A public relations failure
The state comptroller's draft report, reviewing the government's decision-making process during Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip in 2014, is hardly a reason for the war of words that has erupted between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yosef Shapira. The animosity between the two seems rooted in other issues, but the recent strife reflects the political sensitivities attributed to the 50-day military campaign that neither Israel nor Hamas wanted in the first place.
The draft is hardly as severe as the media painted it out to be. In includes worthy insights and appropriate criticism, alongside substantial inaccuracies. The threat of Hamas tunnels has been fueling political fervor since 2014, and the comptroller's draft added fuel to the fire.
Yisrael Beytenu head Avigdor Lieberman claims he did not have sufficient information on the tunnel threat, and he has blamed Netanyahu, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon and former IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz for that. But if Lieberman truly had no understanding of the gravity of this threat, than it seems he either failed to attend all the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet meetings, left them in the middle, or failed to read the briefs the Government Secretariat prepared for cabinet members.
Some cabinet ministers opted to become well-versed in the issue. Lieberman, and at times Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett, opted to sling mud. This is why the accusations that cabinet members were excluded from the decision-making-process cannot hold water.
The cabinet made strategic decisions, including entrusting Netanyahu, Ya'alon, and Gantz with leading the operation. The ministers were briefed on any change on the ground, as they were this week, when the cabinet convened for a security briefing following Hamas fire on Israel.
The government handled Operation Protective Edge appropriately, but its moves were plagued by a public relations failure, as the public remained unaware of the reasons for much of the operational moves, which were not aimed at a decisive victory over Hamas, but rather sought to carve out a cease-fire agreement that would last as long as possible.
The gist of the report offers the best response to the claims it details: Israel has no interest in seizing control of the Gaza Strip. Such a move would constitute a pyrrhic victory that could only diminish the public's sense of security, increase the number of casualties, and undermine Israel on the global stage.
Military campaigns the likes of Operation Protective Edge have a rather dry objective -- to generate deterrence and prolong the lulls achieved opposite Hamas. Anyone promising the additional achievements that do not include retaking Gaza is using demagoguery to mislead the public.
As Operation Protective Edge outline limited objectives, favoring aerial and naval strikes over an extensive ground incursion was the proper course of action. The number of bereaved families, whose pain is felt by all of us, would have been much higher had the more aggressive policies suggested by Lieberman and Bennett been employed.
Moreover, Israel had to secure the diplomatic support of the United States and Egypt. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had unfortunately intervened in the cease-fire talks in a way that made Gaza's rulers believe the Turkish initiative was better that the tried and true Egyptian mediation. Nevertheless, biding time for 50 days, with IDF troops deployed on the ground, was worthwhile if it meant Israel did not snub its friends just so it could pursue policy that would see it bang its head against the wall.
Hamas, for its part, is interested in maintaining the calm achieved following Operation Protective Edge. The flare-up seen last week can be attributed to the fact that the military is pursuing massive counter-tunnel efforts. Last week's events do not signal the end of the cease-fire brokered with Hamas in 2014. If anything, the lull may stretch even further.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו