The final hours are always the most hectic. The slow, comfortable contacts between rounds bear no significance -- at the end of the day, there is always a lot of work to be done. Both sides feel compelled to try to gain just another tiny advantage. Usually, but not always, once this point is reached -- when the issues at hand boil down to whether the construction in the settlements will be limited publicly, and how much of a settlement freeze is agreed to; as well as whether Palestinian prisoners with blood on their hands will be released from Israel's prisons, and how many -- then a press conference is convened and whoever is serving as the U.S. secretary of state at the time announces that an important breakthrough has been achieved. Each round of talks begins with the semblance of being monumental. Then the talks turn into an agreement (Oslo, Hebron, Wye) or come to a screeching halt (Camp David in 2000). This weekend felt as if the moment of truth was upon us. Over the good will shown by all hung the fundamental assumption, which is still in place, that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas actually wants a crisis to erupt before this coming September, when the U.N. will hold its annual General Assembly. There were also murmurs suggesting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has changed his strategic approach to the conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are currently not at the top of the international diplomatic agenda. The bloodshed in Syria, the turmoil in Egypt, the flames "licking Hassan Nasrallah's robe" and of course the Iranian nuclear endeavor are topping the list at this time. But the U.S. and Europe are truly hoping for some kind of progress, and the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians is the easiest progress to achieve. Are the negotiations conditioned on public Israeli concessions that will spark severe conflict within the coalition? Or perhaps on concealed flexibility that could potentially have affected the internal Likud party elections (held Sunday under a cloud of hostility between the candidates and an overt lack of interest on behalf of the general public and even the party members themselves)? For months, Netanyahu did not give a second thought to the goings on behind the scenes within his party -- until the court ordered him to hold elections for party institutions. He does not have a preferred candidate to head any of the key party organs, except perhaps Likud minister Yisrael Katz, who is running for re-election as the head of the Likud Secretariat. The rest of the ministers did not even submit their candidacies for any of the positions, but they are fighting among themselves with open animosity. That is why Netanyahu does not care who wins. He knows full well that control over the party is the only way to successfully run the coalition. He will soon have to go back to the party headquarters, even if he is less than eager to do so. That is, unless there is truth to the rumor that Netanyahu has decided to really give the peace negotiations a chance and he is taking into account the possibility that he will have to split from Likud, establish a new party, and call early elections. There is no direct link, only an indirect one, between the two arenas: peace talks and Likud party politics. In any case, if the four-way summit that the U.S. is pushing (Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan and the U.S.) actually happens, and representatives with truly good intentions from each camp take part (ones who don't view the summit as merely a political maneuver), this process will be encouraged. It has to be that way, even if it is not too practical.