Some 40 years ago Israel launched a daring hostage rescue mission in Entebbe, Uganda freeing more than 100 people from the hands of terrorists in Operation Thunderbolt. But in the months leading up to the 40th anniversary this week, some have tried to tarnish the main architect behind the raid, Yonatan (Yoni) Netanyahu, who, as the commander of the elite Sayeret Matkal commando unit, led the main assault force. Netanyahu was killed minutes after storming the terminal where the hostages were held, and later the operation was renamed Operation Yonatan in his memory. This conveniently timed smear campaign begun with a few articles in Haaretz, written by Amir Oren and Uri Misgav, who questioned Netanyahu's conduct in the raid. It then continued with lamentations about how Netanyahu's family has supposedly tried to create a myth surrounding Yoni. But it reached its peak this week, in the satirical sketch that was critical of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 5-day trip to Africa. After the sketch, one could hear the song "The Lion Sleeps Tonight" where the repeated "wimoweh" refrain was substituted with the Hebrew for "because Yoni died," and, referencing Sunday's ceremony in Entebbe marking the 40th anniversary of the operation, the words were changed to "a moronic ceremony ... 28 million shekels were wasted on an embarrassing ceremony." But despite this orchestrated campaign to discredit Netanyahu, the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), has recently published a new book on the raid titled "Operation Yonatan in the First-Person Narrative," where 34 Sayeret Matkal commandos tell for the first time how the operation unfolded from their perspective. The book puts to rest the decades-old dispute between Netanyahu's deputy at the time, Muki Betser, and the Netanyahu family. The dispute centers on several questions, including who planned the operation, was it necessary to fire on an Ugandan sentry before storming the terminal (which some say led to the loss of the element of surprise), why did Betser stop just before entering the terminal and more. The Haaretz-led campaign is designed to second-guess Netanyahu's conduct and to belittle his operational role. The campaign has also become a weapon against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Even Dr. Ronen Bergman, from Yedioth Ahronoth, has weighed in, defending Yoni's role. "Some journalists who would like to hurt Yoni's brother, Benjamin, have seized on the dispute [and the articles on it]," he writes. Bergman then adds, "But the truth of the matter is that Sayeret Matkal commandos, even those who are opposed to [Benjamin] Netanyahu and his way, have praised Yoni's conduct [in the operation]; this is just a historical fact." Right from the first few pages of the book, the question of who planned the operation is resolved. "On Thursday [two days before the operation] Yoni interrupted his activities on the Egyptian border and returned [to the Sayeret Matkal base]. He received the Sayeret Matkal mission's orders from the commander of the operation, Dan Shomron, who was also the IDF chief infantry officer, and went ahead to plan the takeover of the terminal with his subordinates." The book includes testimony from the unit's intelligence officer at the time, who said: "Dan Shomron assigned the unit with the task of taking over the old terminal and releasing the hostages. Muki occasionally updated the wider forum [of the some 200 people who took part in the operation], but Yoni remained holed up in his room so he could plan the raid with meticulous detail. This meticulousness was very much part of his character." The book also includes Betser's testimony, which stands in stark contrast to the other commandos interviewed for the book. One key sticking points is the IDF debriefing of the mission. Betser says that the debriefing confirms his version of events, but others say that Yoni's death has resulted in a slanted perspective. In the book's introduction, the commandos write: "We have no doubt that Yoni would have conducted a thorough operational debriefing within the unit, and he would have made sure that everyone [who took part in the operation] would have been heard. This is how you conduct a debriefing in the unit." They further note that "63 participants have yet to express their views on how things unfolded." One of the most controversial parts of the operation has to do with the delay in entering the terminal. According to Amir Ofer, who was among the first to storm the terminal, "Muki stopped, which put Amnon [who was in charge of one of the squads], myself and the hostages in grave danger. When he was asked why he stopped he said, 'My AK-47 jammed.' Then, after we landed in Israel, he changed his story, saying that he had to replace his magazine, even though he had yet to face a target that required its emptying. It is just mind-boggling that such an experienced officer failed to keep the necessary amount of bullets for that moment, where he is about to storm the terminal." Another bone of contention is Yoni's decision to fire on a sentry guarding the terminal. The general consensus among the commandos interviewed for the book was that Netanyahu acted properly. "Netanyahu led the assault team toward the terminal and decided to eliminate the guards that stood in our way, and most of us believe he did the right thing," they write. "Yoni led the force and gave the orders to charge; he told us to hurry when he saw us stalling, and he probably saw some of the commandos entering the terminal before he was shot." Alex Davidi, a staff sergeant at the time, validates this claim and assigns direct blame on Betser, whom he calls "the person who has for the past 40 years tried to adapt history to his own personal narrative, which has him at the center of events and a major factor in the operation's success, all the while ignoring the basic facts that are obvious to the overwhelming majority of the commandos who took part in the raid. Right after the operation, and in the years since, new so-called 'fathers' have emerged to take credit for the ideas leading up to the operation, the plans that were hatched and the conduct of the troops. But for me and my friends, there is only one real father to this operation, Yoni Netanyahu, who is unfortunately not here to fight for the proper recognition he deserves for this operation." In response to these claims, Betser issued the following statement: "The operation has become the stuff of legend over the past 40 years, and it has come to represent Zionist values. People in Israel and outside of Israel have waxed lyrical with nostalgia, but I would like to focus on the operation itself -- the planning, the decision-making by the political echelons and its execution by many troops, including the pilots who took us there, the soldiers from Golani and Paratroopers brigades, our unit [Sayeret Matkal] and the Mossad." Dr. Ido Netanyahu, Yoni's youngest brother, reacted to the Channel 10 sketch on Thursday saying: "They can do as they please; if they want to believe that [Benjamin] Netanyahu was elected prime minister 40 years after the operation just because he was Yoni's brother, by all means, let them believe this."
