noam Shalit in Jerusalem and spoke with mother Aviva and grandfather Tzvi over the phone. Afterwards Netanyahu notified President Shimon Peres and Foreign Minister and chairman of Yisrael Beitenu Avigdor Lieberman, and later, members of Nentayahu's own Likud party. Three ministers opposed the deal: Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya'alon, Lieberman, and National Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau. All three have stood firm in their beliefs, and they will undoubtedly reap the political benefits for sticking to their guns. Alongside the ideological votes there were more populist ideas. Interior Minister and Shas chairman Eli Yishai called for the release of Jewish prisoners that had attacked Arabs. Transportation and Road Safety Minister Yisrael Katz called for the return of the death penalty for the murderers of the Fogel family in Itamar earlier in the year. Releasing the prisoners is a pat on the back for terrorism, a victory for Hamas, and surrender for Israel, according to Ya'alon. Strategically it harms Israel and is a wrong course of action. The IDF's role is to defend its citizens and not the other way around. There are certain cases in which we should act according to the Talmud's "you cannot redeem a prisoner for more than his worth," Ya'alon argued. Lieberman echoed Ya'alon's sentiments. "Morally I am opposed to the agreement; I am against negotiating with terrorist organizations, which is why I was opposed to previous prisoner exchanges. We need to do everything to release our kidnapped soldiers, but not with hollow deals that only serve to embolden terror and bring about more kidnapping," he said. Landau was even more explicit. "The moral of this deal is that abductions pay and there's a prize for them. This deal strengthens the terrorists' resolve. On a strategic and diplomatic level, everyone sees Israel as a weak nation that capitulated and was humiliated. Israel's security, ability to deter, and justice system which tried and sentenced these murderers to jail were all damaged." There were no discussions held in government over the morality of the decision or its consequences. The prime minister knows it is impossible to ignore the steep price the ministers point to, but has reminded them on multiple occasions that he is not the first prime minister to release terrorists, and with the conditions put before him, he made the best decision he could. Now the stain of Gilad Shalit's captivity can be wiped off the prime minister's table. Israel's cold peace with Egypt thaws Netanyahu spoke of the windows of opportunity that led to the deal's fruition. He cited Egypt's important role in facilitating the deal. Hamas came to the party at the last round of negotiations, officials in Jerusalem said. Hamas' late arrival is tied to their leadership's worry over their safety in Damascus as Assad's regime faces a continuously growing popular revolt. Hamas' leadership deduced that they will have to migrate eventually, and thus looked to Egypt, which since its change in regime, became a key opening. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas leaned on Mubarak to accept hosting the Shalit talks with the German mediator, but preferred that no deal be struck as to avoid strengthening Hamas and their ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak's removal paved the way for making Egypt an unbiased facilitator, willing to pressure both sides equally. Hamas was interested in moving its leadership to Cairo and thus brought a new proposal to the table which in the end formed the agreement. Jerusalem sees its peace with Egypt as a strategic objective of the highest priority. Anarchy in Egypt spells bad news for Israel, and so Israel hopes to improve ties with the current military regime until the installment of a new government. The general's governing body is reliable, one which can be trusted and follows through with agreements. Dialogue between Israel and Egypt generally goes through the Defense Ministry and then straight to the prime minister's office. One outcome of the Shalit deal is warmth in relations between Egypt and Israel. After the deal was struck, Netanyahu called the Chairman of the Supreme Military Council Field Marshall Mohamed Tantawi. A definite improvement, since Tantawi ignored Netanyahu's repeated calls a month earlier when the Israeli Embassy in Cairo was under assault by protesters and its staff nearly lynched. "Egypt has learned from the Embassy events [a month ago]," a senior official said. While the Israeli ambassador has yet to return to Cairo, there has been positive with dialogue with Egypt. The Egyptians want to work with Israel on all levels. Israel sees Egypt as an important part of the Western-American bloc against Iran, alongside Saudi Arabia and Turkey. MK Carmel Shama (Likud) spoke of Netanyahu's three main goals entering office on his Facebook page: "Getting out of the economic crisis, returning Gilad Shalit, and terminating the Iranian nuclear program. We have long been out of economic crisis, and Gilad is coming home alive and well." Now all that remains for Netanyahu is to complete a mission he has spoken about for years, preventing a nuclear Iran.
