Hamas' crushing defeat
There was a particularly uplifting moment on Sunday. Despite the harrowing tales they told of the protracted fighting against a brutal enemy, despite being covered in dust, Israeli soldiers could be heard lamenting that their mission had been cut short, that they should have been allowed to get the job done.
They saw what death looks like; they lost their brothers in arms; they witnessed ostensibly U.N.-operated schools become Hamas strongholds. Their lamentations echoed what our sages said, that once you begin to perform a mitzvah, you have the duty to see it through.
This sentiment is a positive one. It explains why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's approval ratings, which were 80 percent at the height of the campaign, are now just above 60 percent.
People had high hopes, with expectations that could never materialize. Such is the way of the world.
But the poll numbers don't mean much anyway. Not until the dust settles. In fact, that the public can't make up its mind is hardly surprising. As a veteran journalist pointed out, Professor Benny Morris' book "1948" deals with this phenomenon. According to Morris, then-Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion lamented that the Jewish people suffered from manic depression. Our ecstatic celebration turns into despair on a dime.
The public has no reason to be disappointed. Hamas has been dealt a crushing blow. It now has significantly fewer rockets.
Yes, Israel had intelligence about the tunnels, but Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ya'alon failed to set their destruction as one of the operation's initial objectives. They erred, big time. There are going to be inquiries on this matter, to determine why there was no effective countermeasures and what rationale was used to discount this threat. But there is a course correction already underway. The tunnels are being dealt with, and the vast majority are already in ruins.
Netanyahu has had two highly qualified defense ministers since his return to power, Ehud Barak and Ya'alon. Neither believe the Gaza conundrum can be solved militarily, but they know Israel can inflict significant damage on Hamas. Perhaps, as former GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav Galant claims, Israel could have done more to hurt Hamas. But without a new order taking place through some diplomatic heavy-lifting, the problem will persist. Brute force can help you manage crises, but that's it. That may be a lot, but it is not enough.
When people complained that Operation Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense would only calm things for several years, Barak would retort, "Would that be so bad-" Ya'alon made his views clear in his memoir, "Long Short Road."
Netanyahu knew full well what Ya'alon's worldview was when he tapped him for the job. All three have come to the realization that if Israel was to effectively use its power -- while avoiding legal, diplomatic and PR pitfalls -- it must show restraint and lower expectations.
Those who feel Israel should have done more must compare the gains made to the actual goals that were spelled out at outset of the campaign, not to some fantasy they have in mind. I did that, and I feel no disappointment.
The public has a visceral feeling that there is more to be done, and this must be addressed. Indeed the gains of Operation Protective Edge will lose their potency if Israel dances to the tune of the intra-Arab dialogue taking place in Cairo. It should not cast its lot with those negotiators.
Just as Israel unilaterally redeployed along the Gaza border, it must bring this operation to a reasonable conclusion without waiting for others to decide. Otherwise it runs the risk of getting stuck in the Gaza quicksand.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו