Second Lebanon War: Mistakes, lessons and the next war

The calm on Israel's northern border is no illusion. Ten years after the Second Lebanon War, the border is calmer and more stable than ever. A host of reasons and interests -- strong mutual deterrence, checks and balances, and other wars in the Middle East -- supposedly promise that the calm will persist. In other words: If nothing unusual that neither side desires takes place, and if there is no tragic miscalculation, the calm may stand for years to come.

This quiet is the direct result of the Second Lebanon War. The bitter feelings on both sides of the border following the war, as well as the devastating blows suffered by both Hezbollah and Israel, have generated a disinclination on both sides to start another war. At the same time, they have sent Hezbollah into a flurry of rehabilitation and re-armament in preparation for the next round, which both sides are working closely to prevent.

This calm was hard to envision on Aug. 14, 2006, when a cease-fire took effect after 34 days of fighting. Israel was involved in an orgy of self-flagellation, and Hezbollah with rebuilding the ruins. One sentence by Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah ("If I'd known there was a one in 100 chance that the abduction of the soldiers [Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, who were killed in a Hezbollah ambush] would lead to a war, I wouldn't have done it") might have signified what was to come, but the general atmosphere was miserable and doubtful.

The political and military leaders of the war, primarily then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, then-Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, view the current calm in the north as proof of the war's success, and their own success in leading it. As the ones who drew the most criticism at the time, they believe they have a right to bask in the compliments now that the big picture has become clear.

But that is very short-sighted of them: The Second Lebanon War was a failure in terms of how it was handled, and brought to light serious problems at all levels -- strategic, operative, and tactical. Its leaders suffered from a mix of blindness, arrogance, and a lack of understanding of the forces and their limitations. They entered into a war they didn't want and ended it with insufficient gains. If they had acted differently, the war might have been prevented or shortened, and certainly would have ended more decisively.

At any rate, the resulting calm isn't the only measure of success. The war also made Hezbollah the biggest challenge facing Israel today, bigger than any other enemy around us. A third Lebanon war, if it ever breaks out, will not look like any other war we've known, especially on the homefront. This, too, is one of the "gains" of the war, which means that strong deterrence is in effect, not only against Hezbollah, but also Israel.

Plenty has already been written about the failures of the Second Lebanon War in committees, reports, newspapers, and books. Most of it was written soon after the war ended, and only a small part looked back after some time had passed at what had changed, what we learned, and what conclusions were drawn. This week, Israel is quietly marking the second anniversary of 2014's Operation Protective Edge against Hamas in Gaza. Disturbingly, some of the same issues arose in the two campaigns, eight years apart. These will be detailed in an upcoming report by the state comptroller, due out in a few weeks (although excerpts have already been leaked to the media). Like the 2006 Lebanon war, the Gaza war in 2014 suffered from a shortage of intelligence, incompletely defined missions, an operation without a strategic purpose, and the same systemic problems.

You'd have to be a dyed-in-the-wool optimist to believe that if another war breaks out, things will go differently. Much has changed for the better on the tactical and operational level, but when it comes to strategy, almost nothing has. Cabinet ministers continue to complain about a lack of intelligence, and certainly about incomplete knowledge of the IDF's operational plans -- the same plans they are supposed to approve.

Of course, they're right, although some are complaining just to complain: They don't show up to briefings designed precisely to inform them. The National Security Council is no more helpful today than it was (or wasn't) in 2006, and it only plays a negligible part in the decision-making process. That isn't due only to the fact that the NSC hasn't had a permanent head since Yossi Cohen was appointed head of the Mossad; it's mostly because the dominant entities -- the Defense Ministry, the IDF, the Mossad, and the Shin Bet security agency -- don't really pay much attention to it, just as they ignore the supervisory committees in the Knesset. The result is bad whether we look at the method or the result. The cabinet (or government) is legally responsible, but only on paper. In reality, no one in 2006 expected the ministers to be something they weren't, and no one expects it today. On July 12, 2006, not a single member of the cabinet tried to object to the IDF chief of staff's decision or the reasoning and goals he laid out (with the exception of Shimon Peres, who was quickly shushed), and it's doubtful that any cabinet member would do so today.

This is an unhealthy situation in which roles are reversed and no one takes responsibility. Instead of the government setting clear objectives for the military, from which it derives operational plans, the military works almost in a void. It has no idea what its goals and purpose are. The result is that in the case of Lebanon, Gaza, and every other flare-up, the IDF ends up dictating to the government, which then approves the army's requests, absolving itself of responsibility. Ensuring that the process is upheld is important, and not only because that is the law -- which makes the government responsible for security, and puts it in command of the military (via the defense minister) -- but the discussion itself is supposed to contribute to the result, or at least question the consensus. When things are decided by a threesome that closes ranks -- Olmert/Peretz/Halutz in 2006 and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu/Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon/IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz in 2014 -- there's much more room for mistakes, and when we throw ego into the mix, that risk is even greater.

Ten years ago, Halutz quashed anyone who challenged his decisions. In the case of one major mission, toward the end of the war, an IDF general approached Peretz in the hallway and tried to convince him not to approve the action. Peretz inquired why the general hadn't spoken up in the meeting about it, and the unspoken reply was: "Chief of Staff Halutz."

The situation today is no less disconcerting. While Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot is far more open to different opinions than Halutz was, and encourages officers to disagree with him, over the past two weeks Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman has done two things that should throw up a red flag: He kept the chief of staff and chief of Military Intelligence from attending a cabinet meeting about reconciliation with Turkey, arguing that it was a diplomatic debate; and he instructed IDF officers not to answer questions that Education Minister Naftali Bennett posed in the cabinet.

In the first case, Lieberman was wrong not only because any issue related to the Gaza Strip has clear military ramifications and because the chief of staff is a more important strategic actor than most of the cabinet ministers, but also because the IDF and Military Intelligence chiefs think differently than he does, and he has an obligation to ensure that all opinions are heard, even if he is the one who makes the final decision for the defense establishment. In the second case, Lieberman was also wrong, even though according to some who were present in the discussion, Bennett went too far both in terms of how he phrased his questions and how he presented them.

Nevertheless, cabinet members are elected officials and defense officials are public servants who have an obligation to report and provide answers when they are asked to. Lieberman should be extra careful, not only because of his massive responsibility as defense minister, but mainly because of his inexperience. In 2006, the combination of inexperienced prime and defense ministers and an IDF chief unfamiliar with the army he was leading [Halutz was from the air force], led to bad decisions being made. Netanyahu and Eizenkot are more experienced than Olmert and Halutz were, but not proof against making mistakes. Given the lessons of the past, it's vital that they, too, stick to an orderly discussion and decision-making process.

Only the soldiers excelled

Israel's main enemy in 2006 wasn't Hezbollah, it was Israel itself. A series of concerns and old ghosts, combined with certain people's characters, systemic defects, and faulty decision-making processes led to the war ending on a sour note. The fury over the abduction of Regev and Goldwasser (two and a half weeks after Gilad Schalit was abducted in Gaza), along with matters of personal and national honor, threw the system out of balance and bogged the country down in an extensive war instead of what could have been a short, focused operation of three or four days.

Things went on as they began. The lack of faith in the abilities of the ground forces, the fear of casualties, the prospect of once again getting bogged down in the infamous mud of Lebanon, and the attempts to rack up an achievement at almost any price toward the end of the war dovetailed with a failure to make decisions to call up reserves and declare a special situation on the homefront. The failures were present on almost every level, with the exception of the actual soldiers in the field. A committee that investigated the troops' functioning and motivation determined, unsurprisingly, that they had acted properly, with devotion and courage that matched those of previous wars.

The problem was with the orders the soldiers were given, the methods, the intelligence, and particularly in comprehension of the situation. The IDF came to the Second Lebanon War after long years of combating terrorism in Judea and Samaria. It paid a heavy price, without realizing it: Units hadn't drilled for years, and when they had, the drills were focused on anti-terrorism tactics. Stocks and ammunition had been cannibalized for the sake of ongoing operations. Some of the emergency warehouses were empty. Worst of all, the picture of the situation was completely distorted and relayed incorrectly to the soldiers in the field.

There is a huge difference between a limited operation and a war. In Judea and Samaria, even at the peak of the suicide bombings and Operation Defensive Shield last decade, the dynamic was different. There is time, troops can close in on a house, collect intelligence, operate heavy equipment, command the forces from afar and prevent as many casualties as possible. No such luxury exists in a war, when everything is here and now. The Prussian general and military theorist Claude von Clausewitz called war a kingdom of uncertainty, and that holds for Lebanon, too. Time and intelligence are vital resources, but not to the extent that they should prevent execution. In the Second Lebanon War, the IDF dawdled for long weeks on pointless, useless operations, sometimes a few hundred meters from the border. Instead of making decisions, taking action, and rushing to complete the mission, the IDF hesitated, changed plans and direction, and underperformed. In 2006, the IDF did not have a clearly defined mission, and when it did, it changed so often that both the people who decided on it and the people who were supposed to carry it out nearly always failed.

A major lesson of all this is that the IDF has to come to a war, any war, with complete, approved operational plans that both the command and the operational levels are familiar with and know how to put into action. The Second Lebanon War caught the IDF without a definite plan, which led to confusion at all levels. If we add the faulty preparedness of some of the units and a lack of fitness for war, we get an unsatisfactory result.

After the war, the IDF changed its tune. Halutz deserves the initial credit. Before he resigned, he led a thorough investigation process and laid the foundation for changes that his successors pursued. Today, the IDF takes care to be prepared on all levels: from the emergency call-up system down to the troops in the field. Units drill according to a graph to keep up basic fitness for a full-scale war. The realization that fighting terrorism does not prepare troops for war has been upgraded given the insight that war training does, however, contribute to anti-terrorism ability.

In addition, stringent regulations have been put in place regarding stocks of emergency supplies and ammunition. Units, including reserves units, are supplied with appropriate equipment, and the deployments vital to the success of the war, especially the Air Force and intelligence, are kept at a high state of readiness. In the Second Lebanon War, the IDF had decent intelligence about Hezbollah that wasn't delivered to the forces in the field on time, and too few targets were taken down in strikes. The result was that when these 200 or so targets were attacks, the efficiency of the IAF dropped dramatically.

As a result, the IAF and Military Intelligence changed their tactics. Even if we take some senior IDF officials' declaration that "no commander in the world today has the same amount of intelligence that we have on Hezbollah," as an exaggeration designed to exert psychological pressure on the other side, we still have a lot more targets, a lot more intelligence, and mainly a much more efficient way of operating our air forces which should -- assuming they are put to wise use -- give us much better results in the next war.

The enemy is deterred, but stronger

Israel's perception of defense, as it was designed in the 1950s by David Ben-Gurion, could be summed up in three buzzwords: deterrence, alert, and defeat. The first two are certainly relevant today, but we can debate the relevance of "defeat" in modern wars. In Defensive Shield in 2002, Israel might have defeated Palestinian terrorism in Judea and Samaria, but in the Second Lebanon War and the three most recent operations in Gaza (Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge), the enemy wasn't defeated, and even grew stronger as a result. The IDF believes that defeat is possible, but makes it clear that it won't come in the form of white flags and a full occupation of the territory, but rather in striking the enemy's main strong points and its ability to operate.

With or without defeat, Israel's current perception of security includes a fourth element: defense. In the Second Lebanon War, 4,500 missiles (rockets and mortars) were fired at Israel, more than in all the previous Israeli wars combined. Since then, the missile threat has increased significantly, in Gaza and especially in Lebanon. With over 100,000 rockets and missiles, and a plan to fire 1,500 a day at Israel on average, Hezbollah comprises an unprecedented threat to the Israeli homefront, and not only in terms of the numbers. The organization has arms that can reach any point in Israel, and precision rockets with heavy explosives that are designed to hit strategic targets and cause severe damage.

A few weeks ago, the cabinet approved a homefront scenario that addressed these three threats: number, size, and accuracy. According to the scenario, a war with Hezbollah that lasts 28 days would see hundreds of Israeli civilian deaths, thousands of wounded, and tens of thousands evacuated from their homes.

Even if this is the most extreme potential for danger, there is no doubt that the homefront will be no less important than the battlefront in the next war. The expectation that the defense systems (Iron Dome and soon David's Sling, which were developed after the war on Peretz's order) will provide a solution for the country's entire population isn't realistic. Many areas won't be covered, and in some, particularly in the north -- including Haifa -- the sheer number of rockets fired won't allow for them all to be intercepted. This means that civilians will have to go on high-alert protocol, especially if the working assumption that vital systems such as electricity and cellular communications, which Hezbollah will try to strike, will be out of commission for extended periods.

That will be coupled with another key issue, which arose only peripherally in the last war in Gaza: evacuating civilians. In recent years, Hezbollah has been training special forces designed to penetrate Israel and take over communities or outposts to make Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah appear to live up to his promise to "liberate the Galilee."

With over 20 communities adjacent to the northern border fence and thick foliage that makes tunnels unnecessary, most of those communities are slated to be emptied of their residents either voluntarily or under military orders to reduce the need for the IDF to expend resources defending them and allow the military to focus on attacking inside Lebanon. The evacuations would demand a high level of discipline and complicated logistics: sending thousands of civilians under fire south on crowded roads that are also serving to carry military vehicles north, and finding temporary accommodation for them.

The reality in communities that aren't evacuated will be no less complicated. In 2006, some local authorities in effect collapsed. Some mayors fled with their staff and left the residents to fend for themselves. Since then, all the local authorities and their heads have undergone countless briefings and drills in preparation for emergencies, which could also come in the form of earthquakes or fires. The broad understanding is that the local authorities best understand their civilian residents' needs and should be the ones to provide solutions for a host of problems, from keeping factories open to repairing damaged buildings, and mainly in understanding that a strong, steadfast home front is critical to the success of a war. This will require the government to make clear, implementable decisions quickly. How can it do so against a background of media and public hysteria, social media insanity, and rumors? It must practice ahead of time and stick to the plans it has prepared.

The need to keep the war short

What was understood but not acted upon both in 2006 and in Protective Edge was the need to keep the war short. In the next war in the north, under the threat of rockets, incursions into civilian communities, anti-aircraft missiles and drones , some of which can be used to attack Israel, the longer the war lasts, the most lives will be lost on the home front, and the fighting front will see less success. This means that decisions about reserves call-ups, opening shelters, and launching an offensive in enemy territory will need to be made immediately.

The IDF has made many changes to meet that challenge. The many actions attributed to the IDF that the military carries out as part of its "intra-war activity" intended to negate Hezbollah's operational ability are also helping to keep the next war at bay.

Still, the IDF's main challenge will be in southern Lebanon, in the 240 Shiite villages that were built as fortified fighting zones. Each one contains rockets, anti-aircraft missiles, command centers, intelligence bases, and more. Early airstrikes on them would mean tens of thousands of Lebanese casualties, a humanitarian disaster, and international condemnation of Israel, but refraining from doing so in an attempt to move the Lebanese northward out of harm's way would mean a hail of fire on the Israeli home front and heavy casualties on our side.

The solution is rapid, targeted actions by ground forces designed to attacks Hezbollah's strong points, even at the price of thousands of Lebanese dead. Israel has already warned foreign governments that this will be the inevitable result of Hezbollah entrenching itself among a million and a half civilians. There would be simultaneous strikes in Beirut and the rest of Lebanon's cities, where Hezbollah has also laid out war rooms and weapons. It's likely that Israel will try to avoid damaging Lebanese infrastructure, not only to reduce harm to innocent civilians but also to use the Lebanese government and population as leverage against Hezbollah, who would be bringing disaster down upon them.

This potential for destruction is the main reason for the almost total restraint Hezbollah has demonstrated in the past decade. The balance of power is clear to Nasrallah, who is not convinced that Lebanon would automatically side with him in the next round. His situation is already complicated. He is up to his ears in the civil war in Syria (which has left 1,600 Hezbollah fighters dead and another 6,000 wounded); in financial trouble (due to the Syrian war, and a drop in aid from Iran to about $700 million per year); is seen as the main figure responsible for the political crisis in Lebanon (no president has been elected in over two years); and is mired in the heart of the Sunni-Shiite conflict, which has dragged Hezbollah into military involvement in Iraq and Yemen and led to terrorist attacks against the group in Lebanon.

However, Israel remains Hezbollah's main target and threat. Currently, Nasrallah has no reason to initiate another war, but he continues to prepare for one diligently. Hezbollah might be refraining from a war, but it has drawn clear red lines for Israel when it comes to strikes in Lebanese territory or assassinating Hezbollah figures.

Hezbollah on the offense

It's hard to overstate the challenge Hezbollah poses for Israel. It has transformed from a guerilla organization into a quasi-army that has gained experience using artillery and tanks in Syria and that also employs cyber warfare and possesses advanced weaponry and control systems. The group whose identity was "the defender of Lebanon" has now gone on the offensive. Once centered in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is now deployed throughout the country and can operate from Syria, too.

All this complexity must not frighten Israel. One of the main lessons of 2006 was knowing the threat, understanding it and maximizing our military, civilian, and political ability to confront it. Intelligence plays a central role, as does studying the other side's capabilities, and mostly analyzing its intentions and preventing an unwanted war.

As of today, another war in the north looks far off. Hezbollah is busy with its own affairs, but a key condition to continued quiet is Hezbollah understanding that Israel is not afraid to fight a war. That is why the IDF is careful to preserve Israeli sovereignty over every foot of the north, unlike the situation that preceded the Second Lebanon War, and makes it clear at every opportunity the price Hezbollah and Lebanon will pay for escalation.

In many aspects, the IDF is prepared for the challenge in the north much better than it was a decade ago. The main elements -- operational plans, training, supplies, intelligence, and mainly the awareness that war could break out and wreak a heavy price -- are where they should be, and should guarantee a much better result than the one achieved in the Second Lebanon War.

Still, Israel is facing a very complicated challenge, not only because of Hezbollah's capabilities and the potential scope of damage to the homefront. The problems in the decision-making process at the upper political echelon and between the government and the military that led to the unsatisfactory result of the 2006 war have not improved significantly, and could cast a shadow over what needs to be done in a third Lebanon war.

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