If we're honest about the Iranian nuclear issue, we'll inevitably arrive at the following conclusions: First, that the diplomatic process led by the United States has failed, as expected. Secondly, the economic sanctions imposed on Iran may be hurting them, but not enough to dissuade them from pursuing their nuclear ambitions. Thirdly, the U.S. and Iran have reached an equilibrium neither country wants a confrontation, and therefore they will cooperate with one another in postponing dramatic events. As long as Iran advances its nuclear program in measured steps that aren't too brazen, the U.S. will accept this progress. Lastly, almost all of the red lines that Israel and the U.S. have drawn in recent years have now been crossed. Iran is enriching enormous quantities of uranium unhindered. It is capable of enriching to weapons grade levels, if it only decides to do so. In actuality, the recent flurry of American activity the succession of official visits to Israel, meetings with Iran, fresh sanctions and the deployment of additional forces in the Persian Gulf weren't intended to sway Iran, but rather to influence Israel. The U.S. is trying to prevent an Israeli strike before the presidential elections in November by saying to Israel "wait two weeks, and then wait another two weeks." At any given time the Americans are pointing to some specific date, anywhere from one week to a month down the road, on which they claim something significant is supposed to occur, thereby eroding Israel's timetable for an attack in the hopes that Israel's plans will fade away altogether. This approach, however, is unacceptable. The passage of time allows Iran to advance its nuclear program, and it is approaching the point where the distribution and fortification of its nuclear installations will make an attack unfeasible. A few months later Iran will have achieved credible nuclear ambiguity and will have become a de-facto nuclear power. In addition, there is no guarantee that things will change after November. If U.S. President Barack Obama wins another term, no one knows what his policy will be. If he loses the elections then the new president will only enter office in January 2013. The new president will likely want to study the issue and exhaust other options, and it is very unlikely that a new president will launch his term with a war in Iran. Therefore Israel has two simple and inevitable options: Either attack immediately or come to terms with a nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's strategy is based, apparently, on one of two alternatives: attacking Iran or creating a credible threat of attacking Iran. The second option can't be sustained forever. A policy of "hold me back before I do something" loses its credibility if it drags on past a limited time frame. Furthermore, an attack, or the threat of an attack, is not something that can be isolated and separated from other practical measures a large number of systems must act in synchronicity. We must assume that an attack on Iran means a war with Hezbollah, which may spill over into conflicts in other arenas. Therefore, the Israel Defense Forces' reserve divisions must be trained and military warehouses must be replenished; the economy must be prepared for an emergency (enough gasoline and the like needs to be ready); a wartime coalition must be preserved within the public sphere, meaning that the government must seek to appease the reservists instead of the ultra-Orthodox sector; the White House, which will have a crucial role to play in any diplomatic agreements following hostilities must be brought into the loop, therefore Israel must make gestures of good will (like apologizing to the Turks, for example, even if it's not justified); Israel must initiate diplomatic efforts on the Palestinian front, even if we know they won't bear any fruit, and Palestinian prisoners must be released from Israeli prisons, even if we know we will be forced to detain them again. Not synchronizing all the systems required for an attack leaves Israel with two unappealing alternatives: The threat of an attack will be perceived as non-credible, or that an attack will take place but will lack the required multi-faceted planning that it requires.