The Islamists wanted too much

Anyone following events in the Arab world may recall what happened in Algeria in 1991 when, the day after Islamists won the parliamentary election, the army stepped in and undercut the democratic process. The rest is history: civil war that lasted just under a decade, in which about 100,000 civilians were killed.

But in Egypt we are expecting a different scenario. The Muslim Brotherhood doesn't need to launch an armed campaign: The Islamists in Egypt currently possess electoral power, efficient organizational ability, the dependency of the depressed population, and, in stark contrast to Algeria, diplomatic ties with key Western countries, including the most important one, the U.S., where President Barack Obama gave up on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 as though he was a used tissue.

In 1991, the world trembled at the thought of Islamists taking over Algeria. Today, the entire world is willing to give fundamentalist Islamists in Egypt a fair chance. It is not just Egypt that has changed — the world has changed too.

The Muslim Brotherhood has hit the jackpot since the Tahrir Square revolution that saw Mubarak ousted. Perhaps that is why it has responded rather sedately to the Egyptian military's power grab on the eve of the presidential election. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has in effect rendered the newly elected president impotent. The Supreme Constitutional Court (whose members were appointed by Mubarak) recently dissolved the (Muslim Brotherhood-dominated) parliament and the army assumed extensive legislative and budgetary authority. A constitutional military coup, if you will.

The Muslim Brotherhood leaders decided, despite the military's actions, to be good boys. They have their reasons. After all, they are the ones who violated their agreement with the army. Following the Tahrir Square revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood struck an extremely unnatural alliance with the army in an effort to steal the revolution away from the youths who demonstrated in the square. A clash between the brotherhood and the army was just a matter of time. The army ushered the brotherhood not only into the protest movement (albeit a little late), but also into the political arena. The brotherhood's part of the deal was to take only a slice of the pie.

But the pie only whetted its appetite. The brotherhood, which initially promised not to run a candidate for president, won a landslide victory in the parliamentary election — it and the Islamist Salafis together gained 70 percent of the parliamentary seats. It also took over the council appointed to draft a new constitution.

It craved the presidency as well, but there was a limit to what the army was willing to agree to.

The Muslim Brotherhood wanted too much, too fast. Eventually it will get everything it desires, only at a slower pace. It, too, has made some mistakes — hence the extremely moderate victory speech made by the Muslim Brotherhood presidential candidate, Mohamed Morsi, who has already crowned himself king. The brotherhood has not yet succeeded in appeasing Egypt's intellectuals, Egyptian women and above all the uptight Copts. It will continue communicating calming messages to everyone until the repeat parliamentary elections.

The Muslim Brotherhood's constitutional takeover of Egypt is just a matter of time. The army does have a lot of power, but the brotherhood has a different kind of power: It has the street and it has Allah. It has been waiting to take over since 1982. It has waited so long — what are a few more months or years? One thing is certain: Things are not going to be calm. Egypt may not be Algeria, but it is also definitely not Switzerland.