There is only one honest criticism one can direct at the speedy unity government deal concocted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Kadima Chairman Shaul Mofaz: that it was insulting. The fact that such a dramatic, revolutionary political maneuver was formulated in secret, without a single leak or suspicion, and that there was not even a hint of a clue of the coming political bombshell, insulted quite a few people. The MKs were insulted that they were kept out of the loop. Yair Lapid (who recently founded a political party), Shelly Yachimovich (Labor party leader, who had an eye on the prime minister's chair) and Naftali Bennett (the former head of the Yesha council of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, who was putting together a party) were insulted that the anticipated early elections had been called off. The country's journalists were insulted that they didn't get the scoop of their careers. All the rest of the criticism about the deal emanated from these insults. A thin line divides a brilliant maneuver and a dirty underhanded trick. The simplest way to differentiate between them is to examine the outcome. The power of a clever political maneuver, as well timed as it may be, is measured by its feasibility. Israel's politicians would be looking back with nostalgia at the brilliant maneuver Shimon Peres concocted in 1990 had it been successful. Instead, Israelis call it the "stinking maneuver" because it failed so miserably. (In 1990, Peres tried to topple Yitzhak's Shamir's government, but when his secret deals fell apart, he was unable to form an alternative coalition and the government stayed under Shamir's leadership.) A dirty trick is a political act that is ultimately detrimental to the public. We have already become accustomed to politicians who put their own interests above those of the public let us not be naive: Mofaz was thinking about his party's inevitable decimation in early September elections when he signed the deal with Netanyahu, and not about military service for all or changing the system of government. The fact is, though, that by signing the deal with Netanyahu, Mofaz operated just as the public would have wanted him to, and he did not harm the public interest. The public did not want early elections, and most people could not understand why they had been called in the first place. The people, at least according to the polls, also didn't want to replace Netanyahu, and he probably would have been sworn in as prime minister in the next government anyway. Kadima's last-minute entry into the coalition achieved both of these things no early elections, and Netanyahu as prime minister for another year and a half. On the opposite end, Shelly Yachimovich, despite her disappointment, can now derive much benefit from her new role as leader of the opposition. She will be conferring with foreign leaders, delivering speeches in international forums and will be flanked by tough security guards. In contrast, one can't shake the feeling that the biggest loser in this political drama is Yair Lapid. He could already smell the Knesset air, he was dreaming of its halls, fantasizing about the plenum and all at once poof, everything was gone. It was no small feat for Lapid to maintain his relevance for the three months he's officially been in politics. In light of the consistent erosion of his popularity, however, the big question on everyone's mind had been what kind of state he would be in when early elections rolled around, four months from now. What shape will he be in when the elections are held a year and a half from now? That is almost not even a question anymore.
A brilliant maneuver or a dirty trick?
מתי טוכפלד
הפרשן הפוליטי של "ישראל היום". התחיל את דרכו העיתונאית ברדיו "קול חי", המקומון "מלאבס" של רשת שוקן וב"מקור ראשון". שימש ככתב פוליטי של "ישראל היום" מהקמתו ועד מינויו לפרשן הפוליטי. במהלך עבודתו הוביל את סיקור התחום הפוליטי בשורה ארוכה של חשיפות וגילויים על המתרחש במסדרונות הכנסת ובמשרדי הממשלה. נשוי לנעמה ואב לחמישה ילדים. מתגורר בירושלים.