Since the Egyptian revolution of 1952, when a group of military officers led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a coup that toppled King Farouk, the army has been the main governing authority in Egypt. It is stable and reliable, and its status did not erode even after enduring upheavals in the Sinai campaign of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967 and following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. However, the army reacted belatedly and hesitantly to two events in 2011, possibly inflicting irreversible damage to its position. Early this year, the Egyptian army stood on the sidelines and watched as a storm erupted in Tahrir Square. It should have led and acted decisively, whether it chose to support the protest and oust Hosni Mubarak or not. The army was insipid and passive, and the outcome of its inaction could be seen as recently as Sunday. Get the Israel Hayom newsletter sent to your mailbox! Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, was forced to warn protesters that he would not allow them to harm the army. Tantawi told them he would transfer power to civilian rule, but not now, not before parliamentary elections get underway and the identity of the country's new president is determined. This is an expression of weakness, of composure regained too late, of unclear national leadership. The Egyptian army remains strong and can still retake the reins of power. Yet there is little chance it will be afforded special constitutional status similar to that of the Turkish army during Ataturk's time which ended when the Islamic party rose to power in Ankara. But even without special constitutional status, the army is a powerful body that is supported by important groups and benefits from huge budgets, modern American arms and lavish pension plans for those in uniform. Shimon Peres once said that the Turkish army actually protects democracy in that country contrary to the conventional wisdom of political science. That is not exactly true, but not entirely far-fetched either. A similar situation could develop in Egypt. Will the Muslim Brotherhood act moderately or aggressively? A great deal depends on the results of parliamentary elections that get underway Monday, and it is unclear whether the vote will reflect the public's will or distort it after the polls close. It also depends on how determined military officials are to clinging to power despite their internal disputes. Tantawi does not appear to be the natural successor to Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. Yet no other officer has emerged to fill that role, which the army so desperately needs.