The price of peace | היום

The price of peace

The fact that the dispute within the Israeli government regarding the renewal of negotiations with the Palestinians is over the release of convicted terrorists shows that Israel's basic position won out. Ever since Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas scuttled the last round of talks, Ramallah had insisted on three demands -- negotiations must be conducted on the basis of the 1967 borders; negotiations must start from where they left off during the premiership of Ehud Olmert, who offered far-reaching concessions; and Israel must completely halt settlement construction during the course of negotiations.

Now, after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's many visits to the region, none of the Palestinian preconditions remain. Politically, the absence of Palestinian preconditions relieves the pressure that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was expected to face from the right-wing elements within his coalition. Also, Tzipi Livni's decision four months ago to join the coalition in order to promote negotiations has now been completely vindicated.

Opponents and refuseniks can focus, for now, on the release of Palestinian prisoners. The release of these prisoners is painful, unjust and violates basic moral principles. But we're talking about 85 terrorists who have served 20 to 29 years in Israeli jails. They will only be freed, in four stages, if negotiations progress as planned. This will give the Palestinians a reason not to foil negotiations, even if they really want to. One also could go further and say it would be unwise to arrive at a negotiating table across from an opposing party that feels all of its opening demands were rejected.

Ever since Netanyahu, Livni and Yitzhak Molcho convinced Kerry not to support the Palestinian preconditions, the fate of negotiations has been in Kerry's hands. Kerry used a carrot-and-stick approach to drag Abbas back to the table. On one hand, Kerry applied direct American pressure on Abbas. On the other, he promised the Palestinians a benefits package.

Not only does Hamas reject the authority of Abbas to renew negotiations with Israel, but Abbas also faces strong opposition from within his own ranks. Many analysts therefore believe Abbas will quickly find a way to back off from the diplomatic track without the Americans being able to pin him with responsibility for the subsequent renewed stalemate.

In January 2012, Abbas thwarted talks that were being held in Amman and it's reasonable to assume he'll do the same with the upcoming talks in Washington. The Palestinians will bring up the 1967 borders and a settlement construction freeze. Israel demanded that these issues not be preconditions for talks, but there is no avoiding them during negotiations.

It's safe to assume that Israel is interested in making progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, or at least wants to appear to be doing as such. That was Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon's message on Saturday. Thus, if the Palestinians cause another collapse of negotiations, it will be clear to the world that the Palestinians are to blame, like in 2000 (when the Palestinians rejected then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak's peace proposal) and in 2009 (when they ran away from Olmert's proposal). Israel must take steps that will prevent the Palestinians from being able to cast blame in its direction.

At this point, the most important task is to prevent the Palestinians from finding a convenient way to withdraw from negotiations. This will depend on both Kerry's diplomatic skills and how much rope the Israeli government gives Netanyahu and Livni to conduct complex and fluid negotiations.

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