Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at the U.N. General Assembly last week received reactions from around the world. Both his supporters and detractors, those who praised his use of an illustrative diagram and those who mocked it, did not remain indifferent to his presentation. In this way, the prime minister managed once again to raise the level of awareness of the Iranian threat among the international community, a threat which he believes is the most challenging issue Israel has ever faced. In addition to his genuine concern, during his address to the General Assembly Netanyahu also presented a new criteria for crisis management: drawing clear-cut red lines in a public forum. He did away with closed-door agreements regarding red lines and how they should be defined, and silent understandings of what can and can't be done in important matters. From now on, all the cards are on the public table. Now the question is why we shouldn't draw unequivocal red lines in other areas as well. Why, for example, shouldn't Israel openly declare the point at which it can no longer support an Israeli-Palestinian peace dialogue - the point at which Israel begins to work to end it at any cost? Just as Netanyahu made no mention in his speech at the U.N. of Israel's intentions should Iran cross its red line, there would be no need to state Israel's intentions on the Palestinian issue as well, but why not at least define the red line? After the red line in that issue is crossed, the country's leaders may opt to annex territory, withdraw unilaterally, conduct intensive negotiations or take any other action they choose. As Defense Minister Ehud Barak said last week "If no permanent deal is struck, and if during the course of the negotiations it becomes clear that an interim agreement is also untenable, we will have to consider unilateral action. Such measures would serve as a barrier on this slippery slope that we have been sliding down for years, heading toward the possibility of this country no longer being Jewish or democratic." Doesn't such a strategic threat require Israel to draw an explicit red line- And why should we draw such lines only for international political issues? Wouldn't it be appropriate to define red lines for social justice issues as well? What, for instance, should be our red line for poverty? What should the threshold be for the number of Israelis who are poverty-stricken, which if surpassed would be considered the crossing of a red line? Why shouldn't we define the number of unemployed citizens which if surpassed would signal the breaching of a red line? Why shouldn't we declare the gap between the upper and lower echelons of society, which, if enlarged any further, would be defined as the crossing of a red line? And once again, at first there would be no need to state our intentions if these red lines were to be crossed. As the prime minister said after his address, the fact that the red line is made public suffices to reduce the chances of our having to deal with it in the future. Netanyahu's technique at the U.N. was not as bad as some of his critics claimed it was. An inability to get the world to act through other means caused Netanyahu to attempt this method to bring about the desired result. Perhaps we should use it in other areas as well - especially in areas in which there seems to be an agreement and which are no longer considered just "issues," but matters that threaten Israel's security and social character. Dr. Yuval Benziman is a post-doc visiting professor in the Gildenhorn Institute for Israeli Studies. He teaches in the Tel-Aviv University in the Conflict Resolution and Mediation program. He also works for the Geneva Initiative.